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The mechanism of law—what courts are to deal with which causes and subject to 
what conditions—cannot be dissociated from the ends that law subserves.  So-
called jurisdictional questions treated in isolation from the purposes of the legal 
system to which they relate become barren pedantry.  After all, procedure is instru-
† © Stephen B. Burbank 2008. 
†† David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School.  I have presented various drafts of this work and received helpful 
comments at the Western State University College of Law Symposium on State Civil 
Procedure, the University of Minnesota Law School, the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School faculty retreat, the Duke University School of Law, and the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review’s 2007–2008 Symposium.  In addition, Kevin Clermont, Frank 
Goodman, Jim Pfander, Ed Purcell, David Shapiro, Cathie Struve, Steve Subrin, and 
Tobias Wolff provided extremely useful comments on various drafts.  Michael 
O’Connor, University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 2009, provided excellent re-
search assistance.  Michael Eisenkraft, Harvard Law School Class of 2004, and Polly 
Graham, Harvard Law School Class of 2008, both provided helpful contributions to the 
underlying research. 
1440 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 1439
mental; it is the means of effectuating policy.  Particularly true is this of the fed-
eral courts. 
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis
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INTRODUCTION
Jurisdictional legislation, like the law of procedure with which it 
tends to be grouped, can become disembodied from the political and 
social contexts in which it was enacted, the political and social con-
texts in which it functions, and the historical and institutional circum-
stances that affect—if not determine—its significance.  Scholars who 
are preoccupied with doctrine, and courts that must try to make sense 
of jurisdictional legislation and precedent interpreting it, may be con-
tent (or constrained) simply to grapple with the technical details.  
Those who seek to understand law’s significance, however, require 
1 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (1927).
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perspectives in addition to the internal logic of technical reasoning.  
Particularly when the law in question is labeled “procedure,” they 
must resist the temptation to accept a doctrinal question at face value 
(that is, to regard doctrine as an end in itself), to view such a question 
apart from the litigation dynamics that it engenders, and otherwise to 
ignore issues of power that may be at stake in its resolution. 
Some of the political and social implications of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)2 are hard to miss.  That statute, after all, 
resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by 
interest groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), parti-
san wrangling, and, following two successful filibusters, fragile com-
promises.3  Not only does CAFA mark a sharp break from a nearly uni-
form history of congressional contraction of diversity jurisdiction.4
The scope of putative class actions that, at the end of the day, the stat-
ute brings within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is very broad.  Those facts—coupled with the legislation’s place in a 
trio of “tort reform” measures sought by the Bush administration, and 
with unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
in particular—help to understand why some critics regard the com-
promises as insufficient and the ultimate legislation as inimical to the 
interests of numerous groups of potential litigants.5
2 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
3 See, e.g., “Tort Reform” Bill Dies in the Senate, in 59 CQ ALMANAC PLUS 13-10 (2003); 
Seth Stern, Fearing Spate of Amendments, Frist Pulls Class Action Bill After Senate Cloture Vote 
Fails, 62 CQ WKLY. 1691 (2004) (describing the Senate’s failure to pass a previous version 
of CAFA in 2004); Seth Stern, Republicans Win on Class Action, 63 CQ WKLY. 460 (2005) 
(calling CAFA’s enactment “the capstone of a six-year slog through Congress”). 
4 See Brett Curry, Institutions, Interests, and Judicial Outcomes:  The Politics of Federal 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 60 POL. RES. Q. 454, 456-58, 464 app. A (2007).  For much more 
modest departures from that history of contraction that may have influenced the de-
liberations concerning CAFA, see the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropria-
tions Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1), 116 Stat. 1758, 1826-27 
(2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 2005)), which provides for federal juris-
diction in cases arising from certain accidents in which at least seventy-five people have 
died; the Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, § 15(c), 113 Stat. 185, 201-02 (1999) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 6614 (2000)), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over Y2K-
related class actions; and infra text accompanying notes 293-297. 
5 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective:  The Old and 
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823; Stephen Labaton, Senate 
Approves Measure To Curb Big Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1 (“Republi-
cans say they hope the vote will provide momentum for two other major bills overhaul-
ing the tort law system, one on asbestos litigation, the other on curbs on medical mal-
practice lawsuits.”). 
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How, one might wonder (particularly after reading supporters’ 
protestations to the contrary), could a statute that purportedly does 
not change the state substantive law usually applicable in federal di-
versity litigation be considered “tort reform”?6  The answer is simple.  
Members of Congress now realize what most informed observers have 
long realized, to wit, that procedure is power.7  More specifically, all 
informed observers of the litigation process now understand that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and state class action rules, although 
regulating the process of litigation, can still have major substantive 
impact.8  Even if such rules do not change the substantive law directly, 
they can change the practical enforcement of substantive rights, 
whether by enabling plaintiffs to sue who would not otherwise be able 
to do so, or by exerting irresistible pressure on defendants to settle 
cases that they regard as lacking in merit. 
It has also long been clear that plaintiffs’ lawyers react to changes 
that make litigation more difficult in one court system by moving their 
cases to other court systems, while defense counsel seek forum advan-
tages for their clients by using the tools available to them to affect the 
site of litigation.  Forum shopping is not necessarily, indeed not usu-
ally, a ground for criticism of lawyers or their clients, as the existence 
and historic rationale of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts suggest.9  Moreover, a price of federalism is that people 
6 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 56 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 53 (“S. 
5 is court reform—not tort reform.”).  But see “Tort Reform” Bill Dies in the Senate, supra
note 3. 
7 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1703 (2004). 
8 “[T]his Court’s rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and 
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substan-
tive rights of litigants.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).  In a foot-
note, the Court invoked Rule 23 as an example of a procedural rule with important 
substantive effects.  See id. at 392 n.19. 
9 As Debra Bassett argues, 
Forum shopping is not a form of “cheating” by those who refuse to play by the 
rules.  Playing by the rules includes the ability of plaintiff’s counsel to select—
and defense counsel to seek to counter—the set of rules by which the litiga-
tion “game” will be played.  The availability of more than one legally-
authorized forum results in legitimate choice, and lawyers ethically are com-
pelled to seek the most favorable forum to further their clients’ interests.  Se-
lecting the most favorable forum is a rational strategy . . . . The widespread 
criticism of forum shopping simply does not withstand scrutiny. 
Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 395 (2006); see also Alan B. 
Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court:  A Better Way To Handle the Problem of 
Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1524-25, 1530 (2005) (making similar 
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who can sue and perhaps secure relief in one state can’t sue, or can’t 
secure relief, in another.  Forum shopping may, however, be a good 
reason to reexamine the constellation of legal rules (and other influ-
ences) that causes it.  One’s normative assessment of any particular 
forum-shopping phenomenon should consider differences in the abil-
ity of different types of litigants to benefit from forum shopping, the 
purposes for which a forum is being selected, the fairness of the fo-
rum selected to the parties and legal systems concerned, and the pro-
portionality of forum choice.10
CAFA begins with statements of findings and purposes, the latter 
pitched at a high level of generality.  The statute’s stated purposes are 
to “(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with le-
gitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United 
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of in-
terstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and 
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer 
prices.”11
arguments).  For the historic rationale of diversity jurisdiction, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 77-79. 
10 Cf. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Pri-
vate International Law:  A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Common- 
and Civil-Law Systems, in 295 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 68 (2002) (discussing proportionality as a basic 
concern in the design of judicial jurisdiction, one that seeks to provide appropriate 
forums that are “sufficient in number” but not so numerous as to encourage “unjusti-
fied forum-shopping”). 
11 CAFA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005).  CAFA’s antecedent find-
ings report the importance and value of class actions “when they permit the fair and 
efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties,” but they also assert a 
decade of abuses that had harmed both deserving plaintiffs and innocent defendants, 
“adversely affected interstate commerce,” and “undermined public respect for our ju-
dicial system.”  Id. § 2(a)(1)–(2).  After enumerating ways in which class members, who 
“often receive little or no benefit from class actions,” id. § 2(a)(3), have sometimes 
been harmed by them, the statute states, 
 (4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free 
flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as in-
tended by the framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and lo-
cal courts are— 
  (A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court; 
  (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-state 
defendants; and 
  (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States 
and bind the rights of the residents of those States. 
Id. § 2(a)(4). 
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CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, by contrast, are detailed, compli-
cated, and replete with both undefined terms and ambiguous phrases.  
Having worked hard to close off avenues of forum choice that are 
available in the jurisdictional regime that CAFA largely replaces for 
class actions, CAFA’s architects were forced by the need to compro-
mise (and perhaps inclined by a strategic preference for ambiguity) to 
leave some questions implicating forum allocation unanswered.12
They thus guaranteed years of work for lawyers and courts that is un-
related to the merits of the underlying disputes.13
As courts confront, and commentators begin to write about, the 
many jurisdictional questions that emerged from CAFA’s long and 
messy legislative process, I propose to set that legislation in context.  
The contexts that I find most revealing concern the history of federal 
diversity-of-citizenship litigation in general and, within that larger 
story, the history of diversity class actions in federal court.  Because all 
questions of federal court subject matter jurisdiction implicate the 
“happy relation of States to Nation,”14 both accounts will necessarily 
pay attention to state court litigation and to the impact of doctrinal 
12 They sought to answer many of those questions in legislative history.  A number 
of federal courts have declined to rely on the 2005 Senate Report, S. REP. NO. 109-14 
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, for this reason.  See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the use of the Senate 
Report because “naked legislative history has no legal effect”).  Other courts have also 
inferred that the legislative history was not available to senators when they voted.  See, 
e.g., Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Senate Report 
was issued ten days after the enactment of the CAFA statute . . . .”).  Yet, it has been 
contended that, although not ordered to be printed until after CAFA was signed into 
law, the 2005 Senate Report “was submitted to Congress before CAFA became law.”  H. 
Hunter Twiford, III et al., CAFA’s New “Minimal Diversity” Standard for Interstate Class Ac-
tions Creates a Presumption that Jurisdiction Exists, with the Burden of Proof Assigned to the 
Party Opposing Jurisdiction, 25 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 17 n.28 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (cit-
ing 151 CONG. REC. S978 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005)); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 
483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007) (“While the report was issued ten days fol-
lowing CAFA’s enactment, it was submitted to the Senate on February 3, [2005]—while 
that body was considering the bill.”).  Moreover, although there was no House Report, 
there was a House Sponsors’ Statement, see 151 CONG. REC. H727-29 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 
2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), and extensive discussion and debate on the 
House floor.  Finally, it should be noted that much of the 2005 Senate Report was con-
tained in a 2003 Senate Report.  See S. REP. NO. 108-123 (2003); see also infra note 56. 
13 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata:  A Tale of Waste 
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1554 (2008) (decrying “social waste by litigation”); 
id. at 1565 (“This sloppily drafted statute created a lot of useless social friction and 
costly litigation by not foreseeing things like effective-date problems.” (footnote omit-
ted)); id. at 1592 (“Our study of these decisions shows most of this litigation to have 
been socially wasteful.”). 
14 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2. 
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change on the federal-state equilibrium.  To focus on one to the ex-
clusion of the other—on class actions to the exclusion of ordinary di-
versity litigation, or on federal litigation to the exclusion of state litiga-
tion—risks a critical loss of perspective.  The same risk attends the 
failure to mark the peculiar history of corporate citizenship for juris-
dictional purposes.  It is my view that the true measure of CAFA’s sig-
nificance is to be found not so much in its technical details as in the 
historical and institutional circumstances that brought it forth. 
Although mastery of technical reasoning is not a sufficient condi-
tion for illuminating scholarship about procedural law, it is a neces-
sary condition.15  Readers of this Article should have what they need to 
evaluate for themselves the potential significance of the changes 
CAFA effected in jurisdictional law, as well as of changes in the law 
that it did not attempt.  For that reason, I will begin in Part I with a 
description—a snapshot, if you will—of the jurisdictional rules govern-
ing federal diversity class action litigation prior to CAFA,16 as a prelude 
to a description, in Part II, of the changes in jurisdictional law that 
CAFA ushered in (or may have ushered in).17  Readers who are famil-
iar with those details may want to move directly to Part III, where I re-
view the history of ordinary diversity litigation in the federal courts, 
with particular attention to the status and role of corporate litigants,18
and to Part IV, where I revisit pre-CAFA diversity class action litigation 
in the context of the broader world of modern federal and state class 
actions and of overlapping class actions.19  Finally, in Part V and the 
Conclusion, I seek preliminary answers to the question of CAFA’s sig-
nificance.20
This work suggests reasons for concern about the impact that 
CAFA may have on the enforcement of state law.  In addressing that 
concern, I consider whether changes in the litigation landscape since 
1958, when Congress formally embraced corporate citizenship, might 
be thought to justify the changes in the balance of power in forum se-
lection that CAFA brings about.  Critical to my views in that regard are 
the failures of the Supreme Court to police interstate forum shopping 
effectively through constitutional control of personal jurisdiction or 
15 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343 
(2002).
16 See infra Part I. 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 See infra Part V and Conclusion. 
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choice of law, and the steroidal effect of the modern (post-1966) class 
action on the incentives that drive forum choice.  I recognize that the 
state court abuses cited by CAFA’s supporters tended to be episodic 
and transient.  I also recognize that some of what they alleged as 
abuses go to the heart of the modern class action.  At the same time, 
however, at least where nationwide class actions are concerned, it 
takes only one state court to declare an empire, and what the political 
process takes away, it can restore. 
In the circumstances, and given the stakes involved, I conclude 
that it was not unreasonable for Congress to assert a federal interest in 
regulating the process by which, and the forums in which, nationwide 
and multistate (collectively, “multistate”) class action decisions are 
made.  To be sure, the interest in question bears little relation to the 
historic account of diversity jurisdiction with which we are familiar.  
But, as Part IV demonstrates, this interest is consistent with the policy 
that the Supreme Court pursued when umpiring ordinary diversity 
litigation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
consistent as well with the policy that Congress pursued in its 1958 
amendments to the diversity statute.21  Neither the Court nor Congress 
has limited diversity jurisdiction to accord with the traditional account 
of the reasons for the constitutional grant.  In my view, therefore, 
CAFA’s basic approach—which is similarly not so limited and is in that 
respect continuous with past practice—should not be tarred with the 
motives of some who supported the statute, and neither should the 
federal judiciary. 
I reach a very different conclusion with respect to the numerous 
class actions within CAFA’s reach that are not in any meaningful sense 
“multistate.”  Although the 1958 Congress effectively blessed the fic-
tions of corporate citizenship created by the federal judiciary, it left in 
place (if it did not enhance) the instruments of countervailing power 
for plaintiffs that had developed in the system and that made the fic-
tions tolerable.  The 2005 Congress dismantled those instruments in 
order to open federal courts to multistate class actions.  It conven-
iently forgot them when it came time to fashion exceptions.  In the 
process, Congress neglected the critical role the exceptions played in 
equilibrating not just plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests, but also 
federal and state interests.  Ultimately, a combination of special inter-
est overreaching, abetted by the fictions of corporate citizenship, and 
confusion about legislative aims, abetted by the institutional federal 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 307-348. 
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judiciary’s schizophrenia regarding overlapping class actions, led 
Congress to lose sight of its duty, when fashioning CAFA’s exceptions, 
to preserve the “happy relation of States to Nation.”22  As a result, 
CAFA represents an affront to federalism in two respects and a poten-
tial affront in a third. 
First, CAFA deprives states of the ability to regulate matters of in-
tense local interest by enlisting for that purpose the regulatory poten-
tial of the class action as the states conceive it, on the basis of a defini-
tion of national interest that rests on legal fictions and on a vision of 
aggregate litigation that ignores the costs of complexity.  Second, and 
quite apart from the regulatory void that CAFA may entail, the means 
by which Congress reached that result are deplorable.  Working with 
exceptions so complicated that even some academics have been un-
able to penetrate them—and in a fog of ambiguity and hypocrisy—
Congress sacrificed transparency and accountability in the interests of 
preserving deniability.  Third, by exalting the gathering powers of the 
federal courts, Congress has created incentives for litigants and courts 
to create ever bigger “litigations.”  Whether in the form of multistate 
class actions or through nonclass aggregations, such litigation pack-
ages may replicate in federal court some of the supposed abuses in 
state court class actions to which CAFA supposedly responded, includ-
ing the subordination of factual and legal differences of intense inter-
est to individual states.23
The last concern also highlights questions about the effects that 
the increased federal caseload attributable to CAFA—consisting of 
substantial numbers of new district court cases that are notoriously 
demanding and also of appeals from orders granting (or denying) 
motions to remand—will have on the ability of the federal courts to 
deal fairly with all of their cases.  Concerns about the effect that 
CAFA’s predecessor bills would have on the federal courts’ workload 
were long-standing and legitimate.  It is thus surprising that, through 
inability to speak clearly with one voice, the Judicial Conference al-
lowed a vision of the gathering powers of federal courts to compound 
the potential damage.  It appears that federal courts are now seeking 
to minimize that damage by resisting some of the more blatant over-
reaching by CAFA’s supporters.  If so, the phenomenon marks a re-
turn to a more sober view of institutional self-interest and in so doing 
22 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2; see also supra text accompanying note 14. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 349-391. 
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contributes to an understanding of the federal judiciary as an interest 
group.24
I do not propose to treat discretely or in detail those sections of 
CAFA that address class action settlements.  The provisions in ques-
tion, such as those requiring heightened scrutiny of, and regulating 
attorney compensation for, so-called “coupon settlements,”25 are not 
without interest for one who seeks to divine CAFA’s significance.  The 
fact that some of them reflect legislation by anecdote may be evidence 
of an unarticulated agenda, as may the fact that, although the provi-
sions in question apply to all class actions in federal court—where by 
2005 they were arguably unnecessary—they do not apply to any state 
court class actions, in some of which they still might be useful.26  In-
deed, the incentives created by their differential application are a po-
tentially important part of the story of the vastly expanded privilege of 
forum choice that CAFA confers on defendants, one that my col-
league, Tobias Wolff, explores in his article for this Symposium.27
Moreover, descriptions of the supposed class action abuses that 
CAFA’s provisions address are suggestive of a crabbed view of the 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 396-399. 
25  28 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. V 2005). 
26 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1713–1714 (protecting class members against loss and against 
“discrimination based on geographic location”).  Professor Laurens Walker suggests 
that § 1713 was based on one case and § 1714 on testimony in a congressional hearing.  
See Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights:  A Policy and Political Mistake,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 860 (2007); see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The
Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts:  An Empirical Analysis of Filings 
and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1740 (2008) (suggesting that the evidence that 
led to § 1713 “is a class of one, an anecdote based on an unusual case”).  The Decem-
ber 2003 compromise that enabled CAFA’s ultimate passage is also suggestive in this 
respect.  One of its elements, tying attorney compensation to either coupon redemp-
tion or hours actually billed, put teeth into the regulation of coupon settlements, while 
another removed a ban on any compensation for named class representatives that 
might reasonably have been regarded as intended to deter even the “legitimate” class 
actions that CAFA purports to celebrate.  See 149 CONG. REC. S16,102-03 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 
2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (describing the compromise that led to CAFA’s pas-
sage).
 For a discussion of federal rulemaking that arguably made (most of) CAFA’s pro-
visions regulating class action settlements unnecessary in federal court, see Richard L. 
Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793-96 (2008). 
27 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the 
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2042 (2008) (noting that CAFA does 
not prevent defendants from seeking collusive settlements in state court).  “The fact 
that S. 2062 purports to protect absent class members, but does not allow them to re-
move when defendants and class counsel collude to bring about an unfair settlement, 
further demonstrates that the bill is not about fairness to class members, but solely 
about protecting defendants.”  Morrison, supra note 9, at 1548. 
2008] CAFA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1449
proper role of class actions,28 one that some of the statute’s supporters 
evidently hoped is (or will be) shared by the federal courts.  This Arti-
cle is, however, primarily an account of jurisdictional law, one in 
which provisions like those in CAFA that regulate class action settle-
ments are part of the changing mix of incentives and disincentives 
that determine how jurisdictional law in the books affects litigation 
behavior and the enforcement of the substantive law.29
28 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14-20, 58-59 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 
14-21, 54-55 (arguing that lawyers received a disproportionate share of class action set-
tlements and also that class actions should not be used to create “private attorneys gen-
eral”).  “Even if the critics were correct that deterrence was an intended purpose of 
class actions, that assertion is self-defeating because, in the Committee’s view, the con-
cept of class actions serving a ‘private attorney general’ or other enforcement purpose 
is illegal.”  Id. at 59, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 55; see also John H. Beisner, Matthew Shores 
& Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action “Cops”:  Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451-62 (2005) (criticizing the “private attorney general” model of 
law enforcement through class actions); David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness 
Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247,
1286 (2006) (“Some of the law’s principal proponents identified the supposed ille-
gitimacy of large-scale economic regulation through private litigation based on state 
law causes of action as a chief rationale for the statute.”).  But see infra text accompany-
ing note 190 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s intent to facilitate the litigation of 
negative-value claims in the 1966 amendments to Rule 23). 
29 A study of publicly available opinions found only one case, Figueroa v. Sharper 
Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007), that involved disputes about CAFA’s 
provisions targeting alleged class action abuses.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 
13, at 1555 n.4.  Clermont and Eisenberg’s speculation that this lack of cases “may be 
because reformers had exaggerated the degree of the abuse,” id. at 1556 n.4, neglects 
the irony, noted in the text, that those abuses were said to occur primarily in state 
courts, to which the provisions do not apply.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 53-54, re-
printed in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 49-50.  Professor Walker suggests that “[s]urely soon . . . 
cases commenced after the effective date will reach the settlement stage and the judicial 
application process will begin.”  Walker, supra note 26, at 850 n.6.  Moreover, he argues 
that “the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights [is] the most significant provision of the 
new law.” Id. at 849.  His prediction in that regard is based on the supposed political 
incentives of state attorneys general to respond vigorously to the notices of settlement 
that CAFA requires, see id. at 853-54, and on the supposed role that these officials 
might play under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, see id. at 856-58.  I doubt that it is 
sensible to liken their role under CAFA to “enforcement opportunities.”  Id. at 854.  In 
addition, Professor Walker may overestimate both the possibilities for intervention un-
der Rule 24 and the freedom of an intervenor to participate in the litigation.  See
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 378 (1987) (concluding 
in the course of denying an interlocutory appeal that extensive limitations on a per-
missive intervenor were not so onerous as to constitute a constructive denial of inter-
vention).  He may also underestimate the combined forces of budgetary constraints, 
priorities, and inertia.  For these and other reasons, attorneys general, if they decide to 
become involved at all, may prefer to “convey their views informally to parties rather 
than file official complaints or intervene in cases.”  Peter Geier, State AGs Eschew CAFA 
Review, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 5.  For a case where these provisions may have 
made a difference, see Figueroa, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292.  See also Marcus, supra note 26, at 
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I stress at the outset that this Article is a preliminary effort that 
does not pretend to exhaust the history explored, even for the pur-
pose of assessing CAFA’s legal significance.  Fortunately, this Sympo-
sium also includes an assessment of CAFA’s social significance from 
one of this country’s best legal historians (on whose prior work I rely 
heavily in Part III).30  My hope is that, in combination, our work will 
provide useful perspectives for those who follow us. 
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER CLASS ACTIONS 
IN THE DEFAULT REGIME
A.  Original Jurisdiction 
Before turning to CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, it is worthwhile 
to recall the law governing federal subject matter jurisdiction that 
CAFA replaces for cases within its reach.  The law in question con-
cerns, and only concerns, jurisdiction predicated on diversity of citi-
zenship.  Moreover, even as to diversity class actions, this law contin-
ues to provide the rules with respect to cases that are not subject to 
CAFA, for instance, putative class actions in which the class consists of 
fewer than 100 persons or in which the aggregate amount in contro-
versy does not exceed $5 million.  For this reason, I shall refer to this 
jurisdictional law as the “default regime.” 
Under the default regime, the existence or absence of diversity of 
citizenship is determined by considering only the citizenship of 
1796 (citing Figeuroa as an example of a case where the opposition of attorneys general 
to a proposed settlement may have swayed the court); Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA and 
Coupons, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 12, 2007, at 24 (noting the importance of the Figueroa case).  
Ongoing research by the Federal Judicial Center will “document any appearance by a 
public official at a settlement review hearing.”  Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1740. 
 I also do not propose to consider so-called “mass actions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) 
(Supp. V 2005), which CAFA largely assimilates to class actions for jurisdictional pur-
poses.  Civil actions “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are pro-
posed to be tried jointly on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions 
of law or fact,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (emphasis added), are apparently not 
common.  Clermont and Eisenberg’s study unearthed only two cases that involved a 
mass action and only three others that discussed a mass action.  See Clermont & 
Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1556 n.5; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser et al., The Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act of 2005:  The Federalization of U.S. Class Action Litigation, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J.
398, 408 (2006) (“Plaintiffs should therefore be able to keep ‘mass actions’ in state 
court if they adhere to current practices, which typically avoid the filing of complaints 
seeking the joint trial of plaintiffs in numbers even remotely approaching 100.”).  For 
my purposes, in any event, mass actions would be a distraction. 
30 See Purcell, supra note 5. 
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named class representatives and of defendants.  As to those parties, 
however, complete diversity is required, with the result that jurisdic-
tion cannot be exercised if any named plaintiff is a citizen of the same 
state as any defendant.31  This aspect of the default regime, perhaps 
more than any other, empowers class action plaintiffs who desire to 
litigate in state court.32  In addition, whereas the default regime treats 
corporations as citizens only of the states by which they are incorpo-
rated and of the state of their principal place of business,33 it treats un-
incorporated associations as citizens of every state of which their 
members are citizens.34
As to the amount in controversy, which is currently in excess of 
$75,000 exclusive of interest and costs for diversity jurisdiction gener-
ally,35 the default regime was for many years unclear as a result of con-
flicts among the lower courts concerning the effect, if any, of the 1990 
supplemental jurisdiction statute36 on the rule—established by the Su-
preme Court through interpretation—that the claim of every member 
of a plaintiff class must satisfy the amount-in-controversy require-
ment.37  Shortly after CAFA was enacted, the Supreme Court held that, 
so long as the required diversity of citizenship exists, supplemental ju-
risdiction can be exercised over the claims of all members of a class 
when at least one named representative has a claim satisfying the 
amount-in-controversy requirement.38  That decision does not, how-
ever, disturb the default regime’s rule that claims cannot usually be 
31 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921).  The same rule applies to defendant class actions 
which, because of their rarity, will not be further discussed in this Article. 
32 Subject to very weak control by the federal courts under the rubric of “fraudu-
lent joinder,” see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
189 (6th ed. 2002), class counsel need only designate as a named plaintiff someone 
who is a citizen of the same state as one of the defendants, or a defendant who is a citi-
zen of the state from which a named plaintiff hails, in order to destroy statutory diver-
sity.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000). 
34 See United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-51 
(1965) (acknowledging the artificiality of distinguishing labor unions from corporations 
for diversity purposes but stating that any change was for Congress to enact).  The 
same is true of partnerships.  See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 192-96 (1990). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
36 Id. § 1367. 
37 See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973). 
38 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). 
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aggregated to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement,39 and 
thus the default regime continues to require that at least one claim 
meet that requirement. 
B.  Removal Jurisdiction 
The default regime’s treatment of class actions for purposes of 
removal from state to federal court tracks the treatment of ordinary 
litigation.  That is to say, a class action cannot be removed unless it 
would fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
the rules summarized above.40  In addition, when diversity jurisdiction 
alone is claimed, all defendants must join in (i.e., consent to) the no-
tice of removal;41 removal is not permitted when any (properly joined 
and served) defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action was 
brought,42 and although removal is possible (if timely sought) if the 
removal results from subsequent developments in the state litigation 
that make the case removable for the first time, there is a one-year 
limitation (from the commencement of the state action).43  Each of 
these requirements for removal creates additional options for class 
counsel to structure and/or conduct class action litigation so as to 
keep it in state court. 
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they have 
a duty to ensure the existence of jurisdiction—constitutional and 
statutory—at all times and at every level of the federal court system.44
Since the advent of various abstention doctrines45 and the general 
embrace of the forum non conveniens doctrine46 in the 1940s, it has 
been hard to take seriously lofty language that once posited a similar 
duty on the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction that Congress has 
39 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (approving the lower courts’ prac-
tice of allowing aggregation where claims are “joint and common,” but not where 
claims are “separate and distinct”). 
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). 
41 See id.; cf. id. § 1441(c) (allowing removal of separate and independent claims in 
federal question cases). 
42 Id. § 1441(b). 
43 Id. § 1446(b). 
44 The exercise of this duty has famously led the Supreme Court, on its own mo-
tion, to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction cases, fully adjudicated below, in 
which all parties sought review on the merits.  See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1908). 
45 See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943); R.R. Comm’n of 
Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). 
46 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-12 (1947). 
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conferred on them.47  It is another mark of this different attitude to-
ward putatively erroneous findings of no jurisdiction that, in the de-
fault regime, Congress has generally forbidden appellate review, “on 
appeal or otherwise,” of orders remanding removed cases.48
II. CAFA’S JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
A.  Original Jurisdiction 
CAFA opens the federal courts to class actions that could not be 
brought there under the default regime.  The provisions of new sub-
section 1332(d) change the default regime in a number of significant 
respects.  Before discussing those changes, however, it is useful to un-
derstand the cases that are explicitly excluded from the legislation’s 
reach, the so-called jurisdictional carve-outs.49
1.  Carve-Outs 
CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions do not apply to any class action in 
which “the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other gov-
ernmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed 
47 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is 
not given.  The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”).  The qualifier 
that the obligation is “virtually unflagging,” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), does not help (to take “the lofty language” 
seriously).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) (providing, however, an exception for civil rights 
cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443).  This provision originated in an 1887 statute.  
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553.  The Judiciary Act of March 3, 
1875, which substantially expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, had author-
ized review of remand orders by appeal or writ of error.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 
137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472.  The 1887 provision rescinding that authority was inserted 
without discussion, see 18 CONG. REC. 2543 (Mar. 2, 1887), during Senate debate on a 
House bill that was designed “to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the 
Supreme Court of the United States, to promote the convenience of the people, and 
to lessen the burden and expense of litigation.”  18 CONG. REC. 613 ( Jan. 13, 1887); see
also Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1934) (noting that congressional legislation had 
restricted the jurisdiction of the federal trial court).  The provision was preserved vir-
tually unchanged in the 1911 codification of laws relating to the judiciary.  See Act of 
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1095.  It was inadvertently omitted from the 
1948 codification, prompting legislation to restore it the following year.  See Act of May 
24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102.  The exception for civil rights cases was added 
in 1964.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 901, 78 Stat. 241, 266. 
49 Federal subject matter jurisdiction may, however, exist under the default regime. 
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from ordering relief,”50 and they also do not apply to actions in which 
“the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggre-
gate is less than 100.”51  It is apparent that the latter carve-out was de-
signed to leave actions on behalf of small groups of people in state 
court, while the former acknowledges the unfairness of permitting 
state officials to remove cases, only to plead the bar of sovereign 
immunity.52
I should also mention here the exclusions for class actions involv-
ing solely a claim “concerning a covered security as defined [in the 
Securities Acts],”53 “relat[ing] to the internal affairs or governance of a 
corporation or other form of business enterprise” under the law of the 
state of incorporation or organization,54 or “relating to the rights, du-
ties, . . . and obligations relating to or created by any security” as de-
fined by federal securities law.55 According to the Senate Report, 
“[t]he purpose of this provision is to avoid disturbing in any way the 
federal vs. state court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the securi-
ties litigation class action context by the enactment of the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.”56
50 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 2005). 
51 Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
52 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 41-42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39-40; cf.
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 618-24 (2002) (holding that removal waives 
sovereign immunity with respect to state law claims for which immunity was waived in 
state court).  The federal courts could learn a valuable lesson from this in their ad-
ministration of the forum non conveniens doctrine in diversity cases.  Why should state 
courts that do not have any such doctrine, or that follow a version that is less robust, be 
deprived of the power to hear a case that would be dismissed on that ground on mo-
tion of the removing party?  This suggests that federal courts should either apply state 
forum non conveniens law in diversity cases or hold that, by removing, the defendant 
“has thereby waived any personal privilege he might have had to be sued in another 
[court].”  Sayles v. Nw. Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 608, 608 (C.C.D. R.I. 1854) (No. 12,421).  In 
Sayles, the court upheld personal jurisdiction in a removed case involving the attach-
ment of property.  The case could not have been maintained originally in the federal 
court to which it was removed.  See id.  For a recent decision holding that Louisiana 
waived whatever sovereign immunity it had against removal under CAFA by joining 
with its claims against insurers the claims of a putative class of Louisiana and non-
Louisiana citizens, see In re:  Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches, No. 08-30145, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7933 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2008). 
53 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A). 
54 Id. § 1332(d)(9)(B). 
55 Id. § 1332(d)(9)(C). 
56 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 42.  Identical lan-
guage can be found in the 2003 Senate Report.  See S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 46 (2003).  
For an interesting and valuable analysis of the interplay between CAFA and the Securi-
ties Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), arguing that Congress was mistaken 
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2.  Diversity and Amount in Controversy 
Turning then to the main event, CAFA changes the default re-
gime by predicating jurisdiction on minimal diversity.  Thus, the stat-
ute confers jurisdiction, subject to the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement, over any civil action that is a class action in which “any 
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant.”57  Moreover, unincorporated associations are assimilated 
to corporations, in that they are deemed to be citizens only of the 
state where they have their principal place of business and the state 
under whose law they are organized.58
As for the amount in controversy, CAFA again changes the default 
regime, first by raising the required amount to in excess of “the sum 
or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and also by 
providing that “the claims of the individual class members shall be ag-
gregated to determine” whether the required amount is in controversy.59
3.  Definitions 
The provisions of new subsection 1332(d) are subject to defini-
tions, the most important of which for present purposes is the defini-
tion of a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of ju-
dicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more 
representative persons as a class action.”60  For jurisdiction, this means 
that status as a putative class action suffices.  This is also clear from 
another provision, which states that subsection 1332(d) “shall apply to 
any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order 
by the court with respect to that action.”61  The question arises, how-
in believing that the latter had solved the relevant problems and thus also mistaken in 
refusing to extend CAFA to securities cases, see Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdic-
tional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 621, 646-47 (2006). 
57 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).  Subsections 1332(d)(2)(B) & (C) carry out the 
same plan for cases involving aliens and foreign states. 
58 Id. § 1332(d)(10).  This provision was apparently added “to ensure that unin-
corporated associations receive the same treatment as corporations for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction.”  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45-46, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 42-
44.  From the perspective of unincorporated associations alone, it could have the effect 
of reducing access to federal court in a minimal (as opposed to complete) diversity re-
gime, although it would very rarely make a difference in that regard. 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(6). 
60 Id. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
61 Id. § 1332(d)(8). 
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ever, whether jurisdiction subsists when, in a case brought in or re-
moved to federal court under CAFA, the court declines to certify a 
class.  The importance of this question is likely to be greatest in a case 
removed from state court, and the implications of the answer to it may 
be most dramatic with respect to subsequent attempts to litigate in 
state court.62
4.  Exceptions63
CAFA divides the universe of cases in which the basic require-
ments (minimal diversity and more than $5 million in controversy) 
are met into four sets, with its exceptions applying to three of them.  
In the first set are cases in which one-third or fewer of the members of 
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate (“class members”) are 
62 The decisions to date are split.  Compare, e.g., Genenbacher v. CenturyTel Fiber 
Co. II, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (reasoning that a denial of class 
certification did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction), with Hoffer v. Coo-
per Wiring Devices, Inc., No. 06-0763, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75806, at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after class certi-
fication was denied).  See also Good v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., No. 06-1027, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3982, at *46-50 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2008) (inviting parties to submit sup-
plemental briefs, and reviewing the decisions of other courts, on a “new and evolving 
legal issue,” whether a court has jurisdiction over individual claims after CAFA class 
certification has been denied).  The 2003 Senate bill contained a provision requiring 
the court to dismiss a case in which certification had been denied, see Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2003), and one of the elements of 
the compromise that enabled the passage of the 2005 legislation was the deletion of 
that requirement.  Senator Chris Dodd asserted that the “compromise eliminates the 
dismissal requirement, giving federal courts discretion to handle Rule 23-ineligible 
cases appropriately.  Potentially meritorious suits will thus not be automatically dis-
missed simply because they fail to comply with the class certification requirements of 
Rule 23.”  149 CONG. REC. S16,102-03 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003).  Of course, even if a 
court consulted this legislative history, it might conclude that the “appropriate” treat-
ment of the “Rule 23-ineligible cases” would be to see whether they are within federal 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
63 “Exceptions” is a loaded word in this context, because labeling a statutory provi-
sion as such, rather than, for instance, as an “exclusion,” may have unjustified influ-
ence in determining the location of the burden of persuasion concerning the exis-
tence of subject matter jurisdiction.  See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of 
Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 11-12), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005477 (“The notion that one can divine legislative in-
tent by somehow distinguishing certain provisions as ‘exceptions’ immediately raises a 
number of perplexing questions.”); Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provi-
sions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:  In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 
BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 98-102 (2007) (concluding that plaintiffs should not bear the bur-
den of proving jurisdiction where a small subset of cases is carved out from a very 
broad grant of jurisdiction, regardless of the linguistic label applied to such a carve-
out).  I use “exceptions” here only as a concession to the shortness of life. 
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citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed (the “origi-
nal state”).64  Even if all defendants are citizens of that state, a federal 
court has no discretion to decline jurisdiction:  there is no exception 
for such cases.  In the second and third sets are cases where both the 
“primary defendants” and either between one-third and two-thirds65 or 
two-thirds or more66 of class members are citizens of the original state.  
A federal court must decline jurisdiction in the third set (the “home-
state exception”), and it has discretion to decline jurisdiction in the 
second (the “discretionary exception”) based on a consideration of six 
factors, the first of which is “whether the claims asserted involve mat-
ters of national or interstate interest,”67 and the last of which is 
“whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar 
claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.”68
CAFA’s fourth set, triggering the “local controversy exception,” 
comprises cases in which (1) greater than two-thirds of class members 
are citizens of the original state; (2) there is at least one defendant 
from whom “significant relief” is sought, whose alleged conduct forms 
a “significant basis” for the claims asserted, and who is a citizen of the 
original state; and (3) “principal injuries resulting from the alleged 
conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred” in 
the original state.69  Even if all of those requirements are met, the ex-
ception’s duty to decline to exercise jurisdiction does not apply unless 
“during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no 
other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual 
allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or 
other persons.”70
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–(4). 
65 See id.
66 See id. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
67 See id. § 1332(d)(3)(A). 
68 Id. § 1332(d)(3)(F).  The other factors focus attention on the laws that will gov-
ern the claims asserted, “whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that 
seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction,” whether the original state has a “distinct nexus 
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants,” and whether class 
membership is disproportionately composed of citizens of the original state.  See id.
§ 1332(d)(3)(B)–(E). 
69 Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). 
70 Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(iii). 
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B.  Removal Jurisdiction 
Although CAFA may prove a boon to putative class members who 
would prefer, as an original matter, to litigate in federal court,71 one 
would have thought that, in the near term at least, its major impact 
would be felt as a result of its removal provisions.72  These provisions 
71 This would include litigants in states, like Texas, whose courts have made the 
path to class certification not only significantly more difficult in recent years, but also 
more difficult than it is in many federal circuits.  See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 439-42 (Tex. 2007); see also infra note 263. 
72 Note in that regard accounts of multiple state court filings in anticipation of 
CAFA, see Seth Stern, Lawyers Seek Loopholes in Class Action Overhaul, 63 CQ WKLY. 494, 
494 (2005) (“[O]nce Congress put the bill on the fast track this year there was a last-
minute dash by plaintiffs’ lawyers to the courthouses that have been particularly 
friendly to class action plaintiffs.”), and the amount of post-CAFA litigation concerning 
the effect, if any, of amendments to state court complaints on the question of whether 
the action was “commenced” prior to CAFA’s effective date (February 18, 2005).  See
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The “Commencement” Problem:  Lessons from a Statute’s First 
Year, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 469 (2006) (examining the issues posed by these post-CAFA 
complaint amendments and ultimately concluding that state law should define when 
an action is “commenced”); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Cost of CAFA, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 27, 2007, at 13 (discussing the risk that corporate defendants will have to pay 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for improper removal, as these defendants “reflexively remove 
all state class actions into federal court”).  Yet, the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) em-
pirical studies do not support the supposition in the text; its data indicate that a major-
ity of CAFA cases have been filed as original actions in federal court.  See Lee & Will-
ging, supra note 26, at 1752. 
Although both diversity removals and original proceedings increased, compar-
ing the pre- and post-CAFA periods, the greatest increase is observed in the 
original proceedings.  Pre-CAFA, the average number of monthly removals of 
diversity class actions was 16.6; post-CAFA the comparable figure was 23.7, an 
increase of, on average, about 7 class actions.  But pre-CAFA, the average 
number of monthly original proceedings of diversity class actions was 10.8; 
post-CAFA, the comparable figure was 31.5, an increase of about 20 class ac-
tions per month. 
Id.  It may be worth determining the extent to which these findings were affected by 
the FJC’s decision—for all consolidated cases, including those subject to the multidis-
trict litigation (MDL) process—to include only lead cases in their analysis database.  See
id. at 1746.  That decision is understandable for purposes of workload and resource 
studies, but it is not obviously appropriate in comparing filing and removal rates (par-
ticularly pre- and post-CAFA rates). 
 The FJC’s researchers suggested in an earlier report that plaintiffs’ counsel, pre-
ferring state court but not confident about their ability (or not willing) to structure the 
litigation so as to keep it there, may have decided that the game was not worth the 
candle. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT 
OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 16-17 
(2007).  Moreover, as that report also points out, by filing in federal court originally, 
plaintiffs’ counsel preserved the choice of forum (where personal jurisdiction and 
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change the default regime in at least four respects.  First, the statute 
enables any defendant to remove, whether or not other defendants 
consent.73  Second, it extends that privilege even to in-state defen-
dants.74  Third, CAFA eliminates the default regime’s one-year time 
limitation on removal.75  Fourth, it provides for discretionary appeals 
from orders granting or denying motions to remand.76
venue law afford choice).  Id. at 17; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) (prescribing the 
venue of a removed case as “the district court of the United States for the district and 
division embracing the place where such action is pending”).  Additional analyses have 
shown that the mix of post-CAFA original and removed cases varies among the circuits, 
prompting the researchers to look for correlations between those circuits attracting 
larger percentages of either original filings or removed cases and circuit reputations 
for liberality or conservatism in class certification.  See Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 
1761-62 (reporting mixed data as to whether such a correlation exists).  Part of that 
inquiry—as, for instance, concerning the high percentage of removed cases in the 
Fifth Circuit—should include attention to state certification law and practice.  See supra
note 71 and accompanying text. 
 Finally, the contrary (nationwide) finding of empirical work based on opinions 
publicly available—that cases removed under CAFA do dominate those originally 
filed—may indeed be one more piece of evidence of the risks of empirical research 
that relies on published opinions: 
Probably the difference shows merely that among CAFA class actions, re-
moved cases are the ones generating pitched battles and hence published 
opinions, and especially opinions that expressly mention CAFA.  The differ-
ence between the two studies thus may reflect the danger of relying only on 
published cases to get a picture of what is really happening on the ground. 
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1563.  Note, however, the question above 
about the FJC data concerning consolidated cases and the fact that the composite FJC 
data mask differences among the circuits. 
73 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. V 2005). 
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. § 1453(c)(1).  The removal provisions contain carve-outs mirroring those 
under revised § 1332.  Compare id. § 1453(d) with supra Part I.B.  To my knowledge, the 
federal courts have not wrapped themselves in knots over the potential problem cre-
ated by § 1453’s failure to require explicitly that there be original jurisdiction under 
§ 1332(d)(2), as contemplated by the legislative history.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, 
supra note 13, at 1557 (assuming the usual requirement that the removed action be 
one that could have been entertained by federal court as a matter of original jurisdic-
tion “in accordance with the clear legislative history despite the absence of appropriate 
statutory wording”); Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’ Ears, and Congressional 
Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction:  Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and its Lessons for the Class 
Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279, 292-98 (2006) (discussing this disconnect be-
tween CAFA’s text and its legislative history regarding the requirement of original ju-
risdiction under § 1332(d)(2)); see also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, No. 07-
0098, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6354, at *29 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 29, 2008) (“ATTM, there-
fore, may not rely on CAFA to circumvent the long-standing requirement that only a 
true defendant may remove a case to federal court.”). 
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III. DIVERSITY LITIGATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
More than two centuries have not shed much light on the reasons 
why the Constitution includes in Article III a grant of judicial power in 
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”77  Early on, 
however, the Supreme Court embraced what has become the tradi-
tional view, and the Court has never abandoned it.  Under that view 
the constitutional grant of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction was in-
tended to make available a neutral forum for litigants worried about 
local bias in the courts of states other than their own.78  Consistently 
with that view,  the Court, in 1806, interpreted the statute implement-
ing the grant of judicial power for inferior courts to require complete 
diversity.79
Apart from its pedigree in decisions of the Supreme Court, the 
traditional view has in its favor that it was the rationale advanced by 
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers80 and, according to Henry Friendly, 
the rationale most frequently invoked when Article III was debated in 
state ratifying conventions.81  The fact that Friendly’s research in pre-
1787 decisions of state appellate courts found no evidence of actual 
77 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
78 See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87-88 (1809). 
79 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).  In cases kept from fed-
eral court by that interpretation, a state court intent on disfavoring an out-of-state citi-
zen would also have to disfavor one of its own.  This is not to say that an interpretation 
not requiring complete diversity would in all circumstances be inconsistent with the 
traditionally ascribed purpose.  Moreover, the fact that—from the beginning and still 
today—a plaintiff can (as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction) sue an out-of-state 
defendant in a federal court in the plaintiff’s state is inconsistent with the traditional 
account.  This “anomaly” may be evidence of the existence of reasons for the constitu-
tional grant other than, or in addition to, the fear of bias.  Congress has long been 
urged to eliminate the anomaly.  See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 128 (1971) 
(testimony of Richard H. Field, Professor, Harvard Law School) (“Now, so far as the in-
state plaintiff is concerned, this represents about half of the diversity cases.”); ALI,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 1302(a), at 123-24 (1969) [hereinafter STATE-FEDERAL STUDY] (proposing to pro-
hibit the invocation of diversity jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, by an in-
state citizen).  Although Congress has declined to do so, it has eliminated the twin 
anomaly of a venue option of plaintiff’s residence.  See Judicial Improvements Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 
(2000)); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 94 (1990) (advocating 
the elimination of the venue anomaly). 
80 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
81 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 492 (1928). 
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bias82 may only confirm that a different kind of bias—publication 
bias—was acute in the eighteenth century.83  Research designed to de-
termine the extent of actual bias does not in any event speak to the 
existence of solicitude for the fear of biased treatment on which the 
Court in fact relied.84  Certainly, as John Frank observed, there was 
evidence of biased treatment of some aliens, namely British creditors, 
sufficient to insulate from question the basis for the cognate grant of 
judicial power in “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens 
82 See id. at 493-95. 
83 “Publication bias” refers to the confounding effect in studies based on pub-
lished opinions of nonrandom differences in the rate of publication.  It may account 
for the prominence of cases removed under CAFA in publicly available opinions.  See 
supra note 72.  A vivid example of the phenomenon was revealed by the Second Cir-
cuit’s observation that it published decisions reversing grants of summary judgment far 
more often than decisions affirming them.  See Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 
12 (2d Cir. 1986).  John Frank analyzed (for different purposes) “5[9]4 reported cases 
in seven colonies and states from 1658 to 1787 . . . [, which comprised] substantially all 
available reported cases.”  John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24 (1948). I have corrected the figure given in the original 
quotation (554) to accord with Frank’s Table 3—it now says 594.  See id. at 25 tbl.3.  
Even noting a likely appeal bias in cases of “diverse origin” and coding generously in 
favor of that group, Frank found that the group contained only fifty-five of the 594 to-
tal cases, and many of the fifty-five were “not interstate cases, but English-state cases.”  
Id. at 24-25 & tbl.3.  In comments on a draft of this Article, Kevin Clermont suggested 
that there may also have been a selection effect at work: 
[T]he last place I think you would see actual bias in old cases is in the cases 
themselves.  Litigants would be painfully conscious of bias, and would not sue 
or settle to avoid the bias.  The reported cases would turn out to read just like 
cases in a total absence of bias.  As we showed in our Xenophilia articles, 
[Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in Ameri-
can Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996)] and [Kevin M. Clermont & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts?  Before and After 9/11, 4 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441 (2007)], win rates can show whether bias is more 
or less than the parties expect, but cannot show whether bias exists or not. 
E-mail from Kevin M. Clermont to author (Nov. 18, 2007) (on file with author). 
84 See supra text accompanying note 78.  Friendly acknowledged that a change to a 
bill in the first Congress was “clearly in line with the theory, already orthodox [in 
1789!], that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent the baneful effects of 
local prejudice.”  Friendly, supra note 81, at 501.  Of course, CAFA itself may represent 
an example of solicitude for the fear of biased treatment that either does not exist or is 
statistically insignificant.  See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney 
Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation:  What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 591, 653 (2006) (finding “little difference in the rulings issued by the two sets 
of courts,” notwithstanding attorney beliefs that “state courts are more permissive to-
ward class actions” than are federal courts).  But see infra note 367 (discussing meth-
odological and interpretive questions raised by this study). 
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thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”85  Moreover, Frank 
also provided reasons to believe that Madison “and his colleagues ob-
viously thought of national and international diversity together.”86
Whatever the role of actual bias or fear of bias in its creation, the 
diversity clause elicited only a “tepid”87 defense by Marshall in the rati-
fication effort.88  Just as proponents may have been loath to articulate 
a bill of particulars against biased state courts, so too may they have 
been content to mask their true goals for the diversity clause in the 
supposed apprehensions of their countrymen.  In that regard, Article 
III contains a number of grants of judicial power that, Frank argued, 
were “of actual practical significance to large landholders.”89  More-
over, Madison’s remark on which Frank relied for the conflation of 
85 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Frank, supra note 83, at 24 (“There can be 
no doubt, for example, of direct bias in the administration of justice against British 
creditors in Virginia.”). 
86 Frank, supra note 83, at 27. 
87 Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928). 
88 See Friendly, supra note 81, at 487-88.  Friendly acknowledged Felix Frank-
furter’s assistance.  See id. at 483 n.*; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 383 (1964) (noting that Friendly, in 1927, 
was “working, under the guidance of Professor Frankfurter . . . on a paper”).  Frank-
furter, in turn, relied heavily on Friendly’s article in an article of his own published the 
same year.  See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520-21.  Proceeding from the doubts that 
Friendly’s research had engendered about the existence of the problem that the con-
stitutional grant was traditionally viewed as addressing, Frankfurter launched a vigor-
ous attack on the need for diversity jurisdiction in 1928, stressing its controversial na-
ture and political and social costs.  An advocate of abolishing statutory diversity 
jurisdiction, he argued that, in any case, “[c]ertainly the obvious abuses of diversity ju-
risdiction should be promptly removed by legislation.”  Id. at 523.  Moreover, he made 
it clear that in his mind the most obvious of such abuses was corporate diversity litiga-
tion.  See id. at 523-26.  Frankfurter also used his article to advocate passage of a Senate 
bill that would have overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), see Frankfurter,
supra note 87, at 529-30 & n.152, revealing neither that he wrote the bill nor that he 
did so at the suggestion of Justice Brandeis.  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1109 n.433 (1982).  The circle was closed when 
Brandeis cited Frankfurter’s article in his opinion for the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 n.6 (1938).  See infra note 162 (noting the repeated citations 
to Frankfurter’s article in Justice Brandeis’s opinion). 
89 Frank, supra note 83, at 20.  Although Frank acknowledged that the grant in 
cases “between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different 
States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, was the “most obvious relevant clause,” he argued 
that “the diversity and treaty clauses were the jurisdictional clauses most immediately 
affecting large landed interests.”  Frank, supra note 83, at 20.  He also concluded that 
the “Supreme Court aided virtually every land speculator who came before it from 
1790 to 1815.”  Id. at 22; see also id. at 20 (discussing the favorable treatment given to 
landholders by the Constitution). 
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interstate and international diversity also linked “justice” to “foreign-
ers” with the promotion of trade.90  Whether or not, as Friendly con-
cluded, “the desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to 
debtors was a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction,”91
it surely was one reason animating some of its supporters.92  As I have 
previously argued, 
 An important reason for the existence of Article III federal judicial 
power in diversity (including alienage diversity) cases and for the First 
Congress’s decision to create lower federal courts had to do with con-
cerns that state courts were hostile to creditors.  Although this concern 
was at its height in connection with British creditors, the discriminatory 
treatment of whom might prove a cause of war, it was by no means con-
fined to such cases.  In the period immediately preceding the Constitu-
tional Convention there was ample evidence of the propensity of states 
to favor debtors.  Indeed, concerns about the impact of such laws on 
contract and property rights and on the ability of the new country to 
progress to a developed commercial state led to more than a head of ju-
dicial power; they contributed to a substantive restriction in the Consti-
tution, the prohibition against the impairment of contracts.
93
There is thus evidence that the grant of diversity jurisdiction in 
Article III was designed to make available a forum where the creditor 
class would receive “justice.”  Moreover, as Frank suggested, although 
the “typical case [in 1787] was still A v. B for a cow,”94 the framers and 
90 See Frank, supra note 83, at 27; supra text accompanying note 86. 
91 Friendly, supra note 81, at 496-97; see also Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520 (cit-
ing Friendly and arguing that fear of state legislatures, not state courts, motivated di-
versity jurisdiction); Friendly, supra note 81, at 498 (“There was a vague feeling that the 
new courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s courts.”). 
92 Note in that regard Hamilton’s argument that judicial independence would 
serve to temper “unjust and partial laws”: 
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the inde-
pendence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of 
occasional ill humors in the society.  These sometimes extend no farther than 
to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and 
partial laws.  Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast impor-
tance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
93 Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:  Tradition, History, and Limitations 
on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1323-24 (2000)
(footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1325-26 (discussing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 1, 46-47 (1825), an intensely controversial decision in which Chief Justice 
Marshall candidly discussed the perceived problem of state court bias and speculated 
“about the reason Congress conferred local federal power to alter state final process 
law in the Process Act of 1789”).
94 Frank, supra note 83, at 26. 
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ratifiers of the Constitution should perhaps be credited with imagin-
ing  developments in interstate and international commerce with 
which they had no experience.95
One development that those responsible for the Constitution 
surely did not anticipate, but that was uppermost in the minds of 
CAFA’s supporters, was the role of corporations in the economy.  
Business corporations in the modern sense hardly existed in 1787,96
and for some fifty years thereafter their creation in most states re-
quired special legislation—generally in the form of charters.97  During 
that period, the ability of corporations to sue or be sued in federal 
court was restricted by the requirement of complete diversity.  Since 
95 Both Friendly and Frank also suggested, with very little evidence, that the con-
stitutional diversity grant was intended to provide possible refuge from state courts that 
were inefficient or worse.  See Frank, supra note 83, at 27 (“Poorly paid, short-term state 
judges were, in the minds of the Philadelphia Convention, sometimes incompetent 
and inept.”); Friendly, supra note 81, at 497-98 (suggesting that “[t]he method of ap-
pointment and the tenure of the judges [in state courts] were not of the sort to invite 
confidence”). 
96 As Henry Butler explains, 
Following the American Revolution, there was almost universal assent to the 
proposition that the power to form corporations was vested in the state legisla-
tures.  All corporate charters were issued one by one by individual legislative 
acts, and the overwhelming majority of the corporations chartered in the late 
1700s were banks, insurance companies, water companies, and companies or-
ganized to build or run canals, turnpikes, and bridges.  Many of the public  
utility or transportation corporations were awarded monopoly privileges and 
police powers of the state (for example, eminent domain) in exchange for the 
financing and construction of quasi-public goods by the private firms. 
Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate 
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1780–1970, at 7 (1970) (“There is no evidence of significant demand for cor-
porate charters for local enterprise until about 1780; both opportunity and means 
were lacking for undertakings ambitious enough to invite using the corporation.”); id.
at 17 (noting that, of the 317 special charters enacted in the states between 1780 and 
1801, “less than 4 per cent were for general business corporations”); Phillip I. Blum-
berg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 
300 (1990) (“At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there were very few cor-
porations.”). 
 “Common issue” class actions, of course, also hardly existed in 1787.  “Thus, the 
form was entirely absent from the Founders’ thinking.”  Purcell, supra note 5, at 1860. 
97 New York enacted the first general incorporation statute of widespread applica-
bility in 1811, but until 1845 only two other states (New Jersey and Connecticut) fol-
lowed suit.  See Butler, supra note 96, at 143.  “The special chartering system inherently 
possessed the potential for rent-seeking behavior, and many examples show how char-
ter applicants strained to get more generous terms from their legislators than those 
obtained by rival groups already in the field.”  Id. at 141. 
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corporations were not themselves viewed as citizens at that time, 
courts employed the technique of looking to the citizenship of their 
shareholders instead.98  In a move that heralded, if it did not reflect, 
the increasingly important role that corporations played in an increas-
ingly interstate economy,99 the Supreme Court, in a confusing100 but 
heroic bit of fiction-making, blundered to the solution that corpora-
tions would be accorded the benefits of citizenship for diversity pur-
poses through an irrebuttable presumption that their shareholders 
were citizens of the incorporating state.101  As a result, corporations 
98 See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64-66 (1809); Blumberg, 
supra note 96, at 302-03 (discussing the rationale behind Justice Marshall’s decision, in 
Deveaux, to tie the citizenship, for jurisdictional purposes, of a corporation to the citi-
zenship of that corporation’s shareholders); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corpo-
ration in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1598 (1988) (noting that looking to 
the citizenship of a corporation’s shareholders precluded many federal courts from 
exercising jurisdiction in many corporate suits). 
99 Butler suggests that the replacement of special charters with general incorpora-
tion statutes (the two systems coexisted in many states for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury) was due to the increase in interstate commerce and the development of a com-
petitive market for incorporation.  The competitive market emerged when it became 
clear that states were constitutionally required to allow foreign corporations to conduct 
interstate commerce within their borders.  See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 
183 (1868) (upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia statute requiring the payment 
of a fee by out-of-state insurance companies seeking to do business in Virginia, but ex-
pressly resting this decision on the propositions that insurance does not constitute 
commerce and that a corporation is not a “citizen” protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Butler, supra note 96, at 133, 155-56 (explaining that Paul for-
bade states from discriminating against foreign corporations by implicitly holding that 
a state could not exclude a corporation from engaging in interstate, rather than intra-
state, commerce); id. at 150-51 (“Prior to the 1850s, it was either assumed or required 
that the operations of corporations—both special and general law—would be confined 
to their chartering state.”). 
100 The confusing nature of the Court’s opinions on corporate citizenship may 
have contributed to confusion about their effects.  Thus, one commentator described 
Deveaux as “allow[ing] easy access to federal courts because it was easy to demonstrate 
diversity of citizenship.”  Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”:  A New Analytical Ap-
proach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 73 
(2005).  Given the requirement of complete diversity, this cannot be right. 
101 See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
497, 555-56 (1844) (holding that a corporation created by a state is to be deemed a 
citizen of that state); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29 
(1854) (holding that stockholders of a corporation are presumed to be citizens of the 
corporation’s state of incorporation); see also Blumberg, supra note 96, at 304-05 (de-
scribing the legal fiction, arising in Letson and Marshall, that gave the corporation “ju-
risdictional opportunities” without according it “citizenship”); Frankfurter, supra note 
87, at 523 (“[L]egal metaphysics about corporate ‘citizenship’ has produced a brood of 
incoherent legal fictions concerning the status of a corporation . . . .”).  As Hovenkamp 
observes, the logic of the Marshall decision “was undermined two years later by Dodge v. 
Woolsey,” 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), “which entertained a diversity action between a 
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were treated as if they were outsiders, potentially subject to biased 
treatment, in the courts of all states but one.102
It was not just the federal law of subject matter jurisdiction that 
impeded corporate litigation well into the nineteenth century (and 
that makes a suggestion of the framers’ prescience look like wishful 
thinking).  In combination with a conception of corporations as enti-
ties that could not act outside of the chartering state103 or could do so 
only with express or implied consent of other states,104 state personal 
jurisdiction law, which was highly favorable to defendants,105 made it 
shareholder and a corporation.”  Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1599.  For the role that 
decisions about corporate citizenship for diversity purposes may have played in the 
subsequent recognition of corporations as “persons” under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see id. at 1642-43; Krannich, supra note 100, at 76-80, 91-92. 
102 Charles Warren described the Marshall decision as follows: 
This malignant decision has resulted in allowing a corporation sued in the 
State in which it actually does business, to remove the suit into a Federal Court 
on the ground of diverse citizenship, simply because it happens to be char-
tered in another State.  No single factor has given rise to more friction and 
jealousy between State and Federal Courts, or to more State legislation con-
flicting with and repugnant to Federal jurisdiction, than has the doctrine of 
citizenship for corporations.  And this diverse citizenship jurisdiction created 
by the Constitution and intended to allay friction and to afford equal and 
identical law to citizen and non-citizen in a State, has resulted in putting foreign 
corporations in a more favorable situation than domestic corporations . . . . 
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 90 (1923); see also Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 524-25 (describing the poten-
tial for unfairness arising out of the use of diversity jurisdiction by corporations). 
103 See supra note 99 (Butler quotation).  “Logically applied, this theory of non-
migration prevented suit in a non-chartering state, for the corporation could not be 
there.”  Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939). 
104 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839) (“Every 
power . . . which a corporation exercises in another state, depends for its validity on 
the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised; and a corporation can make no 
valid contract without their sanction, express or implied.”).  Compare Hovenkamp, su-
pra note 98, at 1649  (“In Bank of Augusta, the Supreme Court held that a state could 
more-or-less arbitrarily exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its 
territory.”), with HURST, supra note 96, at 64 (describing the Bank of Augusta Court as 
erecting a presumption “that a foreign corporation might do business within a state 
unless it were positively shown that the state’s policy was one of exclusion”).  For a dis-
cussion of the gradual recognition of “the right of corporations to work in multistate 
markets,” see Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1650; supra note 99. 
105 I have argued this point in another paper: 
The traditional grounds of adjudicatory jurisdiction in this country (domicile, 
tag jurisdiction, and quasi in rem jurisdiction) are general.  In times when 
travel was costly and difficult, they favored defendants, requiring the plaintiff 
to sue where the defendant lived, unless he or she could be served while pre-
sent in some other state (or had property in another state). 
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hard to sue them anywhere else.106  As calls for a local forum for those 
harmed by the activities of entities that did in fact operate outside of 
their respective states of incorporation became more insistent, the 
states responded with fictions of their own.107  In 1856, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that a state court judgment was not enti-
tled to full faith and credit because the rendering court’s jurisdiction 
was predicated on implied consent to service of process on an in-state 
agent.108 But it was not until 1871 that the Court explicitly blessed federal 
corporate litigation outside of the incorporating state,109 and not until 1878 
Stephen B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 745 (2004) (book 
review). 
106 If you could not arrest a corporation, you could not tag it with service under 
the power theory that was dominant in the nineteenth century.  Cf. Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 
171-72 (“The deletion of ‘in which he shall be found’ [in an 1887 venue provision] was 
not directed toward any change in the status of a corporate litigant.  The restriction 
was designed to shut the door against service of process upon a natural person in any 
place where he might be caught.  It confined suability, except with the defendant’s 
consent, to the district of physical habitation.”).  The other main antidote to tradi-
tional pro-defendant jurisdictional rules, quasi in rem jurisdiction, apparently was 
available as against foreign corporations through attachment of their property, at least 
in some states.  If diversity existed, such cases could be removed even though they 
could not have been maintained as original actions in federal court.  See, e.g., Sayles v. 
Nw. Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 608, 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1854) (No. 12,421); Bliven v. New Eng. 
Screw Co., 3 F. Cas. 715, 715 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 1550); JOHN F. DILLON, RE-
MOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS 27 (St. Louis, G.I. Jones & 
Co. 1876). 
107 “The fact that corporations did do business outside their originating bounds 
made intolerable their immunity from suit in the states of their activities.  And so they 
were required by legislatures to designate agents for service of process in return for the 
privilege of doing local business.”  Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 170.  As Purcell has observed, 
In 1870 . . . only a half-dozen states had enacted laws that required foreign 
corporations to consent to jurisdiction in order to do business within their 
borders.  By 1900, however, forty states had adopted such laws, and by 1910 
virtually every state in the nation had done so.  Most immediately relevant, the 
statutes often authorized jurisdiction over corporations on causes of action 
that arose in other states, thus allowing nonresident plaintiffs asserting claims 
that arose in their home states to secure personal jurisdiction over corpora-
tions in the enacting states. 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDIC-
TION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 181 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
108 See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407-08 (1856). 
109 See R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 83-84 (1871); PURCELL, supra note 
107, at 17-18.  Harris was not a diversity case, but rather “[i]t was controlled by acts of 
Congress local to the [District of Columbia].”  Harris, 79 U.S. at 86.  That may explain 
why lower courts failed to follow its logic in diversity cases.  See infra note 110. 
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that the Court made it clear that the same rule applied in diversity actions110
and (in dictum) that such suits could be removed to federal court.111
These last developments were key contributing factors to the “sys-
tem of corporate diversity litigation” so brilliantly chronicled by the 
legal historian Edward Purcell.112  Purcell’s book, which should be re-
quired reading for all who teach and write about federal courts and 
federal practice and procedure, shows how and why corporate liti-
gants used the federal courts, primarily through removal from the 
state courts, to gain litigation advantages over their opponents, par-
ticularly the growing number of individuals injured in “Industrial 
America” and, with the spread of insurance, the growing number of 
policyholders.  The litigation advantages they sought included, first, 
the opportunity to inflict punishing expense and delay on, and extract 
favorable settlements from, opponents with fewer resources to spend 
on litigation.  The value of this strategy decreased when automobiles 
became ubiquitous, federal courts became more numerous, and the 
population became more urban.113  The second advantage was the op-
portunity to secure more favorable rules of substantive law, especially 
after the federal courts expanded the sphere of application of general 
110 See Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 378 (1878) (noting “the practice in the 
circuit courts generally . . . to decline jurisdiction in this class of suits,” but reasoning 
that the cases relied on by the lower courts were “in conflict with the rule [in Harris]”).
111 See id. at 377 (“As the company, if sued in a State court, could remove the cause 
to the Circuit Court, and thus compel a citizen of the State to submit to that jurisdic-
tion, we see no reason why the citizen may not, if he desires it, bring the company into 
the same jurisdiction at the outset.”).  “As a result of Ex parte Schollenberger, it was clear 
that a corporation came within the provisions of the removal statutes so as to give ju-
risdiction to the circuit court in every state in which the corporation transacted busi-
ness through an agent.”  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 90 (footnote omit-
ted).  As Purcell observes, “Although Harris and Schollenberger had opened the federal 
courts to foreign corporations in the 1870s, both explained that they did so to assist 
individuals who wanted to sue those corporations in federal court.” PURCELL, supra
note 107, at 18. 
112 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 4. 
113 These considerations led Judge Dillon to recommend raising the amount in 
controversy, or increasing the number of federal courts or judges, in 1876: 
In view of the inconvenience and expense of litigating in the Federal courts, 
held often more than one hundred miles distant from the residence of the 
parties; the crowded state of their dockets; and considering that removals, es-
pecially by foreign insurance and railway corporations, often have the effect to 
delay, if not to oppress, those having claims against them, it is quite clear that 
the amount to justify a removal should be enlarged, or the Federal courts mul-
tiplied, or at all events their judicial force increased. 
DILLON, supra note 106, at 25-26. 
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federal common law and the Supreme Court became enamored with 
freedom of contract (i.e., increasingly in the period Purcell studied, 
until the 1930s).  The third advantage that corporate litigants sought 
in this period was the possibility that the federal courts might act in 
accordance with the view of them held by many people—namely as 
bastions of business interests—especially in times of social upheaval 
(i.e., intermittently in the period Purcell studied). 
In addition, corporate litigants came to understand that although 
Congress closed the avenues for remedial dispensation that judgment 
creditors had sought in actions at law, where federal diversity courts 
were required to apply state procedure,114 no such constraint applied 
to equitable remedies (e.g., injunctions), as to which conformity had 
never been required.115  Finally, late in the period Purcell studied, a 
(Democratic) Congress added to the federal courts’ remedial arsenal 
a discretionary remedy—the declaratory judgment—that quickly be-
came an additional incentive for corporate forum shopping, particu-
larly in insurance litigation.116   
Once corporate litigants were given broader access to federal 
court, plaintiffs’ lawyers devised tactics to deny them the litigation ad-
vantages they sought by keeping cases in the state courts.  In line with 
the growing popular view that the federal courts favored business in-
114 See Burbank, supra note 93, at 1327 (explaining that, in response to the Su-
preme Court’s controversial decision in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 
(1825), “the proponents of change secured legislation in Congress that required fed-
eral courts to follow state laws concerning final process as of 1828 and that channeled 
their power to alter state law on final process in one direction, namely the adoption of 
post-1828 state laws”). 
115 See Burbank, supra note 88, at 1039 (“Equity had remained free of any require-
ment of conformity [with state procedure] since the beginning of the Republic . . . .”). 
But see Burbank, supra note 93, at 1321 (“[E]ven prior to 1938, federal courts tended to 
follow state law that expanded the remedial rights of litigants, and assertions concern-
ing the inability of state law to affect federal equity from that period must be carefully 
evaluated . . . .”).  For a description of the use of federal equity in insurance litigation, 
see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 206-09.  Note also railroads’ use of state court injunc-
tions against Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) litigation in allegedly inconven-
ient forums, which the Court put a stop to through interpretations of the statute’s 
venue provision.  See id. at 222-24, 370 n.82. 
116 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 212-13.  An interesting article by Andrew Bradt 
has rescued Congress’s 1934 statute from oblivion, reminding us of the multiple pur-
poses that animated its chief promoters, who were law professors, and at least one of 
whom (Edson Sunderland) was a progressive/realist.  See Andrew Bradt, “Much To Gain 
and Nothing To Lose”:  Implications of the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) 
Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 771-91 (2006).  The perspective taken in the text suggests 
that further research may reveal that this statute, like the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
enacted the same year, was welcomed by people of very different political persuasions. 
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terests,117 some states sought to assist plaintiffs in that effort, including 
by attempting to domesticate corporations that they licensed to do 
business.118  As Purcell describes, the Supreme Court put an end to 
this maneuver in 1896, at the height of a period when its decisions 
might well be thought to have justified the popular view.119  Thereafter 
and more typically, stuck with an increasingly implausible view of cor-
porate citizenship (under the traditional view of the purpose of the 
diversity grant), plaintiffs’ lawyers relied on various stratagems to de-
feat removal. 
The most promising techniques for defeating removal were the 
joinder of nondiverse defendants120 and the manipulation of the dam-
ages claimed,121 either of which could prevent corporate defendants 
from satisfying the requirements of original jurisdiction.  Each of 
these maneuvers elicited countermeasures from corporate defen-
dants, and the federal courts were required to umpire the system 
through the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes. 
Key to defending against the joinder stratagem was a provision 
permitting the removal of separable controversies (now separate and 
independent claims).122  Long treated by scholars as complex if not 
obscure, and having been amended in recent years to reach only fed-
eral question claims, this provision is still a fertile source of doctrinal 
questions.123  It once was much more than that.  Purcell shows how 
corporate defendants—and in particular railroads—sought access to 
117 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 26 (“The belief that federal judges tended to 
favor business was a widely shared part of American political culture . . . .”); Frank-
furter, supra note 87, at 522 (“Moreover, it is politically highly unwise to permit the 
federal courts to be used as an escape from state tribunals and thus to associate the 
federal court in the public mind as the resort of powerful litigants.”). 
118 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 18 (describing the development of corporate 
domestication); Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 521 (“With a view to circumventing this use 
of jurisdiction by foreign corporations, states have resorted to every variety of legisla-
tion, frequently frustrated by the Supreme Court.”); supra note 102 (Warren quotation). 
119 See St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562-63 (1896) (holding that 
state law cannot change corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); 
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 18 (“James, in other words, ensured that corporations 
could restrict their jurisdictional citizenship to only one state and thereby preserve di-
versity with citizens of every other state in the union.”); id. at 267 (discussing two Su-
preme Court decisions that “expanded corporate removal rights” by allowing removal 
by corporations to the federal courts in the state of filing, even where neither party was 
a citizen of that state). 
120 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 104-26. 
121 See id. at 90-97. 
122 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000); PURCELL, supra note 107, at 106-07. 
123 See, e.g., WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 32, at 235-42. 
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federal court by contending, among other arguments, that claims 
against the (diverse) corporation and a (nondiverse) employee were 
not “joint” because they were based on different theories of liability; 
how some lower courts (led by the future Chief Justice, William How-
ard Taft) accommodated them by accepting this contention;124 and 
how the Supreme Court vacillated and temporized before ultimately 
remitting the answer to state law, which tended to be favorable to 
plaintiffs (foreclosing removal by treating the claims as joint).125
Plaintiffs pursued a wide variety of antiremoval tactics involving 
the amount in controversy,126 some less seemly than others.  It suffices 
here to mention two.  First, some plaintiffs deliberately alleged dam-
ages less than the amount required for diversity in their state court 
complaints, only to amend the ad damnum after the time for removal 
had passed.  Corporate defendants responded to delayed upward 
amendments by removing and arguing that federal jurisdiction should 
not be defeated through fraudulent pleading.127  Having avoided the 
question in a case squarely presenting it in 1890,128 the Court eventu-
ally approved the view of lower courts that rejected this tactic, holding 
(in a case involving an amendment to drop a nondiverse party from 
state litigation) that postcommencement developments making a case 
removable restarted the time limit.129
Second, a more interesting and apparently far more common tac-
tic was the conscious discounting of claims that might yield recovery 
in excess of the required amount in controversy for diversity jurisdic-
124 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 111-12. 
125 See id. at 118-21.  Purcell notes that even then plaintiffs faced difficulty because 
of lower court intransigence, the problems created by the need to keep the nondiverse 
party (who might be a coworker) in the case, or corporate defendants’ determination 
to impose expense even in cases where removal was clearly improper.  See id. at 120-21. 
126 The amount in controversy was raised from in excess of $500 to in excess of 
$2000 in 1887, and to in excess of $3000 in 1911.  PURCELL, supra note 107, at 91.  For 
an argument in favor of raising the amount by a sitting federal judge in 1876, see supra
note 113. 
127 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 95-97. 
128 See N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Austin, 135 U.S. 315, 318 (1890); PURCELL, supra note 
107, at 95-97. 
129 See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 102 (1898); PURCELL,
supra note 107, at 112-14.  The value of this rule to defendants was diluted in 1988, 
long after the disintegration of the system of corporate diversity litigation, when Con-
gress enacted an overarching one-year limitation.  See Judicial Improvements and Ac-
cess to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000)).  But see infra note 317 (suggesting that CAFA’s elimina-
tion of the one-year limitation on removal will provide further opportunities for collu-
sion by defendants). 
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tion.130  This tactic became more attractive when that amount was 
raised from in excess of $500 to in excess of $2000 in 1887, and to 
more than $3000 in 1911.131  Even so, it is sufficiently arresting to 
prompt a reminder of the historical context—in particular, the facts 
that federal court litigation could be significantly more expensive and 
less convenient for plaintiffs than state court litigation;132 that some 
defendants did not scruple to remove even in cases where it must have 
been apparent that they had no right to do so; and that some lower 
federal courts were happy to oblige those defendants, even in the 
teeth of Supreme Court precedent.  On that view, apart from any per-
ceived advantages of litigation in state court, by discounting, plaintiffs 
sought insurance against the transaction costs of removal battles.  
More broadly, according to Purcell, 
[T]he development of a collection of highly technical and apparently 
trivial procedural rules centering on the jurisdictional amount helped 
forge one of the great, if largely unspoken, social and legal compromises 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The operative rule 
was simple and well understood.  If plaintiffs agreed to keep their claims 
reasonably small, they could guarantee themselves a state forum.
133
130 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 90-97.  At that time, according to Purcell, a 
plaintiff’s recovery was generally restricted by state law to the amount stated in the 
complaint.  See id. at 91.  Changes in pleading rules since that time have already caused 
difficulties in litigation under CAFA.  See, e.g., Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 
F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (criticizing Low-
dermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007), for imposing a higher 
burden of proof (to a “legal certainty”) on a removing defendant when the plaintiff 
alleges a specific amount less than the jurisdictional threshold, because “[s]ome states 
do not allow any mention of damages in state court complaints”); Morgan v. Gay, 471 
F.3d 469, 477 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We admonish that a verdict in excess of the demand 
could well be deemed prejudicial to the party that sought removal to federal court 
when the party seeking remand uses a damages-limitation provision to avoid federal 
court.”); Strawn v. AT & T Mobility, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602-03 (S.D. W. Va. 
2007) (observing that an ad damnum below the jurisdictional amount is not sufficient 
to deny federal jurisdiction in West Virginia, where recovery is not limited to the 
amount demanded in the complaint).  For a valuable discussion of the doctrinal puz-
zles lurking in jurisdictional-amount requirements, both in the default regime and un-
der CAFA, see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1568-79; see also Shapiro, supra
note 63, at 116-21 (discussing the validity of plaintiffs’ self-imposed caps on recovery 
and the complications introduced by these voluntary caps in CAFA cases). 
131 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 91, 99. 
132 Purcell notes that the popularity of discounting by plaintiffs endured even after 
developments, such as the automobile and increases in the number of federal courts, 
that made federal litigation less onerous for individual plaintiffs.  See id. at 148, 154-60. 
133 Id. at 251. 
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If the refusal of federal courts to follow state law concerning final 
remedies—thereby favoring creditors—proved intensely controversial 
in the 1820s,134 it is hardly surprising that, once the system of corpo-
rate diversity litigation was fully operational, the advantages it unques-
tionably conferred (and those that many people feared it conferred) 
on corporations in litigation against individuals also provoked intense 
controversy.  We have seen that various efforts by states to thwart re-
moval, such as by attempting to domesticate foreign corporations, 
were unsuccessful.135  The controversy was equally intense in the halls 
of Congress, where repeated efforts to abolish corporate citizenship or 
otherwise curtail corporate access to federal court found substantial 
support in the House—a number of the bills passed there—but always 
failed in the Senate.136
In his rich and nuanced account of the system of corporate diver-
sity jurisdiction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Purcell vividly evokes the thrust and parry, not just of the litigants, but, 
as it were, of the federal courts.  He demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court responded differently, indeed inconsistently, to the interpretive 
questions posed, and that, even when the Court had appeared to set-
tle a question, some lower courts did not get the message—at least if it 
was one that disfavored the interests of corporate defendants.  Ac-
knowledging that it is difficult to read the Court’s decisions in the 
1890s as something other than a conscious effort to enable corporate 
134 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.  For the checkered history of 
state statutes tying a corporation’s permission to do business to its remaining in state 
court, see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 201-02, 205.  Purcell notes that such statutes 
were of particular salience to insurance companies.  Since insurance was not “com-
merce,” those selling it across state lines were not protected by the Commerce Clause 
from the power to exclude.  “If a state revoked an insurance company’s license [be-
cause it removed a case to federal court], then, the company would simply be out of 
business in that state.”  Id. at 202.  These statutes ceased to be enforceable as a result of 
Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922), in which the Court affirmed an 
injunction barring the Arkansas Secretary of State from revoking a corporation’s li-
cense to do business because it had violated a state statute by suing an Arkansas citizen 
in federal court and removing another case brought by an Arkansas citizen to federal 
court.  Id. at 532-33.  The Terral Court remarked that “the Federal Constitution confers 
upon citizens of one State the right to resort to federal courts in another,” and “that 
state action, whether legislative or executive, necessarily calculated to curtail the free 
exercise of the right thus secured is void.”  Id. at 532. 
136 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 88-93, 136-45.  The House passed 
bills that would have eliminated corporate citizenship in 1880, 1883 (twice), and 1892; 
a bill that would have limited Supreme Court review in diversity cases in 1890; and a 
bill that would have eliminated railroad citizenship in 1894.  See Curry, supra note 4, at 
464 app. A. 
1474 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 1439
access to federal court, Purcell is careful both to note the larger politi-
cal environment that probably contributed to that impulse and, iden-
tifying cycles of pro- and anti-access decisions, to eschew any one 
causal explanation for the Court’s behavior, let alone a narrowly ideo-
logical causal explanation.137
Felix Frankfurter appeared to accept Friendly’s argument that the 
Constitution’s diversity grant was more likely animated by the purpose 
of enabling creditors to escape prodebtor state legislation (and more 
generally, perhaps, of providing “business men’s courts”) than it was 
by the purpose ascribed to it by the traditional view.138  Yet when advo-
cating the abolition of the system of corporate diversity, he was equally 
happy to point out that some of the Supreme Court’s decisions pro-
viding corporate access could not be justified according to the tradi-
tional view.139  Purcell follows Frankfurter in pointing out the inconsis-
tencies, but, as a historian not constrained by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court (or the incentives of an advocate of change), he digs 
deeper, ranges more broadly, and is more sensitive both to causal 
multiplicity and to the transformation of law in the books. 
Evaluating experience under the removal provision of the Local 
Prejudice Act,140 Purcell provides evidence that bias against foreign 
corporations was a rare and isolated phenomenon in the late nine-
teenth century.141  Prejudice was, however, a very serious problem for 
137 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 121-26, 193, 262-91. 
138 See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520-21 (quoting Friendly, supra note 81, at 
498).
139 See id. at 525-26 (criticizing removal jurisdiction for state court cases between 
two nonresidents, removal of a whole controversy under the separable controversy 
provision, and receiverships based on diversity of citizenship); infra note 152 and ac-
companying text. 
140 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 558-59.  As Purcell explains, 
The original local prejudice act allowed nonresidents to remove regardless of 
whether they were plaintiffs or defendants and to do so “at any time before 
the final hearing or trial.”  To remove under the act, parties had only to sub-
mit affidavits stating that they had reason to believe that from “prejudice or 
local influence” they would be unable to obtain justice in the state courts. 
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 129 (footnote omitted) (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 
196, 14 Stat. at 559).  For a description of amendments to the Act in 1887–1888, see id.
at 130-31. 
141 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 137-42 (finding “several reasons to doubt 
whether local prejudice constituted a major and pervasive threat to corporate defen-
dants,” including the absence of evidence from noncorporate spokespersons and re-
ported decisions showing that “corporate defendants failed to produce evidence of lo-
cal prejudice in any significant number of cases”). 
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the putative beneficiaries of the removal provision of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.142  Comparing the Court’s decisions under the two stat-
utes in light of the general provisions concerning diversity jurisdic-
tion, Purcell finds that “[i]n diversity cases federal law was willing sim-
ply to presume the existence of prejudice and to grant a broadly 
effective remedy; in civil rights cases it was content to ignore the 
prejudice and to offer only a paper remedy.”143  This is part of the 
powerful case he makes for the proposition that 
a better explanation [than the traditional view] for the actual shape that 
the Supreme Court gave diversity jurisdiction over the years—or, at least, 
from the 1870s to the 1940s—was simply that the Justices generally if im-
plicitly believed that they should maintain federal jurisdiction over issues 
and interests that they regarded as having national importance.
144
Purcell’s account of federal diversity litigation after the early years 
of the twentieth century is equally rich and nuanced, and equally fas-
cinating.  The advent of the automobile, the proliferation of federal 
trial courts, and the movement to urban living reduced the advantages 
of removal for corporate litigants,145 while the Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act (FELA), which was quickly amended to bar removal,146 and 
state workers’ compensation laws147 both provided attractive alterna-
tives to a brutally laissez-faire general federal common law and em-
powered plaintiffs who desired to litigate in state tribunals.  The loos-
ening of restrictions on state court personal jurisdiction over 
corporations encouraged an increasingly entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
personal-injury bar to turn the tables on corporate opponents by ven-
142 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
143 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 147. 
144 Id. at 256; see also HURST, supra note 96, at 143 (“Conceptions of the legal char-
acter and the social uses and dangers of the corporation deeply colored the ideas of 
national interest which the Court pursued.”).  At times, however, Purcell may retroject 
to political actors in 1787 and 1789 the much later belief system and motivation of the 
Court (or of Congress).  Consider in that regard the following: 
The respective jurisdictions were created and construed not on the basis of 
any showing about the dangers of “local prejudice” or any considered evalua-
tion of the need for various carefully tailored remedies but, rather, on a desire 
to accomplish divergent and ulterior social goals.  For its part, diversity juris-
diction was simply designed to favor nonresidents who engaged in interstate 
commerce.  In a variety of ways, some intended and others not, it did just that. 
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 147. 
145 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 154-60. 
146 See id. at 165-72. 
147 See id. at 161-63. 
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turing into other states in search of forum advantage.  Noting that the 
advantages sought often reposed not in rules of substantive law, but 
rules of “procedure” broadly defined,148 Purcell describes the attrac-
tions of one state favored by plaintiffs, Minnesota, as follows: 
 The legal system in Minnesota was distinctly favorable to plaintiffs.  It 
recognized a far-reaching rule of personal jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations, placed the burden of proving contributory negligence on the 
defendant, provided that plaintiffs were not subject to examination be-
fore trial, and applied a generous employer-employee joinder rule, thus 
making a critical antiremoval device readily available.  Its supreme court, 
too, construed remedial statutes liberally.  The Minnesota jury was espe-
cially attractive.  State law provided for a nonunanimous verdict by ten of 
twelve jurors and gave its juries considerable latitude in fixing the 
amount of damages.  Equally or more important, its juries had a reputa-
tion for bringing in handsome verdicts for plaintiffs.149
Corporate defendants that for decades had used the burdens of 
distance and expense as tactical weapons to wear down individual 
plaintiffs through removal started to protest the burdens that inter-
state forum shopping imposed on them.150 Moreover, ever eager to 
148 See id. at 179 (explaining the effect that “procedure’s” “broad and often uncer-
tain scope” had on creating significant differences, including outcome differences, 
among state courts); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 
TUL. L. REV. 553, 573-74 (1989) (providing examples of cases in which procedural con-
cerns trumped substantive concerns for plaintiffs, and arguing that conflict of law rules 
often cannot prevent procedural forum shopping). 
149 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 185 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 184 (“Of all 
the states that offered attractive forums, however, none rivaled Minnesota in its com-
bination of both favorable law and an enterprising plaintiffs’ bar.”).  Minnesota con-
tinued to provide jurisdictional and choice of law rules that were very favorable to 
plaintiffs long after the period that Purcell chronicles, and it also continued to provide 
cases in which the Supreme Court sought to use the Constitution to put on the brakes.  
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-31 (1980) (holding unconstitutional Minne-
sota’s exercise of jurisdiction where the defendant’s only contact with the state was the 
fact that his insurer did business, and “held” his insurance policy, there).  Indeed, be-
cause of a very long statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Minnesota is still a 
“hotbed for out-of-state plaintiffs.”  Mark Hansen, Lawsuits Travel Up North, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 2007, at 16, 16-17. 
150 As Purcell writes,
 In their efforts to establish a doctrine of forum non conveniens and to have out-
of-state suits enjoined, corporations exhibited a keen awareness of the bur-
dens that distance imposed on litigants. . . . Indeed, in a good many imported 
cases the distance was less than the additional distance that removal imposed 
on numerous individual plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, when distance became a 
plaintiffs’ tool, corporate defendants loudly proclaimed its unfairness and vig-
orously sought relief from its oppression. 
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 189 (footnote omitted). 
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take advantage of more favorable rules of general federal common 
law—in a litigation environment where, because of “legislative en-
croachments,”151 those rules had less scope of application—they sought 
and ultimately (in 1923) secured reversal of a 1906 Supreme Court 
decision that, consistently with the traditional view of diversity litiga-
tion, had barred removal from the courts of a state in which neither 
the plaintiff nor the defendant resided.152  Purcell describes how, in 
that 1923 decision and by other means, the Court in the 1920s and 
1930s sought to police interstate forum shopping.  Central to those 
efforts were attempts to use the Constitution to restrain state court ju-
risdiction and state choice of law.153  Both efforts proved short-lived, as 
the Court apparently realized that the Commerce154 and Full Faith and 
Credit155 Clauses were equilibration instruments entirely too blunt for 
the dynamics of forum selection. 
151 See id. at 160-66 (describing how both Congress and the states removed some of 
the power of federal common law by enacting various statutory schemes, including the 
states’ workers’ compensation laws and Congress’s FELA). 
152 See id. at 191-93.  The decisions in question were Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.S. 449, 
460-61 (1906), in which the Court prevented the removal of a case brought in a district 
in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided, and Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Co., 260 U.S. 653, 658-61 (1923), in which the Court overruled Wisner and held 
that a case otherwise removable can be removed without regard to the original venue 
requirements.  Note Professor Frankfurter’s criticism of this result in terms of the his-
toric rationale for diversity jurisdiction.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
When writing for the Court in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 
(1939), Justice Frankfurter had reason to think better of Lee, at least insofar as it cut a 
path to making a federal court available to a plaintiff suing a defendant that had ap-
pointed an agent for service of process in a state of which neither was a citizen.  See
Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 168, 171 n.8 (praising Lee for allowing parties to litigation to waive 
statutory venue requirements). 
153 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 192-99 (explaining the Court’s “numerous ef-
forts . . . to develop constitutional doctrines of judicial forum control”). 
154 Compare Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923) 
(holding the assertion of jurisdiction under a Minnesota statute, based solely on the 
presence of a “solicitation agent” of the railroad and not on the locale of the litigated 
incident, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause), with Int’l Milling Co. v. Co-
lumbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 517 (1934) (“[Davis] was confined narrowly within 
the bounds of its own facts.”). 
155 Compare Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932) (requir-
ing a New Hampshire court to apply Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute as a 
matter of full faith and credit), with Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 
294 U.S. 532, 548-50 (1935) (distinguishing Clapper into oblivion in allowing California to 
enforce its own workers’ compensation statute in a case arising from injuries suffered in 
Alaska).  In Purcell’s understated formulation, the Court in the latter claimed “some-
what unconvincingly to be consistent with Clapper.”  PURCELL, supra note 107, at 198. 
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The failed constitutional experiments of the 1920s and 1930s set 
the stage for the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins156 and 
for its embrace of a broad forum non conveniens doctrine,157 the for-
mer antithetical to corporate interests and the latter something that 
those interests had long advocated.  Purcell here158 lays the ground-
work for his subsequent, equally brilliant book, Brandeis and the Pro-
gressive Constitution,159 confirming what a close reading of the Erie deci-
sion and its progeny reveal.  Quite apart from the “unconstitutionality 
of the course pursued”160 under Swift v. Tyson,161 the Court was intent 
to address the “defects, political and social” of the system of corporate 
diversity litigation by eliminating the forum-shopping incentives that 
different rules of decision created.162
Scholars have tended to view International Shoe Co. v. Washington163
as contributing to the development of the modern market for litiga-
tion by enhancing opportunities for forum shopping.164  Although 
156 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
157 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (refusing to “cata-
logue the circumstances” that will justify applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, 
so as to leave the courts with discretion). 
158 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 224-30. 
159 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA (2000).
160 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78. 
161 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
162 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74; see PURCELL, supra note 159, at 141-91 (describing Justice 
Brandeis’s political and social concerns in writing the Erie opinion).  A very close read-
ing of the Erie decision reveals a number of citations to Frankfurter’s 1928 article, supra
note 87, where, despairing of a judicial remedy to Swift, the author advocated the legis-
lative fix that Brandeis had urged upon him.  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.6, 77 nn.20-21; 
see also supra note 88. 
163 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
164 I have previously taken the view that 
the greater latitude to assert jurisdiction afforded the states by International 
Shoe and its progeny dramatically enhanced the opportunities for interstate 
forum shopping and, coupled with loose federal control of state choice of law, 
the incentives of both litigants and state courts to run a race to judgment, cre-
ating a market for litigation in which the voluntary extension of wholly domes-
tic lis pendens doctrine to interjurisdictional litigation would constitute sur-
prising self-restraint.
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Pro-
gress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 210 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also
Bassett, supra note 9, at 353 n.59. 
2008] CAFA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1479
Purcell makes no such claim,165 his account raises the question 
whether International Shoe was actually animated in part by the desire 
to reduce forum shopping against corporations.  By enabling states to 
assert activity-based personal jurisdiction without resort to fictions 
such as corporate presence, the Court may have hoped to change the 
balance of incentives in favor of suit in the state where the corporate 
activity grounding the claim occurred.  The Justices may have hoped 
thereby to reduce the incidence, and set the stage for a reconsidera-
tion, of what we now call “general doing-business” jurisdiction.166  If so, 
rather than contributing to the impulses that led the Court, two years 
later, to embrace forum non conveniens (a view that is in any event 
suspect insofar as that doctrine has little if any role to play in cases of 
specific jurisdiction167), International Shoe should be seen as part of a 
165 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 220-21 (“The [International Shoe] decision limited 
the ability of foreign corporations to structure their business so that they could carry 
on activities in a state but remain beyond the reach of its courts, and it made it easier 
for plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in their home states.”). 
166 As I have previously observed, 
Apparently a creation of the courts, but subsequently adopted in the jurisdic-
tional statutes of some states, doing-business jurisdiction was justified under 
traditional theory by the fiction of presence.  When that fiction was undressed 
in International Shoe, a case that involved an assertion of what we would now 
call specific jurisdiction but that reasoned to a new paradigm by surveying 
cases of both specific and general jurisdiction, the future of this jurisdictional 
ground was put in doubt.  It is still in doubt. 
Burbank, supra note 105, at 750 (footnotes omitted).  This discussion prompted David 
Shapiro to ask,
[I]sn’t it true that the contemporary justifications for asserting personal juris-
diction over out-of-state corporations were both over and under-inclusive?  
That is, they might reach some cases where the corporation had “consented” 
in order to do business (or was “present” in some abstract sense) yet the case 
had no connections with the state, but wouldn’t reach others in which the un-
derlying facts had significant contacts with the state? 
E-mail from David Shapiro to author (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with author). 
167 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:  End of the Century or Beginning 
of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 120-21 (1999) (evaluating Robert 
Casad’s view, as put forth in Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the 
Twentieth Century, Forum Conveniens and Forum Non Conveniens, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 91, 105-06 (1999), that forum non conveniens is limited to cases involving only gen-
eral jurisdiction). Both of the Court’s 1947 decisions embracing a broad forum non 
conveniens doctrine, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), and Koster v. (Ameri-
can) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), were federal diversity ac-
tions.  Purcell describes them as a “respon[se] to the general rise in interstate forum 
shopping,” PURCELL, supra note 107, at 235, and suggests that they may have contrib-
uted to the defeat of a bill that would have restricted venue options in FELA cases.  Id.
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concerted attempt to develop alternatives to the failed constitutional 
experiments of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Whether or not International Shoe was animated by a goal of reduc-
ing interstate forum shopping against corporations, the role that the 
forum non conveniens doctrine and its statutory successor168 were per-
ceived to play in policing that phenomenon is evidence that, by the 
late 1940s, diversity jurisdiction had come to be seen by many not as a 
magnet for abusive litigation behavior by corporations, but as a source 
of protection against such behavior on the part of plaintiffs.  Of 
course, the new role was linked no more closely to the traditional view 
of diversity jurisdiction than that which it replaced.  Moreover, it would 
only have traction until such time as the Court or Congress came up 
with alternative and more direct ways of restraining state court over-
reaching. 
Purcell persuasively argues that, by the 1950s, the changes 
wrought by Erie and its progeny, and the changed complexion of the 
federal judiciary, effectively rendered the federal courts more likely to 
be sought than feared by individual plaintiffs.169  Thus, at a time when 
the federal courts were under attack for unpopular constitutional de-
cisions, but when diversity cases were proving a burden, Congress re-
jected a bill sponsored by a southern congressman that, by eliminating 
corporate citizenship entirely, might have cut the federal civil docket 
by as much as twenty-five percent.170  Instead, Congress raised the 
amount in controversy to in excess of $10,000 and addressed what 
were perceived to be the last vestiges of the system of corporate diver-
sity litigation:  giving plaintiffs in workers’ compensation cases the 
same privilege of forum choice as under the Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act, and eliminating the abuse of tactical reincorporation fa-
mously blessed in the Black & White Taxicab case.171  The latter was ac-
at 235-36.  He also notes the likely influence in that regard of the transfer provision in 
the draft Judicial Code, which was enacted in 1948 as 28 U.S.C. § 1404.  Id.
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000).  Added by the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, 
this provision authorizing transfer (rather than dismissal) of cases in which there is 
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue had the effect of 
confining the federal forum non conveniens doctrine to cases in which the alternative 
forum is foreign. 
169 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 230-43. 
170 See id. at 241-42 (“The Tuck bill would have cut the diversity docket by almost 
two-thirds and sliced the entire federal civil docket by 25 percent.”). 
171 See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1928) (upholding the application of general federal com-
mon law different from Kentucky law in a lawsuit brought in federal court in Kentucky 
by a local company that had strategically reincorporated from Kentucky to Tennessee). 
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complished by providing that corporations are citizens both of the 
states by which they are incorporated and of the state that is their prin-
cipal place of business.172
Purcell’s discussion of the 1958 legislation adumbrates the point 
that he develops at length in Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution
with respect to Henry Hart and Erie scholarship, namely that by this 
point the actors had lost sight of the social meaning of the system of 
corporate diversity litigation.173  As a result, the actors deemed the un-
usual and essentially local problem involved in the Black & White Taxi-
cab case as emblematic of that system. 
Whether those responsible for the 1958 legislation had forgotten 
or were simply unaware of the serious and widespread social problems 
that the system of corporate diversity litigation engendered, the mani-
fest absurdity of treating modern business corporations as outsiders, 
vulnerable to local prejudice, in all states but two cannot have escaped 
them.174  Or rather, it could not have escaped them if they had been 
172 See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). 
173 See PURCELL, supra note 159, at 229-57. 
174 This is not to deny that members of Congress, or others considering the legisla-
tion enacted in 1958, echoed the traditional account of reasons for the diversity grant, 
or that they entertained the possibility of prejudice against national corporations do-
ing interstate business.  It is, however, to suggest that their hearts were not in it and 
thus to agree with Purcell’s interpretation of the legislative record.  Consider that, in 
identical language, the House and Senate Reports (1) espoused the goal of “reducing 
the number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts on 
the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists,” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3 
(1958), S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958); (2) stated that the “jurisdictional amount 
should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor 
so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies,” H.R. REP. NO. 85-
1706, at 3, S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; (3) having articulated the “underlying purpose of 
diversity of citizenship legislation,” went on to observe that “[w]hatever the effective-
ness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations which, because 
of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another State,” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4, 
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; and (4) noted that the change “will not eliminate those cor-
porations which do business over a large number of States, such as the railroads, insur-
ance companies, and other corporations whose businesses are not localized in one par-
ticular State.”  H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4, S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5.  Consider also that 
in his testimony before a House Subcommittee on behalf of the Judicial Conference, 
which originally proposed the legislation, Judge Maris acknowledged that there were 
intermediate measures Congress could take between expanding corporate citizenship 
by adding the principal place of business and simply making diversity jurisdiction un-
available to corporations.  See Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizen-
ship:  Hearing on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 4497 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong. 30, 34-35 (1957) (statement of Judge Albert B. Maris).  Moreover, 
he stated that the measure proposed (and ultimately enacted) “is the minimum, . . . 
and it is the one which the Conference felt it was proper for it to recommend.”  Id. at 
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thinking about diversity jurisdiction in the traditional way.  Whatever 
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution may have intended in Ar-
ticle III, Congress in 1958—with far better reason (at least as a matter 
of institutional legitimacy) than the Court in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries—had moved on, confirming what its repeal 
30.  Given that formulation, his additional comment that “[y]ou could go further and 
say that a corporation shall be regarded as a citizen of any State in which it is doing 
business, whether that is its principal place of business or not, though that would 
eliminate many more corporations,” id., might have seemed an invitation.  In that re-
gard, Judge Maris also testified that the Judicial Conference had considered and re-
jected making corporations citizens of all states in which they were (doing or) qualified 
to do business because “that would really eliminate American business, which is mostly 
now incorporated, from access to the Federal courts.”  Id. at 35.  Withal, when asked 
about possible opposition from “people representing corporations,” to the various pos-
sible measures discussed at the hearing, id., Judge Maris observed that they “seem to 
regard pretty highly their privilege of taking their litigation into the Federal courts in 
States remote from their headquarters where they don’t know the local people, and 
they fear for the results that might be reached in the State court.  They seem to feel 
that way.”  Id. at 35-36.  He added that “it is the basis, I suppose, for the diversity juris-
diction, when all is said and done; why it was originally put in the Constitution.”  Id. at 36.   
 Finally, the congressional materials informing the interpretation of the 1958 legis-
lation are markedly different in this respect from some of the Judicial Conference ma-
terials they include.  Most notable is the March 12, 1951, report of the Conference’s 
Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue, see H.R. REP NO. 85-1706, at 12-27; S. REP. NO.
85-1830, at 15-30, chaired by Judge John Parker, no stranger to the system of corporate 
diversity litigation in the 1920s and 1930s. See John J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and 
Recent Attacks upon It, 18 A.B.A. J. 433, 434 (1932) (defending diversity jurisdiction 
against critics he called “socialists and near socialists”); see also Marcus, supra note 28, at 
1262 (describing Parker as a “staunch advocate for both diversity jurisdiction and the 
Swift regime”). The Judicial Conference Committee insisted that “local prejudice con-
tinues to exist.”  H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 15; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 18.  Tellingly, 
however, much of the support it adduced for that proposition in connection with cor-
porations came from the 1920s and 1930s, including the 1932 hearings that Purcell 
discusses, see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 242, and a 1922 speech by Chief Justice Taft, 
one of the architects of the system of corporate diversity litigation.  See H.R. REP. NO.
85-1706, at 16-17; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 19-20; supra text accompanying note 124 
(noting then-Judge Taft’s hostility to the tactic of joining nondiverse defendants to de-
feat removal).  What emerges from the Judicial Conference Committee’s report is the 
conviction that corporate access to federal courts is essential to “cultivat[ing] a na-
tional outlook” and ensuring that “there is the freest communication and intercourse, 
with unrestricted flow of capital and commerce into the various parts of the Union.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 16; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 19.  To that end corporations 
need not only “protection . . . against local prejudice,” but also “the benefit of the salu-
tory rules and practice of the Federal courts.”  H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 17; S. REP. NO.
85-1830, at 20. 
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of the Local Prejudice Act ten years earlier had suggested.175  As Pur-
cell observes, the important thing, rather, was 
to recognize the dominant role of large corporations in the nation’s 
economy and to accord their activities the time and attention of the na-
tional courts.  The distinction that Congress drew between local and na-
tional corporations—for which it cited no significant evidence—allowed 
it for the first time to give its formal blessing to the judicially developed 
doctrine of corporate citizenship and to confer on national businesses 
the statutory right of access to the federal courts.  That policy judgment 
was profoundly if subtly different from the traditional premise that justi-
fied diversity jurisdiction.  In 1958 Congress was not concerned with pro-
tecting corporations against the dangers of local prejudice but with 
keeping in the hands of the national courts what it regarded as in every 
realistic sense the basic affairs of the nation.
176
Purcell’s point about “los[ing] contact with the social history of 
[diversity jurisdiction and the federal common law]”177 is, however, far 
more telling with respect to Hart than it is with respect to the 1958 
Congress.  For, as Purcell demonstrates, the system of corporate diver-
sity litigation had been dismantled by 1958.  Even if (or perhaps be-
cause) it reconceived the function of diversity jurisdiction in accord 
with the Court’s actual practice during the system of corporate diver-
sity litigation, Congress in that year did not alter the aspects of prior 
law that had bestowed countervailing power on plaintiffs, and it did 
not alter any aspect of Erie jurisprudence.  Attacks on that jurispru-
dence are vulnerable to criticism to the extent that they manifest ig-
norance of the social and institutional contexts that elicited it.  The 
attacks are more troublesome to the extent that, if successful, they 
might so alter the balance of power as to pave the way for a return of 
the system of corporate diversity litigation.178
175 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 238 (“[R]epeal of the local prejudice act dra-
matically captured the profound ambivalence and ambiguity that continued to under-
lie diversity jurisdiction.”). 
176 Id. at 241. 
177 Id. at 239. 
178 See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity 
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1938-44 (2006) [hereinafter Burbank, Aggrega-
tion] (rejecting the argument that courts can and should use CAFA as authorization to 
fashion federal choice of law rules to govern class actions); infra text accompanying 
note 250.  Professor Hazard’s contribution to this Symposium seems to me problematic 
in both respects.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Con-
gress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2008) (interpreting CAFA as a congressional 
statement that “the Erie Doctrine is seriously erroneous”).  Moreover, to view CAFA as 
repealing the Erie doctrine is wishful thinking that is contradicted both by most courts’ 
unwillingness to interpret CAFA silently to overrule long-standing precedent, see, e.g.,
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IV. DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A.  Federal Class Actions in General and the Revolution of 1966179
Class actions fascinate scholars, enrich lawyers, and are greeted as 
either an instrument of salvation or an engine of destruction by cli-
ents.  Although of ancient lineage, they have come to play consequen-
tial roles in American litigation chiefly within the last forty years.  
Their fortunes during that period, moreover, well capture perhaps the 
most critical dilemma of modern procedure, that is, how to provide 
sufficient access to court in a society that depends heavily upon private 
litigation for compensation for injury and the enforcement of impor-
tant social norms with (1) fidelity to those norms, (2) due attention to 
the interests of litigants and others affected by litigation, and (3) ade-
quate attention to the limited capacity of American courts.  One view 
of the history I will sketch is that we have been fabulously successful in 
affording access to court and that we are now experiencing the ago-
nizing reappraisals of those who are the victims of their success. 
Like so much in American law and American society, the class ac-
tion can be traced to England,180 although the parent might deny re-
sponsibility.181  Yet, it should not cause surprise that the problem of 
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (refusing to 
read CAFA as overturning the long-standing rule that the proponent of federal juris-
diction bears the burden of persuasion), and the statute’s legislative history.  See Bur-
bank, Aggregation, supra, at 1943 (noting evidence that Congress did not intend to alter 
Erie’s federal-state lawmaking balance); infra text accompanying notes 360-361.  With-
out authority in an act of Congress, lower federal courts “lack the freedom of law pro-
fessors to overrule the Court.”  Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords:  A Response to Professor 
Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 660 (1985) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Afterwords].  Withal, CAFA may support a limited departure from precedent.  
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra, at 1949-52 (suggesting that, where state choice of law 
rules reflect a bias favoring aggregate litigation, CAFA’s jurisdictional policy may re-
quire federal courts to apply federal choice of law rules); infra note 361. 
179 This Section draws heavily on Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American 
Securities Regulation, in 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 321 (Dieter 
Leipold & Rolf Stürner eds., 1999). 
180 For the history of the class action in England and the United States, see 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS AC-
TION (1987); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of 
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). 
181 I am reminded of the (undoubtedly apocryphal) story of Queen Elizabeth II’s 
visit to Philadelphia during the Bicentennial of American Independence.  Having met 
the then–Mayor of Philadelphia, a former police captain by the name of Rizzo, the 
Queen is supposed to have remarked, “If this is democracy, I want no part of it.”  I can 
imagine the Lord Chief Justice saying the same thing about the contemporary Ameri-
can class action. 
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determining the rights of groups of people occupied the attention of 
English lawyers and judges from very early times.  That was, after all, a 
society filled with groups—guilds, societies, etc.—and one in which, 
for many people, group identity was central to personal identity.  In 
such a society, it made sense that one who already represented a 
group—the Mayor of the City of York, for example-—also should be 
able to represent that group in litigation on questions affecting the 
interests of all equally.182  Moreover, it was not overly adventurous for 
English courts to extend the principle of representation to other 
situations in which litigation could not proceed to decision without 
affecting the interests of those not before the court.  A privateer’s ac-
tion to divide the spoils of capture is not, in that respect, very different 
from a proceeding to settle an estate, and the difference—relative cer-
titude about the identity of those whose interests are affected—cuts in 
favor of, not against, binding adjudication.183
These are the types of cases in which group litigation was permit-
ted in England at the time its wayward child insisted on independ-
ence, and they are, roughly, the types of cases in which class actions 
were permitted in the United States during most of our history.  The 
year 1966 is thus as important to American class actions as the year 
1066 is to English history.  In that year, amendments to the Federal 
Rules became effective that, we now know, facilitated, if they did not 
initiate, a revolution in the use of group litigation.  The formal stated 
agenda of the rulemakers in revising Rule 23 was largely uncontrover-
sial.  They sought, in connection with Rule 23 as with other joinder 
rules (i.e., Rules 19 and 24), to turn federal jurisprudence from ab-
stract inquiries to functional analysis—analysis that considers the prac-
tical, as well as the formal legal, effects of litigation.  But they also 
reconceptualized the categories appropriate for class action treatment 
182 See YEAZELL, supra note 180, at 52-69; Mayor of York v. Pilkington, (1737) 25 
Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch.) (upholding equity jurisdiction in a suit seeking a bill of peace on 
behalf of the residents of York). 
183 See YEAZELL, supra note 180, at 182-83 (reviewing British courts’ willingness to 
allow suits on behalf of all of a privateer’s crew members in disputes over money due to 
the crew); Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:  Reconceiving the His-
tory of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 265-67 (1990) (reviewing 
YEAZELL, supra note 180) (explaining that courts in the privateer cases respected indi-
vidual litigants’ rights, only giving the “full benefits and burdens of the suit” to the pre-
sent class members). 
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and specified different procedural requirements depending upon the 
category.184
It was the third category (Rule 23(b)(3)) that has marked the 
1966 amendments to Rule 23 as a major event in American legal de-
velopment.185  Here—remembering that all putative class actions must 
satisfy the four requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequate representation186—a court may certify a case as a class 
184 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966).  The goals of the Advisory Committee can be 
found in the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1966 amendments.  For fur-
ther discussion of these amendments, see generally Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the 
Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356 (1966). 
 The first category (Rule 23(b)(1)), where “the prosecution of separate actions by 
or against individual members of the class would create a risk” either of “inconsistent 
or varying adjudications . . . [that] would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class” or of “adjudications . . . [that] would as a practical 
matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties,” pretty accurately 
captured the core of traditional class action practice.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) (1966); 
see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842-43 (1999) (noting that Rule 
23(b)(1) was designed to stay close to the “historical model”); infra note 185. 
 The second category (Rule 23(b)(2)), where “the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2) (1966), while somewhat further removed from that core, was still within its 
conceptual reach.  Moreover, both the published and unpublished material of the 
drafters make clear their intention to enlist the revised rule in the struggle for racial 
equality that was then the dominant social issue in the United States.  Thus, the pri-
mary illustration of the new subdivision was “various actions in the civil-rights field 
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one 
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note (1966). 
185 The Supreme Court described the development of this Rule as follows: 
Although the Committee crafted all three subdivisions of the Rule in general, 
practical terms, without the formalism that had bedeviled the original Rule 23, 
the Committee was consciously retrospective with intent to codify pre-Rule 
categories under Rule 23(b)(1), not forward-looking as it was in anticipating 
innovations under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted); see also id. at 861-62 (“[I]t was also the Court’s 
understanding that the Rule’s growing edge for that purpose [mass tort litigation] 
would be the opt-out class authorized by subdivision (b)(3) . . . .”); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“In the 1966 class-action amendments, Rule 
23(b)(3), the category at issue here, was ‘the most adventuresome’ innovation.”). 
186 Rule 23(a) provides that 
one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties 
on behalf of all only if 
 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
 (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
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action if it finds that “the questions of law or fact common to the class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available meth-
ods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”187  If the 
court does so certify, the rule requires that notice be given to the 
members of the class and that they thereby be given an opportunity to 
opt out of the action, avoiding its preclusive effects.188
There has been much debate about the goals of the drafters of 
Rule 23(b)(3).  Study of the published and unpublished material re-
lating to their work persuades me that, although they did not foresee, 
and could not have foreseen, all of the effects of this change, they 
were aware that they were breaking new ground and that those effects 
might be substantial.  Seeking to ensure that members of a class would 
be bound by an adverse judgment as well as benefit from one that was 
favorable,189 the drafters recognized that Rule 23(b)(3) would enable 
those with small claims for whom individual litigation would be eco-
nomically irrational to band together in group litigation against a 
common adversary.190  But for most people so situated, notice and an 
 (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and 
 (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
187 FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
188 FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
189 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966 
amendments were designed, in part . . . to assure that members of the class would be 
identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and 
judgments.”).
190 See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Compara-
tive Context:  The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 684 (1997).  As the 
Court has indicated, 
 The use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may 
offer substantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to 
bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought otherwise.  
Plainly there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by contingent-fee 
agreements and an enlargement of the role this type of fee arrangement has 
played in vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might not con-
sider it worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result 
might be more than consumed by the cost.  The prospect of such fee ar-
rangements offers advantages for litigation by named plaintiffs in class actions 
as well as for their attorneys.  For better or worse, the financial incentive that 
class actions offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the increas-
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opportunity to opt out are hardly important, which raises the question 
why the drafters attached those procedural incidents to this subdivi-
sion and not to the others. 
On this question the unpublished record is fascinating, revealing 
that the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class and the notice system 
necessary to effect it were added very late in the drafting process.  
Prior to that decision, the draft rule had made the provision of notice 
discretionary.191  The Advisory Committee settled on notice and opt-out 
rights to meet the expressed concern that (b)(3) classes might be used 
by class counsel, in league with defendants, to force those with substan-
tial individual claims into group litigation inimical to their interests.192
This account of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23(b)(3) suggests 
that, where the amended Rule went beyond the traditional uses of the 
class action, it did so because of the drafters’ desire to enlist proce-
dure in an effort to facilitate access to court for those for whom indi-
vidual litigation was prohibitively expensive.  In addition, the drafters 
were intent to equalize the risks of benefit and burden and to take ad-
vantage of the potential of the class action to reduce aggregate litiga-
ing reliance on the “private attorney general” for the vindication of legal 
rights; obviously this development has been facilitated by Rule 23. 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (foot-
notes omitted); see also id. at 338 n.9 (describing the facilitation of negative-value 
claims as “a central concept of Rule 23”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
388, 403 (1980) (“This ‘right’ [to have a class certified if the Rule’s requirements are 
met] is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of in-
terest traditionally thought to satisfy the ‘personal stake’ requirement.”); Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (“Rule 23 . . . provides for class ac-
tions that may enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine 
their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.”). 
191 Professor Kaplan explained this discretionary notice provision to his colleagues 
on the Advisory Committee as follows:
Then we have subdivision (d), which reminds the court of the artillery of or-
ders that can be made in a class suit, and attention is called notably to the pos-
sibility of orders requiring notice to be given to the class.  Of course, notice 
may be useful in any given number of different directions.  I cite only one:  to 
make sure that the representation[] is adequate, or as an invitation to inter-
vene in order that the class be properly represented, or that a sub-class within 
the class receive proper protection. 
Proceedings of Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Oct. 
31–Nov. 2, 1963) (statement of Benjamin Kaplan) (on file with author). 
192 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 684 & n.34.  The history of settle-
ment classes suggests that, in this respect at least, the drafters of the 1966 amendments 
had more foresight than is normally accorded them.  See infra text accompanying notes 
229-230. 
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tion expense.  Finally, we see that concern about the implications of 
their handiwork for access to court also played a crucial role in the 
innovation of notice and opportunity to opt out that is required in 
(b)(3) class actions, but that the concern was possible use of the de-
vice to foreclose, rather than to open up, access. 
B.  The Supreme Court Leads a Counterrevolution 
It is perhaps inevitable that courts will interpret jurisdictional stat-
utes with attention to their own institutional interests.  The Supreme 
Court, for example, narrowed the apparent reach of the general fed-
eral question statute shortly after it was enacted in 1875.193  It did not 
take long for the Court to realize the impact that amended Rule 23 
could have on the federal caseload and to deploy interpretations of 
the diversity statute in self-defense. 
In an environment of proliferating statutory law and of greater 
competition within the legal profession, the potential of the 1966 
amendments both to serve the purposes espied by the drafters and to 
enrich attorneys was quickly realized.  There followed a period of 
rapid growth in filings, of paeans, and of equally fervent denuncia-
tions.194  Painted over a legal landscape that had previously known 
them only in the corners, class actions soon occupied the foreground.  
193 See, e.g., Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202-04 (1877) (setting 
forth the well-pleaded complaint rule).  For early cases imposing other restrictive in-
terpretations on the statutory “arising under” language, see WRIGHT & KANE, supra
note 32, at 102-10.  As Purcell explains,  
[T]he principal reason for the Court’s abrupt decision to establish the plain-
tiff’s pleading rule was most likely the belief that cutting federal question re-
moval was a necessary trade-off to balance the swollen caseload that would re-
sult from the Court’s contemporaneous decisions that expanded the 
opportunities of corporate tort defendants to remove diversity suits. 
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 271. 
194 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:  Myth, 
Reality and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).  In 1981, the Su-
preme Court observed: 
Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice.  They 
present, however, opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and 
counsel in the management of cases.  Because of the potential for abuse, a dis-
trict court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a 
class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel 
and parties. 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
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A major dilemma was presented by what our economist friends call 
inefficient overenforcement.195
Although Americans seem to abhor legal wrong without legal 
remedy as nature abhors a vacuum, rules of substantive law enforce-
able through private litigation were traditionally framed using a 
model of individual litigation.  Too often it has not been clear 
whether the lawmaker contemplated even private enforcement.196  In 
such a world, the economic irrationality of individual enforcement 
may be understood not as a problem to be solved but as the contem-
plated price of economic progress.197  Class actions can change that 
calculus.198
And so they did in the 1970s, prompting Congress to amend some 
statutes where the fit was notoriously imperfect, such as the Truth in 
Lending Act,199 and prompting the Supreme Court to use its control 
195 See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:  Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Con-
flict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 52-53 (1975). 
196 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 143-44 (5th ed. 2001) (“The most persistently controverted issue concern-
ing actions arising under federal law is whether a federal statute creating a duty also 
implies a private right of action.”). 
197 I have previously elaborated this suggestion: 
[I]t seems entirely possible that—prior to the introduction of the small claims 
class action—a legislature may have been aware, and (collectively) content, 
that in some circumstances the right and its attendant statutory remedy were 
worth only the paper on which they were written.  Indeed, perhaps the legisla-
ture was counting on the complex of other laws and institutions that deter-
mine whether rights can be vindicated to serve as filters.  That view appears 
particularly plausible with respect to a legislature that has sought only selec-
tively to change one of the most important such filters—the market for legal 
services—by providing for an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs.  
It is also a view that will be familiar to those who have studied foreign legal sys-
tems in which rights often go unenforced through private litigation and may 
not be enforced at all. 
Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1929 (footnote omitted). 
198 As Justice Powell observed,
At the very least, the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving 
rise to the claim.  Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law 
of usury.  Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of usury claims, the 
Court’s concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at 
best misplaced and at worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Ena-
bling Act. 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 355 (1980) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes omitted). 
199 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000); see also Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. IV, 88 Stat. 1500, 1517-
21 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197, 197-98 (1976).  For more recent 
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of the interpretation of federal jurisdiction statutes measurably to re-
duce the impact of Rule 23 by keeping out of federal court small state 
law class actions.  In Snyder v. Harris200 and Zahn v. International Paper 
Co.,201 the Court refused to permit aggregation of the claims of class 
members to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement in the di-
versity statute and interpreted that requirement to apply to the claims 
of all members of the class, named and unnamed.  Neither decision 
was foreordained, as there was precedent that could have been in-
voked to support the contrary result.202  Indeed, the Court’s refusal to 
permit absent members of the class to ride on the coattails of their 
named representative for this purpose sat quite uneasily with the con-
tinuing willingness to ignore the citizenship of such members.203  For, 
like corporations, classes enjoy privileged access to federal court 
through a fiction that eases satisfaction of the requirement of com-
plete diversity.  In any event, that the Court was consciously making 
policy was clear from the tenor of the opinions, although the policy 
amendments affecting class actions, see the Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act 
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat. 161 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640).  The original 
legislation, enacted at a time when the general federal question statute imposed an 
amount-in-controversy requirement (which was eliminated in 1980), contained a tar-
geted jurisdictional grant that did not impose such a requirement.  See Consumer 
Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 130(e), 82 Stat. 146, 157 (1968). 
200 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
201 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
202 See id. at 308-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Snyder, 394 U.S. at 348-49 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting); Marcus, supra note 26, at 1773-75.  Note also the suggestion that Snyder ig-
nores the possibility “that the controlling amount is either the value to the plaintiff or 
the cost to the defendant, whichever is higher.”  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1482 (5th ed. 2003). 
203 See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 355 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the promulgation of 
the old Rule 23 provided a new means for resolving in a single federal litigation, based 
on diversity jurisdiction, the claims of all members of a class, even though some in the 
class were not of diverse citizenship from parties on the other side.”); Supreme Tribe 
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921).  In a very interesting recent article, 
Professor Pfander questions the pedigree of doctrine extending Ben-Hur’s treatment of 
diversity jurisdiction to cases certified under Rule 23(b)(3).  See James F. Pfander, Pro-
tective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 
1454-59 (2007); id. at 1456 n.147 (“As part of its expression of policy concerns, the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Black [in Snyder] described the docket-expanding potential of 
the [Ben-Hur] rule as if it applied to all class actions; the opinion failed to distinguish 
between the spurious or (b)(3) actions at issue in Snyder and the true class action that, 
in Cauble itself, had been seen as justifying the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.”). 
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sought to be served related to the workload of the federal courts, not 
to the enforcement of state law.204
A federal judge applied the epithet “Frankenstein monster” to a 
securities law class action in the late 1960s,205 and that case elicited a 
use of the Supreme Court’s interpretive powers to cut back on small-
claims federal law class actions as it had cut back on small-claims state 
law (i.e., diversity) class actions.206  The mechanism for doing so was 
Rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that, in an action maintained under Rule 
23(b)(3), the court “direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”207  The 
Court held that the representatives of a putative class (or more realis-
tically, their lawyers) must pay for sending such individual notice to 
(in Eisen, millions of) reasonably identifiable class members208 and, in 
another securities law case, that they must usually pay the cost of iden-
tifying its recipients.209
These decisions, too, were not foreordained, and, although admit-
tedly less transparent than the diversity class action decisions, may 
have masked concerns not only about workload but about issues of so-
cial policy that largely escaped notice in 1966, including both positive 
and normative questions regarding the respective roles of administra-
tive and private enforcement of the securities laws and, more gener-
ally, the goals of civil process.210  Certainly, in any event, controversy at 
204 Broader reform efforts, whether legislative or judicial, foundered on widely 
shared awareness, as a result of experience under the 1966 amendments, that class ac-
tion reform has predictable substantive implications and hence attracts well-defined 
and well-financed interest groups.  See Miller, supra note 194, at 684-93. 
205 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968). 
206 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen III), 417 U.S. 156 (1974).  I have never 
believed that this decision can plausibly be read as an interpretation of the Due Proc-
ess Clause rather than of Rule 23.  Its vulnerability as an interpretation of either, in the 
context of a negative-value class action, is enhanced by knowledge of the drafting his-
tory recounted above.  See supra text accompanying notes 189-192. 
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (1966). 
208 Eisen III, 417 U.S. at 178-79. 
209 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359-63 (1978). 
210 See Hal S. Scott, Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 337 (1971); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV.
937, 940-45 (1975) (noting that Eisen II and Eisen III resulted from the normative judg-
ment that the purpose of class actions should be to compensate individuals rather than 
to change behavior).  Justice Douglas’s dissent in Eisen III framed the issue in terms of 
the more general goals of the civil litigation process: 
I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be in-
numerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who would go 
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the time centered on class actions seeking recovery on behalf of thou-
sands or millions of investors, each one of whom could allege only a 
small amount of damage but whose damages in aggregate were sub-
stantial indeed. 
Decisions like Eisen III may have dampened the enthusiasm of the 
class action bar, but in an increasingly sophisticated and competitive 
environment211—I refer to the legal profession, not financial mar-
kets—they could not for long restrain the entrepreneurial zeal of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Pooling resources and using the proceeds of suc-
cessful litigation to fund other litigation, the securities class action bar 
was not about to be deterred by the requirement that they frontload 
resources in promising “investments,” that is to say, litigation.212
As a result of the Supreme Court’s efforts to discipline the effects 
of Rule 23, and of other developments in the broader American legal 
culture, the frenzy of the 1970s yielded to a period, lasting through 
the 1980s, of relative quiescence.  Indeed, in 1989, Stephen Yeazell, 
the foremost American historian of the class action, posed the ques-
begging for justice without the class action but who could with all regard to 
due process be protected by it.  Some of these are consumers whose claims 
may seem de minimis but who alone have no practical recourse for either re-
muneration or injunctive relief. . . . Or the unnamed individual may be only a 
ratepayer being excessively charged by a utility, or a homeowner whose as-
sessment is slowly rising beyond his ability to pay. 
 The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has 
against those who command the status quo.  I would strengthen his hand with 
the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as 
to those liberally endowed with power and wealth. 
Eisen III, 417 U.S. at 185-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
211 See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice:  Legal Practice at War with 
the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 938-46 (1993). 
212 There is, of course, a vigorous debate about what made the investment promis-
ing, that is, whether the merits mattered in private securities class actions or whether 
simply filing the suit as a class action was sufficient to induce a settlement.  Compare
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499-501 (1991) (concluding that, in a “significant and iden-
tifiable class of settlements,” the merits have “little or nothing to do with determining 
the amount of the settlement”), with James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions 
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 503-04 (1997) (criticizing and ultimately rejecting Alex-
ander’s study and conclusion that the merits do not matter).  For more recent work on 
this question, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-1507 (2004), which summarizes recent empirical evi-
dence; Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More?  The Impact of the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007), which finds that the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act increased the correlation “between litigation and both 
earnings restatements and abnormal insider selling.”  Id. at 627. 
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tion whether his entire legal career had been spent studying some-
thing about to become extinct.213
He need not have worried.  What I have called “the broader 
American legal culture” is sensitive to changes in the economy and in 
the locus of political power.  Yet, although the economy and politics 
help to explain both the Phoenix-like rebirth of the class action as a 
litigation force and its return to center stage as a subject of reform 
debate, they do not provide the entire explanation.  Three related 
phenomena seem to me especially important:  federal mass tort and 
settlement class actions, the growth of class action practice in state 
courts, and the resulting phenomenon of overlapping federal and 
state class actions. 
C.  Mass Tort214 and Settlement Classes in Federal Court 
Recall that the drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 added 
the requirement of notice and an opportunity to opt out in Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions in response to the expressed fear that, other-
wise, that category might become a tool of defendants and class coun-
sel to deprive individuals of the benefits of individual litigation.215  In 
part for the same reason, the Advisory Committee Note accompanying 
the amendments expressed the view that class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3) would rarely be appropriate in “mass accident” cases, cases 
involving a common disaster such as a hotel fire, bridge collapse, or 
the like.216  And for many years one did not find many certified mass 
tort class actions in federal court, and certainly not many involving 
213 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 685 & n.40.  Also in 1989, the Su-
preme Court observed that “Rule 23 . . . has inspired a controversy over the philoso-
phical, social, and economic merits and demerits of class actions.”  Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 n.19 (1989). 
214 “Mass tort” is a category that is differently formulated depending on the 
speaker.  See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung?  The Future of Mass Toxic Torts,
26 REV. LITIG. 883, 890-91 (2007).  I use it “to describe a large number of tort claims 
arising out of the same factual circumstances and alleging the same or similar injuries,” 
id. at 890, including both mass accidents and so-called “mass toxic torts” such as 
“claims arising out of exposure to asbestos, Agent Orange, and use of pharmaceutical 
products.”  Id.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 190-192. 
216 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“A ‘mass accident’ re-
sulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action 
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability 
and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different 
ways.”); see also Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 684 & n.35. 
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widely dispersed injuries apparently caused by common agents such as 
pharmaceutical drugs.217
Because most tort law is state law, those seeking to bring mass tort 
class actions in federal court are required to satisfy the requirements 
of diversity jurisdiction.  From the perspective of the plaintiff class, the 
major jurisdictional hurdle confronting other (diversity) state law class 
actions—meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement as inter-
preted in Snyder and Zahn—was not likely to be a problem even before 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute was found to overrule Zahn.218
The problem lay elsewhere.  Following a few mass tort class certifica-
tions that survived appellate review,219 the federal courts of appeals 
began to insist on careful attention to the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3).220  This ultimately proved fatal to most attempted multistate 
class actions, including but not limited to mass tort class actions.  Ab-
sent a persuasive showing that, under the governing state choice of 
law rules, the claims of class members would be governed by the law of 
only one state, or perhaps of a few—and quite apart from factual dif-
217 Eventually, however, the federal courts became more hospitable to mass acci-
dent class actions, at least those governed by the law of only one state. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.  This was particularly true in cases 
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. 
219 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008-11 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); 
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re “Agent Orange” 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They?  Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 858, 866-71 (1995) (discussing mass tort cases in which the class action had 
been used).  Professor Hensler’s recent article on the future of mass toxic torts con-
tains an extremely useful table listing all of the “thirty-five product-related mass per-
sonal injury litigations that arose between 1960 and the late 1990s,” Hensler, supra note 
214, at 896, that had been uncovered by two previous studies and by her additional re-
search. See id. at 897-903.  She summarized as follows: 
Half (seventeen) of the mass personal injury litigations identified by the stud-
ies were consolidated and transferred to a single federal court under the 
multi-district statute.  Only one-third (twelve) were resolved wholly or to a sig-
nificant degree by a class action settlement, although class certification was 
sought and denied (or granted but then vacated by appellate action) in a lar-
ger number, and in two instances class actions settled a small fraction of cases 
(asbestos) or related  litigation (Dalkon Shield). 
Id. at 903.  Two of the twelve listed settled class actions were state court cases.  See id. at 
901.
220 Under Rule 23(b)(3), in order to certify the class the court must find “that the 
questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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ferences among those claims—the federal appellate courts came to 
the view that mass tort class actions could not satisfy the predomi-
nance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).221  In the proc-
ess, the federal appellate courts developed a healthy respect for the 
“likely difficulties in managing a class action,”222 and refused to treat 
trial as a fiction in a world dominated by settlements.223  Moreover, 
federal appellate courts have increasingly insisted that certification 
decisions be based on an inquiry that gets beneath the allegations of 
the complaint, even if that inquiry overlaps with the merits.224  Finally, 
since the advent of discretionary interlocutory appeals of class certifi-
cation decisions in 1998,225 federal appellate courts have been in a bet-
ter position both to develop class action jurisprudence and to police 
adherence to it by the district courts. 
221 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996); Geor-
gine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624-34 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Am-
chem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 
1084-86 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th 
Cir. 1995); Marcus, supra note 28, at 1282-86, 1305-08; Linda Silberman, The Role of 
Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2007-11 (2008) (explor-
ing cases in which circuit courts have denied mass tort class certification).  Amchem,
one of the three federal appellate decisions Professor Marcus singles out as influential, 
see Marcus, supra note 28, at 1285-86, involved a settlement class.  See infra text accom-
panying notes 228-238. 
222 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D); see also, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 
F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a single nationwide class would be 
unmanageable because the case would need to apply different law for the residents of 
each state and because there were many distinct factual issues); Castano, 84 F.3d at 743-44. 
223 See, e.g., In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 
417, 421 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Differences among state laws . . . can combine with fact dif-
ferences . . . , making the class model unmanageable and inefficient.”); id. at 423 
(“[T]his Court cannot imagine managing a trial under the law of 51 jurisdictions on 
the defectiveness of Masonite siding.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 350 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting that “plaintiffs have the burden 
of designing a workable plan for trial embracing all claims and defenses prior to class 
certification”). 
224 See, e.g., In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he obligation 
to make such determinations [regarding Rule 23 requirements] is not lessened by 
overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue . . . .”); Szabo v. Bridgeport 
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is not possible to evaluate im-
pending difficulties without making a choice of law, and not possible to make a sound 
choice of law without . . . mak[ing] a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”); Castano, 84 
F.3d at 744 (stating that “[g]oing beyond the pleadings is necessary” to properly reach 
a certification decision). 
225 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  “By the mid-1990s, defendants in class actions began 
to favor federal courts, just as plaintiffs once did.  Conversely, many plaintiffs’ lawyers 
began to prefer state courts.”  Morrison, supra note 9, at 1526 (footnote omitted). 
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For a time, however, it appeared that one type of class action 
might escape the growing skepticism of the federal courts about 
multistate class actions.  The occasion for hope came in asbestos litiga-
tion, which inundated American courts, state and federal, in the 
1980s, and which, after a certain period, became “mature” in the 
sense that the underlying facts concerning the defendants’ conduct 
were known, the legal questions had been litigated to death, the val-
ues of cases were well established, and each additional case was, in 
many respects, a rerun of hundreds of others.226  Yet, the asbestos cases 
in the federal courts seemed to defy efficient resolution, as federal 
judges tried first one and then another technique to spare themselves 
and litigants the extraordinary expense and delay of the traditional 
treatment, while Congress turned a deaf ear to repeated pleas for a 
legislative solution.  One of the techniques that proved largely unavail-
ing was class actions for litigation.227  But something changed. 
Companies that had previously reviled the class action came to see 
it, or at least one form of it, as a potential instrument of salvation, and 
so did many federal judges.  I refer to the so-called settlement class ac-
tion, involving in its most familiar form the virtually simultaneous fil-
ing of a class action and of a proposed settlement.  Here, it was hoped, 
was a vehicle by which plaintiffs could secure prompt relief at less cost 
and mass tort defendants could receive a comprehensive resolution of 
a litigation problem that might otherwise consume years, if not dec-
226 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 659 (1989). 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 219-220.  Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), was an unusual case both because it involved only claims 
previously filed in Texas and because the court of appeals seemed intent on using the 
occasion to chastise Congress for failing to provide a legislative solution for the asbes-
tos crisis and perhaps to scare it into action by foreshadowing the extent to which that 
crisis was forcing departures from the traditional approach to litigation: 
 Courts have usually avoided class actions in the mass accident or tort setting.  
Because of differences between individual plaintiffs on issues of liability and 
defenses of liability, as well as damages, it has been feared that separate trials 
would overshadow the common disposition for the class.  The courts are now 
being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume 
of litigation and more frequent mass disasters.  If Congress leaves us to our 
own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive hearings and arguments 
for each claimant’s attorney to the extent enjoyed by the profession in the past. 
Id. at 473 (citations omitted); see also id. (“Necessity moves us to change and invent.”).  
As we shall see, the Fifth Circuit’s cri de coeur was not unique.  See infra note 238. 
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ades.  For defendants seeking “global peace,” the settlement class ac-
tion seemed just the thing.228
There had been many settlement class actions in other areas, in-
cluding the securities area, before the technique was tried in the as-
bestos litigation.229  Those cases revealed potential abuses of the sort 
that concerned the Advisory Committee in the 1960s, since in some of 
the cases it appeared that class counsel had sold out the class to de-
fendants anxious to purchase quick and global peace on the cheap.  
And both the flowering of settlement class actions and the perception 
of abuses played a role in the Advisory Committee’s decision to reex-
amine Rule 23, a process that continued for more than a decade and 
that, until 2003, yielded only the amendment authorizing discretion-
ary interlocutory appellate review of class certification decisions.230
Also affecting the timing and content of the Advisory Committee’s 
work were the Supreme Court’s decisions in two cases involving at-
tempts to resolve asbestos litigation through the mechanism of the set-
tlement class action.  In both cases, Amchem231 and Ortiz,232 the attempt 
was unsuccessful.  Moreover, the Court left seriously in doubt the cir-
cumstances in which settlement classes could be certified and settle-
ments approved in mass tort class actions—indeed, in any multistate 
class action involving numerous different state laws.  Although the 
Court in Amchem disagreed with the Third Circuit’s view that manage-
ability is as much a concern in considering certification of a settle-
228 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 685-88. 
229 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rule-
making Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 146 (1996). 
230 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra text accompanying note 225.  One reason 
for the paucity of amendments during this period is that for a time the rulemakers 
were waiting for the report of the ad hoc Working Group on Mass Torts appointed by 
the Chief Justice.  The report was made public in early 1999.  See ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 
(1999).  It recommended the creation of a follow-on body to make concrete recom-
mendations for change, id. at 67-70, a recommendation that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
treated with neglect the quality of which (benign or not?) may be inferred from subse-
quent developments.  The creation of the Working Group, in any event, can be seen to 
reflect the judiciary’s awareness that mass torts present special problems, some of 
which are not amenable to solutions by court rule. 
231 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997) (affirming a 
reversal of a judgment that approved a settlement, on the ground that the case could 
not properly be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
232 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (reversing the ap-
proval of a settlement on the ground that the case could not properly be certified un-
der Rule 23(b)(1)(B)). 
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ment class as it is when a litigation class is in question,233 the Court gave 
even greater prominence to the requirement of predominance.234
Moreover, the Court’s treatment of the requirement that “the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class”235 in both Amchem236 and Ortiz237 highlighted the difficulties of 
structuring class actions so as to avoid possible conflicts without creating 
so many subclasses as to make the case unmanageable.238
233 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-20.  But see id. (“But, as we earlier observed, the 
Court of Appeals in fact did not ignore the settlement . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
234 See id. at 622-25.  In my view, treating predominance as a basic structural pro-
tection instead of the warrant of efficiency that the rulemakers intended was an error 
that may have been caused by the Court’s determination to avoid some of the thorny 
constitutional questions that the case presented, including in particular questions re-
lating to so-called “futures”—people who had not manifested adverse physical conse-
quences from their occupational exposure to asbestos or, less plausibly in that particu-
lar context, were not even aware that they had been exposed.  See generally Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (2000). 
235 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
236 521 U.S. at 625-28. 
237 527 U.S. at 856-59. 
238 Professor Nagareda has described the resulting incentives:  “With the prospects 
for class settlements in the mass tort area dimmed, if not entirely extinguished, by the 
Court’s decisions, the new terrain for peacemaking predictably has shifted outward in 
both directions—to aggregate settlements on the immediate left and to Chapter 11 
reorganizations on the immediate right.”  Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Ad-
ministrative State:  Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008) (manuscript at 26-27) (footnote omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1014659.  The directional language refers to a schematic moving from purely 
private on the left to purely public on the right.  In the omitted footnote, Professor 
Nagareda discusses the settlement class approved in the Diet Drugs (Fen-Phen) litiga-
tion, noting the practical problems plaguing its implementation.  See id. (manuscript at 
26 n.117); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 506-07 (E.D. Pa. 
2005).  But note studies showing that, although federal mass tort (personal injury and 
property damage) class action filings declined after Amchem, they increased after Ortiz,
and that such filings remained more or less constant from 2001 through 2005.  See
Hensler, supra note 214, at 910.  Finally, note Hensler’s data on “mass toxic torts of the 
2000s.”  See id. at 912, 913 tbl.2 (finding only two mass tort federal class actions, one of 
them partial, in nine litigations). 
 Even though Amchem’s analysis is not confined to the domain of mass torts, the Third 
Circuit was at pains to call attention to the fact that a settlement class action before it did 
not involve either a mass tort or “futures.”  See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac-
tices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 1998).  The review it afforded the district court’s 
choice of law, and hence that court’s predominance analysis, was hardly searching.  See
id. at 315.  The explanation may lie in Judge Scirica’s cris de coeur, which are reminiscent 
of Jenkins, see supra note 227, and might be thought to have invited legislation like CAFA: 
It may be argued that problems national in scope deserve the attention of na-
tional courts when there is appropriate federal jurisdiction.  Because of the 
extraordinary number of claims, fairness counsels that plaintiffs similarly in-
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D.  State Court Class Actions 
The discovery in the mid-1990s that the class action data gener-
ated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts were un-
reliable has prompted the Federal Judicial Center to begin to fill the 
empirical vacuum with data based on docket studies.239  I am aware of 
no reliable data, historical or current, concerning state court class ac-
tions, and I doubt that reliable data exist for most states.240  We do 
know, however, that most states have used Rule 23 as the model for 
their own class action provisions, and it seems safe to assume that class 
actions did not become, if they ever have been, a major player in liti-
gation in any state’s courts until some years after 1966.  Indeed, given 
Purcell’s reminder that since the 1950s the federal courts had become 
an attractive forum for plaintiffs,241 and the fact that the class action 
revolution started in the federal courts, one would have expected no 
great urgency to follow the federal model were it not for the counter-
revolution led by the Supreme Court. 
As we have seen, the Court’s decisions in Snyder and Zahn closed
the door of the federal courthouse to cases seeking relief under state 
jured by the same course of deceptive conduct should receive similar results 
with respect to liability and damages. 
In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290. 
From a policy standpoint, it can be argued that national (interstate) class ac-
tions are the paradigm for federal diversity jurisdiction because, in a constitu-
tional sense, they implicate interstate commerce, foreclose discrimination by a 
local state, and tend to guard against any bias against interstate enterprises.  
Yet there are strong countervailing arguments that, at least under the current 
jurisdictional statutes, such class actions may be beyond the reach of the fed-
eral courts. 
Id. at 305. 
239 See Willging et al., supra note 229, at 178-79.  This is tedious and time-intensive 
work.  The task has, however, become greatly simplified with the conversion of the fed-
eral courts to electronic case files.  The FJC’s studies of experience under CAFA, see
Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1743-62, are critical to an evaluation of the impact of 
that legislation on the workload of the federal courts.  It may be impossible to replicate 
that research for the state courts, although CAFA supporters have presented some 
data concerning so-called “judicial hellholes.”  See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson 
Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
143, 160-68 (2001); infra note 367. 
240 See Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1763 (“The lack of state court data on class 
actions stems from multiple sources, including the lack of necessary resources to col-
lect the data in the state systems and the lack of common computerized case man-
agement systems.”).  But see id. at 1748 n.84 (referencing preliminary data from Cali-
fornia). 
241 See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 240-43; supra text accompanying note 169. 
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law in which there were not sufficient putative class members with 
claims meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity 
statute to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.242  By 1973 (at 
the latest), therefore, would-be counsel for such groups had an incen-
tive to seek changes in state law that would enable the maintenance of 
these cases in state court.243  Moreover, they could expect a favorable 
response from those responsible for the rules of procedure in many 
states, whether because the lawmakers shared the aspirations of the 
Advisory Committee that wrote the 1966 amendments to Rule 23244 or, 
perhaps more commonly, because their practice was generally to fol-
low the federal model. 
Once class action treatment on the federal model became widely 
available in the state courts, it is likely (but in the absence of reliable 
data one can hardly be confident) that for many years most of the 
cases brought there were those to which Snyder and Zahn had closed 
the federal courthouse, that is, small-claims state law class actions.245
Eventually, however, departures  from the federal model, in the lan-
guage of the governing state law provision or its interpretation, might 
lead class counsel (who had a choice) to select state court. So too 
might the general constellation of rules and institutional practices 
that, after Erie and its progeny, still affected choice between a state 
and federal forum. 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 199-204. 
243 For the dates when states that acted in response to the 1966 amendments did 
so, see infra Appendix.  As suggested below, probably the most common reason states 
followed the model of amended Rule 23 was their general practice of following the 
Federal Rules.  In that regard, eight of the eleven states that embraced the 1966 Rule 
23 amendments between 1966 and 1971, and nine of the twelve states that did so be-
tween 1970 and 1974, were found to be “replica” states in a 1986 study.  Compare John 
B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts:  A Survey of State Court Sys-
tems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986) (listing the twenty-three ju-
risdictions—twenty-two states and the District of Columbia—that “meet all nine of our 
criteria for systematic replication of the Federal Rules”), with infra text accompanying 
notes 416-445 (listing the states adopting class action rules similar to the 1966 amend-
ments to Federal Rule 23 between 1966 and 1971 and between 1970 and 1974).  In 
other words, seventeen of twenty-two “replica” states had followed the federal lead on 
class actions by 1974. 
244 Note in that regard another major innovation of the 1966 amendments, the 
(b)(2) class for injunctive relief, the major animating purpose of which—the facilita-
tion of civil rights class actions—is discussed supra note 184. 
245 See Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 399 (“But ‘small claims’ consumer class ac-
tions have typically proceeded in the state courts, because each class member did not 
have the requisite $75,000 in damages to trigger federal jurisdiction.”). 
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Two sets of rules that are not supposed to affect that choice 
(unless Congress otherwise provides) are the rules respecting personal 
jurisdiction and choice of law.  The force of the mandate for vertical 
uniformity was long clearer as to the latter than the former.  But the 
1993 overhaul of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
should have put any doubts about the requirement of jurisdictional 
uniformity to rest, particularly in diversity cases.246  Similarly, a per-
emptory per curiam opinion insisting on the application of state 
choice of law rules in diversity cases247 settled the continuing vitality of 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.248  Doubts on that score 
may have been due to the fact that Klaxon was an object of scorn by 
Henry Hart249 and remains unpopular in some academic circles today.  
Klaxon’s continuing vitality is instead both unremarkable and wholly 
defensible, albeit not constitutionally required.  Or at least it is for one 
who understands the Court’s goal of dismantling the system of corpo-
rate diversity litigation.250
Klaxon did nothing, however, to discipline state choice of law, a 
task that the Court had undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s, only to 
abandon it because the constitutional tools—due process and full 
faith and credit—were not adequate to the task.251  For a time in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared that the Court was revisiting 
the question whether the Constitution might provide more robust 
federal protection against state court overreaching that encouraged 
interstate forum shopping through both aggressive assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction and aggressive applications of forum law.  As it 
246 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  Given the Court’s peculiar decision in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), see infra text accompanying notes 257-264,
this statement requires refinement to the extent that adjudication of the claims of ab-
sent class members is thought to present a problem of personal jurisdiction.  Whatever 
the merits of the Court’s approach in state court litigation, it has no bearing on litiga-
tion in federal court.  See infra note 259. 
247 Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975). 
248 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal courts in diversity cases must apply 
the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit). 
249 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513-15 (1954); supra text accompanying notes 173 and 177. 
250 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1938-44 (commenting on Samuel 
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law:  Choice of Law After the Class 
Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006)); supra text accompanying note 
178.  For a very useful summary of academic reactions to Klaxon by successors of Hart 
who question his views about that case, see FALLON, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 
202, at 636-42. 
251 See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. 
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turned out, a 1981 decision by a badly fractured Court revealed that 
the prospects for robust protection in the choice of law realm had not 
changed since the 1930s.252  On the other hand, starting in 1977, the 
Court issued a series of decisions evidently aimed at curbing aggres-
sive assertions of personal jurisdiction, through interpretations of the 
Due Process Clause. 
Unfortunately, however, most of the cases that the Court chose for 
the latter purpose did not involve problematic interstate forum shop-
ping in any meaningful sense, whether or not one agrees with the 
Court’s conclusions concerning the constitutionality of the exercises 
of jurisdiction.253  This is not surprising to the extent that, like Interna-
252 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981).  Nor have those 
prospects changed since 1981. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) 
(“In light of this experience, we abandoned the balancing-of-interests approach to con-
flicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” (citing Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 
n.10)); id. at 499 (“Without a rudder to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitu-
tional course of balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve 
conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”).  It is, of course, a separate 
question whether the Court should have assimilated the sovereign-immunity question 
in Hyatt to the choice of law questions presented in those earlier cases. 
253 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) ( jurisdiction permitted) 
(wife who, with husband’s consent, moved to California with children upon separation 
and sued there for divorce and alimony); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 
480 U.S. 102 (1987) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (Taiwanese defendant in state court 
action brought after a motorcycle accident in the forum state impleaded Japanese 
component-part manufacturer); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) 
( jurisdiction permitted) (plaintiff franchisor sued Michigan franchisee in Florida, the 
franchisor’s state of incorporation and corporate headquarters, for breach of franchise 
agreement containing Florida choice of law clause); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 
(1984) ( jurisdiction permitted) (plaintiff brought libel suit in her home state, where 
she likely sustained the greatest injury); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiffs sought damages in Okla-
homa for accident in that state, where they were hospitalized); Kulko v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiff sought domestication 
and modification in California of Haitian divorce decree after she had moved to Cali-
fornia following separation, and after defendant had subsequently consented to 
daughter moving to California to live with her mother); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186 (1977) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (shareholder brought derivative action in 
Delaware against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation on the basis of acts 
in other states that caused financial damage to the corporation, treating defendants’ 
stock and stock options as property for quasi in rem purposes).  But see Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) ( jurisdiction permitted) (libel suit in New 
Hampshire by resident of New York, after initial suit against Ohio corporation in Ohio 
was barred by the state’s statute of limitations); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) 
( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiff brought suit in after-acquired domicile of Min-
nesota for accident-related injuries sustained in Indiana, where the plaintiff then lived, 
by treating the defendant’s insurance policy as property located in Minnesota).  Note 
that World-Wide Volkswagen was an instance of state-federal forum shopping, rather than 
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tional Shoe itself, the cases in question involved assertions of specific 
jurisdiction,254 as to which the Court’s 1945 decision may have been 
calculated to reduce rather than increase interstate forum shopping.255
It is therefore even more unfortunate, and it is surprising, that “prob-
lematic interstate forum shopping” also was not involved in the two 
post-1945 cases in which the Court has analyzed the limitations that 
due process imposes on state court assertions of general doing-
business jurisdiction.  As a result, one of the most dubious tools of in-
terstate forum shopping by plaintiffs remains in play, in class actions 
as in ordinary litigation.256
Even before the growing skepticism of federal courts about multi-
state (particularly, but not exclusively, mass tort) class actions pro-
vided a powerful incentive for class counsel (who had a choice) to opt 
for state courts—that is, at a time when state courts were (probably) 
interstate forum shopping.  Deep-pocket diverse defendants financed appellate litiga-
tion by their nondiverse codefendants in the hope that the latter would be dismissed 
from a lawsuit in a plaintiff-friendly state court, enabling removal by the diverse defen-
dants to federal court (an ultimately successful strategy that eluded Justice Blackmun).  
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (admitting that he 
was “somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs . . . are so insistent that the regional distribu-
tor and the retail dealer, the petitioners here, who handled the ill-fated Audi automo-
bile involved in this litigation, be named defendants”); Charles W. Adams, World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1140 (1993) (“Nei-
ther Justice Blackmun nor the other Justices could have been expected to know of 
Creek County’s pro-plaintiff juries . . . .”). 
254 See Burbank, supra note 105, at 746-47.  And even in some of the cases not in-
volving specific jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs’ claims did not bear the prescribed 
relationship to the activity on which jurisdiction was predicated), both the plaintiffs 
and the states involved had a legitimate interest in locating litigation in the chosen fo-
rum. See supra note 253. 
255 See supra text accompanying notes 163-167. 
256 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ( ju-
risdiction not permitted); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) 
( jurisdiction permitted); Burbank, supra note 105, at 749-53.  My normative judgment 
about forum shopping in Perkins is influenced by the fact that Ohio, where the defen-
dant conducted essentially all of its (very limited) business during and immediately 
after World War II, was the only domestic court conceivably—and given problems in 
the Philippines in that period it may have been the only court—available for adjudica-
tion of the dispute.  Similarly, Texas, where the defendant in Helicopteros bought the 
helicopter whose crash caused the plaintiffs’ decedents’ deaths and where the em-
ployee pilots were trained, was the logical choice if any domestic court was permissible.  
On the relevance of the status of the defendant as a domestic or foreign corporation, 
see Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration:  Paths to a 
Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 389-92 (2004).  For an interesting recent article 
also calling into question the constitutionality of general doing-business jurisdiction, 
see A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate:  A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617, 655-57 (2006). 
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presiding over mostly small claims class actions—the allure of the state 
class action litigation format as an instrument of interstate forum 
shopping became apparent.  At least it did when the Supreme Court 
decided Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,257 a class action in which the 
Kansas courts had applied Kansas law to the claims for interest on de-
layed royalty payments of all members of a multistate class.  As is well 
known, the Court in Shutts articulated constitutional limitations on 
both the assertion of personal jurisdiction and the choice of law.  The 
question of jurisdiction, however, did not concern the defendant’s in-
terest in freedom from litigation in an exorbitant forum.  Rather, the 
Court accepted the defendant’s invitation to opine about the constitu-
tionality of the assertion of adjudicatory power over the claims of the 
absent members of the plaintiff class.258  Rejecting the defendant’s ar-
gument that due process required those individuals’ consent, the 
Court arguably made the mistake of accepting the premises of the ar-
gument.  In any event, in its jurisdictional aspect Shutts is one of the 
more mischievous opinions in the field of procedure, further obscur-
ing the distinction between procedural and substantive due process.259
257 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
258 See id. at 806-14. 
259 A state cannot deprive its own residents of property without affording them the 
procedural protections that a balancing of all of the relevant interests indicates are 
minimally required.  Granting that members of a multistate plaintiff class lose some-
thing of value when claims brought on their behalf are rejected on the merits, why 
should due process require anything more than what Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 
(1940), suggested that it requires in the class action context, namely adequate repre-
sentation?  Id. at 42-45.  And if adequate representation is not sufficient, why isn’t no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, coupled with adequate representation, sufficient? 
 The Shutts Court’s distinctions between the burdens that litigation imposes on de-
fendants and those imposed on absent members of a plaintiff class, see 472 U.S. at 810-
11, might be thought to support a conclusion that adequacy of representation is all 
that due process requires, at least in a negative-value class action.  On that view, the 
Court erred in taking seriously the argument, predicated on the analogy to defen-
dants, that (in the absence of minimum contacts) consent was required.  In any event, 
the Court’s opinion appears to move unthinkingly from the observation that Kansas 
did afford notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to opt out to the 
conclusion that in class actions seeking predominantly monetary relief, due process 
requires all of those things.  See id. at 811-12. 
 Shutts’s jurisdictional holding is inapposite in federal court class actions on behalf 
of U.S. residents, where the question could only arise in any event in a Rule 23(b)(1) 
or (b)(2) class action.  Such residents have minimum contacts with the relevant terri-
torial unit, and Rule 4(k)(1)(A) makes state law relevant only with respect to defen-
dants.
 Although Shutts has given rise to the fallacy that it speaks with binding preceden-
tial effect to problems of due process that do not implicate geography, and/or to fed-
eral class actions, as Tobias Wolff points out, we should not neglect the possibility that 
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It is, however, no barrier to damages class actions in state court so 
long as the state provides what Rule 23 requires in such a case. 
Although one can regret the Court’s approach to the question 
whether the laws of other interested states were in conflict with the 
law of Kansas,260 it is apparent that the Justices’ main goal was to draw 
a line in the sand, making clear that the occasion of a class action does 
not entrain immunity from constitutional limitations on state choice 
of law, however slight they may be.  Attempts to read more into Shutts,
and in particular a constitutional prohibition against “bootstrap-
ping”—i.e., applying a different choice of law rule in class actions to 
enable certification as against predominance and manageability objec-
tions—are, in my view, not persuasive.261  Indeed, for the class action 
bar, the Court’s decision may have been like a limiting instruction, in-
viting attention by discouraging it.262
Certainly, the bar would have realized—it was a common topic of 
discussion in law school classrooms soon after Shutts—that a decision 
applying the law of Oklahoma, the defendant’s principal place of 
business, to all claims probably would not have been vulnerable under 
the Court’s reasoning, whether or not that decision involved boot-
strapping.263  Attentive members of the bar would also have been 
in some circumstances procedural due process requires an opportunity to opt out.  See
Wolff, supra note 27, at 2076-80. 
260 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 816-18 (discussing possible conflicts but leaving “more 
thoroughgoing treatment” to the state court on remand). 
261 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1944-48.  For an argument in favor 
of such a bootstrapping prohibition, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Dis-
contents:  Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1839, 1911-18 (2006) [hereinafter Nagareda, Discontents]; Richard A. Nagareda, Boot-
strapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UKMC L. REV. 661, 664-65 
(2006).
262 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Manageable Nationwide Class:  A Choice-of-Law Legacy 
of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 543, 543 (2006) (“Shutts con-
firmed the authority of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over class actions and certify 
classes of nationwide scope.”); id. at 545 (“From the perspective of plaintiffs’ advocates, 
Shutts seemed like a godsend . . . .”); id. at 553 (stating that federal courts “were able to 
evade application of the Shutts rule, and avoid dealing with multistate classes at all”). 
263 Of course, one hopes that, in considering the tactical implications of Shutts, the 
bar also attends to the potential problems of professional responsibility, and indeed of 
adequate representation, that single-minded pursuit of class certification can entail.  
Thus, in the hypothetical variant of Shutts mentioned in the text, what if Oklahoma law 
were less favorable to some members of the putative class?  A recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Texas has put such problems in relief by insisting on the application 
of conventional preclusion law to class actions even in situations where the claims pre-
cluded could not have been made in the class action (because they would have pre-
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aware that the defendant’s choice of law victory proved short-lived and 
partial, and that the Supreme Court’s ability to police the state courts 
effectively is theoretical.264  In sum, Shutts may have done more harm 
than good both to the cause of restraining interstate forum shopping 
and to the jurisprudence of due process. 
We have seen that, notwithstanding a few early certifications of 
Rule 23(b)(3) multistate mass tort class actions in the federal courts, 
the federal appellate courts pretty quickly put an end to that phe-
nomenon, usually finding a lack of predominance because of differ-
ences in the law to be applied (and/or the facts relevant under differ-
ent laws) and insuperable problems of manageability.265  We have also 
seen that, notwithstanding a change of heart on the part of some de-
fendants who, in a search for global peace, joined with plaintiffs in 
seeking certification of mass tort classes and approval of prepackaged 
settlements, the Supreme Court made it very difficult for the lower 
federal courts to certify in such cases, first under Rule 23(b)(3) in Am-
chem, and then under Rule 23(b)(1) in Ortiz.266
These developments, particularly the first of them, added substan-
tially to entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ class action lawyers’ incentives to 
test the class action waters in state courts.  They also provided incen-
vented class certification).  See Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 
(Tex. 2007). 
264 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-34 (1988) (rejecting contentions 
that the Supreme Court of Kansas unconstitutionally distorted other states’ laws on 
remand after Shutts).  This prompted Justice O’Connor to protest: 
Faced with the constitutional obligation to apply the substantive law of an-
other State, a court that does not like that law apparently need take only two 
steps in order to avoid applying it.  First, invent a legal theory so novel or 
strange that the other State has never had an opportunity to reject it; then, on 
the basis of nothing but unsupported speculation, “predict” that the other 
State would adopt that theory if it had the chance. 
Id. at 749 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 Class counsel may also be aware of Patrick Woolley’s interesting argument that 
choice of law and class certification burdens are analytically discrete and that, by con-
flating them, some federal courts have erroneously placed both burdens on the party 
seeking class certification.  See Patrick Wooley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1739-43 (2006).  On this view, state courts so in-
clined can blunt some of the force of Shutts and of recent federal and state case law 
emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating compliance with Rule 23 (or its 
state equivalent).  Thus, they can insist that the choice of law question be addressed 
first, invoke a presumption that forum law is applicable, and place on the party seeking 
to displace that law the burden of demonstrating that some other law is applicable.  See id.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 219-225. 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 226-238. 
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tives to seek certification of multistate classes stating claims under 
other bodies of substantive law, particularly commercial law, in both 
federal and state courts.  Moreover, the prospect that the state courts 
might replace the increasingly inhospitable federal courts as the pre-
ferred venue for multistate class actions arose at a time when the 
plaintiffs’ bar was vying with business groups for the election of state 
court judges thought to be sympathetic to their respective interests in 
the larger “tort reform” debate, although the existence of any causal 
relationship between the two phenomena remains unclear.267
In any event, it is clear that, for a time at least, some plaintiff class 
action lawyers were successful in securing certifications in multistate 
class actions that could not have been certified under developing fed-
eral class action jurisprudence.268  Moreover, in some of these cases 
state courts held that the law of one state governed the claims of all 
class members, while in others they accepted class counsel’s argu-
ment, perhaps supported by the “expert” reports of law professors, 
that there were no meaningful differences in state law and/or that any 
such differences were manageable.269  It is also clear, however, that the 
267 See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDI-
CIAL ELECTIONS 73 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). “It bears emphasis that empirical re-
search has yet to explore systematically the relationship, if any, between class certifica-
tion and the involvement in state judicial elections of interest groups for whom such 
rulings might well be a major topic of concern—whether the local plaintiffs’ bar or 
business-side interests.”  Nagareda, supra note 238 (manuscript at 8-9).  Professor Na-
gareda notes defense-side research that “documents substantial political contributions 
from the local plaintiffs’ bar to state-court judges in a jurisdiction often dubbed a 
magnet for nationwide class actions.”  Id. (manuscript at 9 n.31); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 270-271 (noting that changes in interpretation of state class action law 
tended to correlate with changes in political complexion of the state supreme court). 
268 This is not to disagree with Elizabeth Cabraser, who contends that “the post-
Shutts era has seen relatively few [state court] nationwide class actions actually granted 
at the trial level, or affirmed on appeal, for trial purposes.”  Cabraser, supra note 262, 
at 545.  Yet, as Judge Easterbrook observed, a “single positive trumps all the negatives.”  
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th 
Cir. 2003); see also Nagareda, supra note 238 (manuscript at 9) (discussing the “game of 
finding the one state court inclined to certify”).  Although not claiming “to address 
empirical proof,” Cabraser states that “a survey of complex litigation practitioners 
would yield corroborating data that most successful state court nationwide class actions 
served as settlement vehicles, which the defendants embraced and supported as their 
preferred mechanism of resolution.”  Cabraser, supra note 262, at 545.  Finally, she as-
serts that “[i]n mass torts particularly, the overwhelming majority of multistate class 
certification decisions were rendered by federal courts, and most grants of class certifi-
cation were issued for settlement purposes rather than to structure trials.”  Id. at 545-46. 
269 See, e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 624-26 (Okla. 2003) 
(upholding, in part, a class certification after determining that the law of only one 
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identity of these state court magnets changed over time,270 and those 
changes tended to follow in the wake of personnel changes in the 
highest court of a state that had previously been a magnet.271  It re-
mains (and will always remain) unclear whether, if CAFA had not 
been enacted, the perceived abuses associated with state magnet 
courts would have continued, or whether the political processes that 
ended them in some states (or some other processes) would have ac-
complished the same thing wherever they arose. 
E.  Overlapping Class Actions 
Contemporary class action practice seems to confound the basic 
assumptions of preclusion law by preferring multiple cases to just one.  
This has long been true in certain substantive fields, such as securities 
law, and the phenomenon of multiple duplicative or overlapping class 
actions272 has increased as the class action bar has become more en-
trepreneurial, more sophisticated, and more competitive. 
The federal courts have a well-developed system for disciplining 
the chaos of overlapping class actions.  Enacted in 1968 to permit the 
federal judiciary to refine and extend the reach of techniques devel-
oped informally in order to deal with a flood of antitrust cases involv-
state, Michigan, would apply).  For other such cases regarded as abusive, see S. REP.
NO. 109-14, at 24-26 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24-26; Marcus, supra note 
28, at 1301 n.294; Silberman, supra note 221, at 2012-14.  The quality of the “expert” 
opinions offered by distinguished law professors in some cases involving differences in 
state law—which they sought to wish away—is embarrassing.  Indeed, I accepted a rare 
engagement as an expert (as opposed to consulting lawyer) in part because of my con-
cern about the phenomenon.  See Opinion of Stephen B. Burbank, Expert Report, 
Alvis v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. A-164,880 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 28, 2003) (on file with 
author).
270 See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 547-48 (discussing changes in class action law in 
Alabama and Louisiana, with both states becoming less receptive to class actions); 
Marcus, supra note 28, at 1294-95 (describing legislative attempts to end “drive-by” cer-
tification in Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi). 
271 The Texas/Oklahoma litigation saga recounted by Professor Silberman is an 
example of both of the last two propositions.  See Silberman, supra note 221, at 2015-19; 
see also Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1483-86 (2005) (detailing movements for tort reform in, among other states, 
Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi); Goldberg, supra note 267, at 81 (“The new judges 
completely changed tort law in Texas, so that it became more favorable to defen-
dants.”); Editorial, Swing of Torts, TIMES DAILY (Florence, Ala.), Nov. 13, 2007, available 
at http://www.timesdaily.com/article/20071113/news/711130304 (discussing the per-
ception that “change in political complexion” of the Supreme Court of Alabama af-
fected the results in cases involving business litigants). 
272 I use the term “overlapping class actions” to refer to both duplicative and over-
lapping class actions. 
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ing the electrical equipment industry, the Multidistrict Litigation 
Statute273 empowers the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(JPML) to transfer all cases having common questions of fact to a sin-
gle federal court, where they are subject to coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings.  So long as a case has been filed in federal 
court or can be removed there, it can be transferred by the JPML, and 
it is no surprise that overlapping class actions are particularly likely to 
receive multidistrict treatment. 
Although the statute requires remand of actions to the transferor 
courts upon the completion of pretrial proceedings unless they have 
been previously terminated,274 few are in fact remanded for trial.275
That too is no surprise.  Less than two percent of federal civil cases 
terminate at or after trial.276  Most class actions settle, just as most 
other cases settle, and a transferee judge under § 1407 is empowered 
to decide dispositive pretrial motions, a form of disposition that, 
across the entire federal civil docket, now accounts for far more ter-
minations than trials do.277  That is not to say, however, that a trans-
feree judge is similarly situated to a judge in ordinary litigation in her 
capacity to bring about nontrial dispositions.  Like counsel who could 
not take a case (or claim) to trial, a multidistrict transferee judge may 
be thought disarmed in the quest for a global settlement by the inabil-
ity to try the case.  That, in any event, appears to be a reason why the 
federal judiciary was so upset by the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Lexecon case,278 disapproving the prior practice whereby transferee 
courts had transferred cases to themselves for trial purposes,279 and 
why it has worked so hard to secure a legislative fix.280
273 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). 
274 See id. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded . . . to the dis-
trict from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously termi-
nated . . . .”). 
275 See Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation:  An Interview with Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, 
Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, ME. B.J., Winter 2004, at 16, 21 
(“It is only occasionally that cases are remanded for trial.”). 
276 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (noting a 
decline in the trial termination rate from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002). 
277 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 617-18 
(2004) (estimating an increase in the summary judgment termination rate from 1.8% 
in 1960 to 7.7% in 2000). 
278 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
279 Under the practice disapproved in Lexecon, the transfer was pursuant to § 1404, 
which meant that the transferee district had to be one where the case could originally 
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Prior to CAFA, there was no provision in federal law that permit-
ted the removal of overlapping state court class actions that were oth-
erwise not removable.  In the increasingly entrepreneurial and com-
petitive environment described above, that meant that all of the 
efforts of a transferee federal court to broker a settlement of overlap-
ping federal class actions might come to naught because a state court 
class action was settled first, with preclusive effect.281  A great deal of 
time and effort by the court and the parties might, therefore, be 
wasted.  Even if not, the coexistence of overlapping class actions before 
different courts could cause serious problems in the conduct of the 
coordinated or consolidated proceedings called for under the statute. 
The incentives that the federal parties and federal transferee 
courts have to avoid such difficulties can elicit very creative interpreta-
tions of federal law.  Similar incentives operate when those subject to 
federal court judgments seek to evade their preclusive effect in state 
courts.  In that situation, many federal courts approved the removal of 
the state court actions under the All Writs Act.282  The Supreme Court 
put an end to this tactic, which bordered on the frivolous,283 in the 
Syngenta case.284  Both before and after Syngenta, some transferee 
have been filed (as a matter of personal jurisdiction and venue as well, of course, as of 
subject matter jurisdiction).  See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 
335, 342-44 (1960). 
280 As Judge Hodges explained,
It would obviously be a lot more efficient if the transferee judge had the au-
thority to try the cases that remain.  That would add another settlement tool 
into the calculus that normally produces settlement anyway.  It would proba-
bly be more efficient, which is why the Judicial Conference and the panel 
supported legislation that would change that part of the statute and alter the 
result required by Lexecon, but I can’t say we are not able to function efficiently 
for the want of it at the moment. 
Hansel, supra note 275, at 21. 
281 The Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 
U.S. 367 (1995), made it clear that there would be very little room for class members 
who did not opt out of the state court class action to avoid its binding effect, even if the 
settlement purported to release claims within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.  Id. at 375-86. 
282 28 U.S.C. § 1651; see also, e.g., Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 
1999) (holding that removal of a class action was proper under the All Writs Act); Sa-
ble v. Gen. Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 
283 See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 401, 470 (1999) (“Permitting federal courts to expand the scope of removal 
jurisdiction by resort to the All Writs Act only distorts the analysis for determining 
when intervention is appropriate.”). 
284 Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33-34 (2002). 
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courts sought to make overlapping state court class actions go away 
through the use of injunctions.  Recalling the role of injunctions in 
the jockeying for forum control under the system of corporate diver-
sity litigation,285 these efforts confront exceptions in the Anti-
Injunction Act286 that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, are very 
narrow.287
Uncertain about the availability of authority in existing law to se-
cure the removal of overlapping state court class actions,288 and seri-
ously constrained by Supreme Court precedent under the Anti-
Injunction Act, key members of the federal judiciary responded by ini-
tiating consideration of possible amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and to federal statutes that might ease the burdens 
posed by overlapping class actions dispersed between the federal and 
state courts.  The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules developed a vari-
ety of proposals that would have authorized a federal court to enjoin 
(1) state court certification of a class substantially similar to one that 
the court had previously refused to certify, and (2) state court ap-
proval of a proposed class action settlement substantially similar to 
one that the court had previously refused to approve.289
285 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
286 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
287 See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 635-39 (1977) (holding 
that § 16 of the Clayton Act did not provide an express exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, the prohibitions of which “exist separate and apart from those tradi-
tional principles [of equity and comity]”).  For a sensitive treatment of the exceptions, 
see In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 233-39 (3d Cir. 2002).  As Martin Redish and I have 
previously argued, and as Tobias Wolff develops in his article for this Symposium, the 
Anti-Injunction Act is in need of a complete overhaul.  See Burbank, supra note 164, at 
215, 228-30; Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power:  Propos-
ing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1347 (2000); Wolff, supra note 27, at 2054-66.  Until then, the best hope for a jurispru-
dence that transcends labels (i.e., does not stretch to assimilate a particular case to one 
involving jurisdiction over property) seems to me the insight that the exception for 
injunctions that are “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283, calls for 
careful consideration of “jurisdictional” policy.  A federal transferee court exercising 
jurisdiction under § 1407 should be able to enjoin overlapping state court class actions 
when they are actually interfering with the conduct of coordinated and consolidated 
pretrial proceedings. 
288 Syngenta was decided in 2002, while the rulemaking effort discussed here oc-
curred in 2001.  Yet, as my gentle description of the view of the All Writs Act rejected 
in Syngenta suggests, see supra text accompanying note 283 (“border[ing] on the frivo-
lous”), the technique was widely recognized to have very bleak prospects. 
289 See Edward H. Cooper, Reporter’s Call for Informal Comment:  Overlap-
ping Class Actions 8-19 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
comment2002/Reporter_Call_for_Comment.pdf. 
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Made aware of serious doubts about the existence of power to im-
plement such changes by court rule,290 the rulemakers convened a 
panel to consider the proposals at a conference in Chicago in 2001.  
The panelists were virtually unanimous in the view that, whatever the 
merits of the proposals, they were beyond the rulemaking power, and 
the rulemakers abandoned the effort.291  The conclusion that effective 
action would require legislation prompted the Civil Rules Committee 
to recommend to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(“Standing Committee”) and to the Federal-State Jurisdiction Com-
mittee that they “support the concept of minimal diversity for large, 
multi-state class actions, in which the interests of no one state are 
paramount, with appropriate limitations or threshold requirements so 
that the federal courts are not unduly burdened and the states’ juris-
diction over in-state class actions is left undisturbed.”292
The federal judiciary was already on record supporting a limited 
use of minimal diversity, and its eagerness to secure a legislative fix for 
Lexecon293 is evident in the comments submitted, in March 2001, on 
legislation containing both such a fix and also provisions for sweeping 
mass disaster litigation into federal court under a theory of minimal 
diversity.294  Although, as enacted in 2002, this legislation has very lim-
290 See Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to author (May 22, 2001) (attaching a 
letter responding to Judge Scirica’s request that Professor Hazard and the author of 
this Article provide their views on the proposals that, as revised, were subject to the re-
quest for comment cited supra note 289) (on file with author). 
291 See, e.g., Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Meeting of 
Jan. 10-11, 2002, at 4; Stephen B. Burbank, Class Action Conference:  Preliminary Re-
marks (Oct. 23, 2001) (on file with author).  The other members of this panel were 
Judge Diane Wood and Professors Daniel Meltzer, Linda Mullenix, Martin Redish, and 
David Shapiro.  See E-mail from author to Judge Lee Rosenthal, U.S. Dist. Court, S. 
Dist. of Tex. (Oct. 18, 2001) (on file with author).  A judge who attended the confer-
ence and thus heard one of the panelists (the author of this Article) suggest, albeit 
dubitante, that a federal court might be able to accomplish the same thing as a matter 
of federal common law, persuaded a panel of his court to do just that.  Judge Easter-
brook’s opinion in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 
F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) is creative.  It is also highly problematic as a matter of preclu-
sion law and as an interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act.  But see Wolff, supra note 
27, at 2074-76. 
292 Memorandum from David F. Levi, Chair, to Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 17 
(May 7, 2002), reprinted in Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (May 20, 
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2002.pdf. 
293 See supra text accompanying note 280. 
294 See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., to Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judici-
ary, U.S. House of Representatives, at 1 (Mar. 13, 2001), reprinted in 147 CONG. REC.
H896-97 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001) (expressing “the support of the federal judiciary for 
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ited application (it requires, among other things, that “at least 75 
natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location”295), it 
might be deemed a forerunner to CAFA in the use both of minimal 
diversity296 and of an exception that, if only by insisting on the tradi-
tional definition of corporate citizenship, evidently takes a narrow 
view of state interests.297
Prior to the Judicial Conference’s meeting in March 2003, and 
notwithstanding the May 2002 memorandum from the Civil Rules 
Committee,298 the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee wrote a report 
urging continued opposition to the use of minimal diversity to bring 
class actions into federal court.  As a fallback position, that Committee 
urged the Conference to support only such proposed legislation as 
H.R. 860, the ‘Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001’”).  
Section 2 of this bill contained a Lexecon fix designed “to allow a judge with a trans-
ferred case to retain it for trial or to transfer it to another district.”  Id. at 1, 147 CONG.
REC. at H896.  The letter noted that in 1988 the Judicial Conference “approved in 
principle the creation of federal jurisdiction that would rely on minimal diversity to 
consolidate multiple litigation [sic] . . . arising out of a single event.”  Id.
295 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. V 2005); see also supra note 4.  As enacted, however, 
it did not contain a Lexecon fix. 
296 This statute provides in pertinent part, 
 (a) IN GENERAL.—The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises 
from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the ac-
cident at a discrete location, if— 
  (1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident 
took place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that de-
fendant is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident 
took place; 
  (2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether 
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or 
  (3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1369(a). 
297 The relevant exception provides, 
 (b) LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.—The district court 
shall abstain from hearing any civil action described in subsection (a) in 
which—
  (1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of 
which the primary defendants are also citizens; and 
  (2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State. 
Id. § 1369(b). 
298 See supra text accompanying note 292 (discussing this memorandum).  The 
Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee’s fallback position, on the other hand, may have 
been consistent with the position advocated by the Civil Rules Committee. 
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left in state court cases in which the states had legitimate interests, de-
fined to include cases in which substantially all members of the class 
were from a single state or were people alleging death, personal in-
jury, or property damage within the state.  As to both, the Committee 
specifically contemplated leaving in place the default regime’s juris-
dictional rules.299
The report of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee elicited a 
response from the Standing Committee that offered somewhat differ-
ent, and somewhat inconsistent, rationales in opposition to the pro-
posed definition of the universe of cases that should remain in state 
court.300  On the merits, the Standing Committee seemed to want to 
bring statewide class actions into federal court for coordinated or con-
solidated proceedings, noting that a defendant might be sued on the 
same claim in all fifty states.301  At the same time, the Standing Com-
299 See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON 
FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION (Agenda E-9) (Mar. 2003) (on file with author); ADDEN-
DUM TO THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JU-
RISDICTION, CLASS ACTION LEGISLATION (Agenda E-9), at 5 n.9 (Mar. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter AGENDA E-9 ADDENDUM] (on file with author) (“The Committee’s proposed 
approach . . . would leave the determination of the citizenship of the defendants, and 
the satisfaction of the complete diversity requirement, to be made in accordance with 
current jurisdictional rules.”).  For other accounts of this history that mute the dis-
agreement between the two Conference committees, see Lee & Willging, supra note 
26, at 1726-33; Marcus, supra note 26, at 1801-03.  Morrison seems to have been un-
aware of it.  See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1541 (noting the change in the position of 
the Judicial Conference without exploring the reason, and contending that the Con-
ference “plainly has not endorsed S. 2062 and its companion bills”).  In fact, disagree-
ment between the Rules Committees and the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee on 
this subject existed from at least 1999.  See Letter from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, 
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Middle District of Florida, 
at 2 (Aug. 10, 1999) (on file with author) (“[I]t is apparent that there is a federal prob-
lem that Congress can properly address.”). 
300 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, OVERLAPPING, COMPETING, AND DUPLICATIVE CLASS ACTIONS
(Agenda E-18) (Mar. 2003), at 13-16 [hereinafter RULES AGENDA E-18], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST3-2003.pdf. 
301 The Standing Committee noted, 
The [Federal-State] Committee’s proposal would prevent the filing in, or re-
moval to, federal court of most actions where the class is limited to nearly all 
in-state plaintiffs—no matter what the primary defendants’ relationship is to 
the state or whether that state’s law governed—so long as one non-diverse de-
fendant was joined.  The likely consequence would be that a defendant might 
find itself litigating statewide class actions in many states.  While avoiding po-
tential concerns about a state court applying its law nationwide, many of the 
consequences associated with multiple actions would remain.  A federal court 
could still find itself competing with as many as fifty overlapping class actions; 
the litigants might still find themselves competing for recovery; and the de-
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mittee observed that such details were heavily freighted with politics 
and should be left to Congress.302
In the revised report of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee, 
which had the concurrence of the Standing Committee, the recom-
mendation did not clearly signal the former committee’s views on al-
location,303 and they were watered down in the accompanying explana-
tion.304  Moreover, a March 26, 2003, letter to Congress on behalf of 
the Judicial Conference repeated the watered-down version.305  Finally, 
when Senator Leahy requested that the federal judiciary submit “legis-
lative language” to implement its views about the appropriate alloca-
tion of jurisdiction over class actions, the response on its behalf 
evinced the same lack of clarity that characterized the Federal-State 
Jurisdiction Committee’s revised recommendation and “deliberately 
avoided specific legislative language, out of deference to Congress’s 
judgment and the political process.”306
fendants might still seek protection under the bankruptcy laws, because they 
offer the sole means of consolidating and resolving multiple claims. 
Id. at 14-15; see also Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 399 (“[A] U.S. defendant might 
face multiple state class actions asserting claims arising from the same product or 
course of conduct, and claims arising from the nation-wide marketing of a standard 
product had no sure means of being centralized in a single federal court.”). 
302 See RULES AGENDA E-18, supra note 300, at 15-16 (“We do not believe the Judi-
cial Conference should involve itself in the specific provisions of proposed legisla-
tion.”). 
303 See SECOND ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COM-
MITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION LEGISLATION (Agenda E-9) 
(Mar. 2003), at 1-2 (on file with author). 
304 See id. at 2 (“Parallel in-state class actions in which the plaintiff class is defined 
as limited to the citizens of the forum state are not included within the term ‘signifi-
cant multi-state class action litigation.’”); id. at 4 (“While the relationship of the defen-
dant to the forum may have some bearing on state adjudicatory power, an insistence 
that all primary defendants maintain formal in-state citizenship is too limiting and may 
preclude in-state class actions where a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum 
state, regardless of citizenship.”). 
305 See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., to Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary, 
U.S. House of Representatives, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2003) (on file with author). 
306 Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the United 
States, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. 
Senate, at 3 (Apr. 25, 2003), reprinted in 150 CONG. REC. S7686-87 (daily ed. July 6, 
2004) (statement of Sen. Carper). 
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V. CAFA’S SIGNIFICANCE: A PRELIMINARY VIEW
Our culture of “adversarial legalism” relies on litigation to provide 
compensation for injury and to enforce important social norms to an 
extent probably unique in the world.307  There is reason for concern 
that CAFA will retard state regulation of harmful activity by including 
within its jurisdictional sweep not just multistate class actions, but also 
class actions that are of intense interest to individual states, whose law 
will govern all or most of the claims.  Of course, that concern should 
only arise to the extent that CAFA alters the balance of power in fo-
rum selection that existed in the default regime.  To that extent, how-
ever, it would be exacerbated by evidence suggesting that some of 
CAFA’s supporters hold—and evidently would have the federal courts 
adopt—an essentialist and prerealist view of the proper role of aggre-
gation.308
CAFA unquestionably changes the balance of power in forum se-
lection.  Educated about the litigation dynamics created by the default 
regime, or at least about the willingness and ability of entrepreneurial 
class counsel, as they pejoratively put it, to “game the system,”309 the 
statute’s supporters understood that changes in the provisions con-
cerning diversity and the amount in controversy, although necessary 
for the attainment of their objectives, would not be sufficient.  Thus, 
even if class counsel could not prevent removal by naming a nondi-
verse defendant, it might be possible to include a friendly defendant 
307 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (2001) (“Compared to other 
economically advanced democracies, . . . [t]he United States more often relies on law-
yers, legal threats, and legal contestation in implementing public policies, compensat-
ing accident victims, striving to hold governmental officials accountable, and resolving 
business disputes.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litiga-
tion:  Curse or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163 (2008).  As Professors Hazard, Gedid, and 
Sowle have noted, 
There is little prospect of legislation that will displace personal injury litiga-
tion with some form of social insurance, or displace consumer litigation with 
more stringent administrative regulation.  On the contrary, the litigation form 
for resolution of social disputes—proceedings under the aegis of courts—is an 
essential part of our culture, as de Toqueville long ago observed. 
Hazard et al., supra note 180, at 1948. 
308 See supra text accompanying note 28 (describing the views of some CAFA sup-
porters towards class actions); infra text accompanying notes 364 (same); see also Bur-
bank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1953 (commenting on Nagareda, Discontents, supra
note 261, and “argu[ing] that it takes an essentialist view, shaped by current federal 
arrangements, on normative questions, including questions of institutional legiti-
macy”).
309 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6. 
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who would not agree to removal,310 to sue the target defendant in its 
home state, or to keep the litigation’s true scope and ambitions hid-
den until the default regime’s one-year limitation on removal had 
passed.  As we have seen, CAFA’s removal provisions address each of 
those tactics, allowing any defendant to remove (apparently, the en-
tire case), and eliminating both the removal disability of in-state (di-
versity) defendants and the one-year limitation on removal.311
CAFA’s supporters were aware that the federal judiciary long op-
posed predecessor class action bills on workload and federalism 
grounds.  They were also aware of the default regime’s other hurdles 
for state court defendants seeking to remove to federal court:  first, 
the rule that the party seeking access to federal court has the burden 
of establishing the existence of jurisdiction,312 and second, the general 
precept to construe the removal statute strictly against jurisdiction.313
Finally, if for either reason they anticipated a hostile reception to 
CAFA removals, they knew that the general statutory ban on appellate 
review of remand orders could frustrate their goals.314
CAFA itself addresses appellate review, however fecklessly, by 
permitting a party aggrieved by an order granting or denying a re-
mand motion to petition for review to the court of appeals, and by set-
ting strict limits on the time within which that court must render a de-
310 This tactic contributed to the Judicial Conference’s 1987 recommendation that 
removal be permitted by “any defendant,” instead of “the defendant or the defen-
dants,” under § 1441(a).  See Court Reform and Access to Justice Act:  Hearings on H.R. 3152 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 93 (1987–1988) [hereinafter House Hearings].  This was the only 
one of five recommendations concerning removal not enacted.  Compare id. at 93-94 
with Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988).  It is tempting to view the choices as reflecting the prefer-
ences of a Congress controlled by Democrats.  Yet the Judicial Conference had previ-
ously rejected the recommendation, probably because it would increase the workload 
of the federal courts, see House Hearings, supra, at 95, and the Reagan Administration’s 
Department of Justice did oppose it on that ground.  See Judicial Branch Improvements 
Act of 1987:  Hearing on S. 1482 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the 
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 202-03 (1988) (“This would add more cases to 
an already overburdened federal judiciary that the state courts are perfectly adequate 
to handle.”).  Court workload, not the balance of power between plaintiffs and defen-
dants, dominated this round of jurisdiction reform, suggesting that in Congress, as in 
the courts, the 1980s were an interlude of quiet before the storm that led to CAFA.  See
supra text accompanying note 213. 
311 See supra Part II.B. 
312 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 32, at 253 n.12. 
313 See id. at 235 & n.68. 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 48 & 76 (discussing discretionary appellate 
review of remand decisions under CAFA).
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cision in a case in which it grants review.315  CAFA’s supporters sought 
to assist state court defendants in crossing the default regime’s other 
hurdles to removal through the use of legislative history.316
It evidently did not trouble CAFA’s supporters that, by eliminating 
a provision in the 2003 bill that would have enabled unnamed mem-
bers of a putative class to remove, they were giving defendants the op-
tion to “game the system”—as, for instance, by choosing to remain in 
a state court that was hospitable to abusive settlements of the type that 
CAFA regulates in federal court.317  Moreover, by focusing only on the 
techniques of forum manipulation available to plaintiffs (and then 
only in the default regime as of 2005), they pretermitted the historical 
and institutional perspective necessary to make a reliable judgment as 
to whether “gaming the system” (by either side) should carry a pejora-
tive connotation.318
We have seen that when Congress first formally blessed the defini-
tion of corporate citizenship for diversity purposes in 1958, it left 
largely in place the existing balance of power in forum selection be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants.319  In order to make a reliable judg-
315 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (Supp. V 2005).  The correction of the scrivener’s error, 
“not less than 7 days after entry of the order,” to the intended “not more than 7 days 
after entry of the order” has proved challenging only for those who embrace theories 
of statutory interpretation with a fervor usually reserved for religion.  See generally Adam 
N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”?  Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class 
Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1230 (2007) (dis-
cussing this error). 
316 Some courts have deemed significant the juxtaposition of these methods of at-
tempting to change the status quo.  See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. 05-2340, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15396, at *24 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005) (“[B]y making substantive 
changes with respect to the aggregation rule, but failing to express a concomitant 
change in the burden of proof, Congress implicitly acknowledged and adopted the 
long-standing rule that a removing defendant bears the burden of proof for establish-
ing diversity jurisdiction.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 06-4855, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27617 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2007). 
317 See supra note 27; see also Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in 
a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1653 (2006) (noting that CAFA gives defen-
dants a “wait-and-see” option for removal).  Professor Purcell correctly observes that 
CAFA’s elimination of the default regime’s one-year limitation on removal “handed 
defendants a new weapon that could actively encourage the very collusion the statute 
purported to end.”  Purcell, supra note 5, at 1874. 
318 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10 (noting that forum shopping need not 
be a ground for criticism). 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 177-178.  It seems unlikely that any of the 
post-1958 changes in federal statutory law had a major impact on the general balance 
of power in forum choice for ordinary diversity litigation.  As to the diversity statute, 
Congress raised the amount-in-controversy requirement to in excess of $50,000 in 
1988, see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 
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ment about the need for the change in that balance that CAFA effects, 
a number of developments since the disintegration of the system of 
corporate diversity litigation seem to me particularly salient. 
It is one thing to call for realism about the likelihood of local bias 
against corporations engaged in national commerce.  If, as Charles 
Warren and Felix Frankfurter argued, it was nonsense to treat (some) 
such corporations as outsiders in almost all states in the 1920s,320 it is 
nonsense on stilts today.321  It is quite another thing, however, to advo-
cate that the fiction of corporate presence, which International Shoe
sought to banish, should be replaced by a fiction of multiple corpo-
rate domiciles in the law of personal jurisdiction.  A perspective on 
the American litigation system that takes a dynamic and comparative 
102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988), and to in excess of $75,000 in 1996, see Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000)).  In addition, Congress addressed problems arising 
in discrete categories of cases in 1964 (citizenship of liability insurance companies 
sued under state direct action statutes), see Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, 
§ 1, 78 Stat. 445, 445 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1)), and in 1988 (citizenship of 
representatives of estates of decedents, infants, or incompetents, and citizenship of 
permanent resident aliens), see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
§§ 202(a), 203(a), 102 Stat. at 4646 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(c)(2), 1332(a)).  In 
1990, Congress passed the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  See Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1367).  As to the removal statute, in 1988 Congress enacted two changes 
with implications for forum shopping.  First, it provided that defendants sued under 
fictitious names (“John Doe defendants”) be disregarded in determining whether di-
versity exists.  See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 1016(a), 102 Stat. 
at 4669 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).  Second, it enacted a one-year limitation on 
removal (from the time a case is commenced in state court) in diversity cases.  See id.
§ 1016(b), 102 Stat. at 4669 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).  Thereafter, in 1990, 
Congress abolished the much-vexed institution of separate and independent claim re-
moval in diversity cases.  See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 312, 104 Stat. at 5114 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)).  Recall that this provision was once a redoubt of cor-
porate defendants but had long since been deprived of its utility.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 122-125.  Finally, Congress made numerous changes to the general 
venue statute affecting diversity cases between 1958 and 2005.  Such changes applied 
(or apply) only to cases brought originally in federal court and thus have no obvious 
relevance to the federal-state forum game.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 
1558 n.8 (“Our coding turned up not a single dispute over venue.”).  Since the re-
moval statute has its own venue provision, however, the desire to secure a more favor-
able venue in a case that could be removed may prompt a plaintiff to file in federal 
court.  See supra note 72 (noting that a majority of CAFA cases have been originally 
filed in federal court). 
320 See supra note 102. 
321 See STATE-FEDERAL STUDY, supra note 79, at 13 (proposing a statutory provision 
barring a corporation or other business organization from access to federal court in 
any state where it has maintained “local establishment” for more than two years in any 
action arising out of that establishment’s activities). 
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view of constitutional requirements and has regard for proportionality 
should not tolerate most exercises of general doing-business jurisdic-
tion over domestic (i.e., U.S.) corporations.322  One holding such a 
view may conclude that a federal diversity forum, and the possibility of 
transfer within the federal court system, should be available to a cor-
porate defendant that is sued in a state in which it is not incorporated 
and does not have its principal place of business on claims having 
nothing to do with its activities in that state, at least if the plaintiff is 
not a resident of the state.323
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman argued, in the context 
of judgment-recognition practice, that a polity’s rules concerning ju-
risdiction are a “hallmark” of the fairness with which that polity han-
dles “litigation involving significant foreign elements.”324  In the con-
temporary litigation market, a plaintiff’s choice of a forum that lacks 
either a regulatory interest over the plaintiff’s claims (which it would 
have if specific jurisdiction existed and perhaps, but more controver-
sially, if the plaintiff were a resident) or an abiding relationship with—
which may include a regulatory interest over—the defendant (such as 
the state of incorporation, at least, would have), is reason for worry 
whether the quest is for legitimate litigation advantage. 
Apart from exorbitant assertions of state court adjudicatory au-
thority that twenty years of Supreme Court neglect could only have 
encouraged,325 the litigation market for which Congress legislated in 
1958 was a very different market from that to which Congress re-
sponded in 2005.  The most important changes occurred because of 
the transformative power of the modern (post-1966) class action. 
Purcell’s description of how an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar 
evolved and devised tactics first to counteract removal by corporate 
defendants and then, once developments in the law of personal juris-
diction permitted, to shop for (and keep) a favorable forum among 
322 See Burbank, supra note 105, at 749-53 (criticizing general doing-business juris-
diction); see also supra text accompanying notes 166, 253-256 (noting limited and equiv-
ocal Supreme Court authority on doing-business jurisdiction). 
323 Cf. Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923) 
(“[O]rderly, effective administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign 
carrier shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause of action did not arise, in 
which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in which the carrier nei-
ther owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does not reside.”). 
324 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions:  A Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1610 (1968). 
325 The Court did not decide a case involving the constitutional limitations on 
state court jurisdiction between 1958 and 1977. 
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the states,326 seems almost quaint today.  The modern class action is 
not just an extraordinarily powerful instrument of law enforcement.  
For a plaintiffs’ bar that is ever more entrepreneurial and competitive, 
it is an extraordinarily powerful addition to the mix of incentives and 
disincentives that drive forum choice. 
Recurrent attempts by the Supreme Court to police interstate fo-
rum shopping through constitutional control of choice of law have 
also proved largely ineffective.327  It is usually very easy for a state court 
that is so minded to find in the complex underlying facts a constitu-
tionally cognizable contact in the state whose law that court wants to 
apply, and usually just as easy to interpret the law as animated by at 
least one policy that the contact implicates, thereby triggering a con-
stitutionally adequate basis for its application.  When the choice of law 
question arises in a putative class action, and when the answer to the 
question will determine whether a class can be certified, nothing in 
the Constitution prevents the state court from “bootstrapping” in or-
der to overcome predominance and manageability problems.328
Moreover, particularly for putative negative-value class actions, “boot-
strapping” may not be necessary, since proponents of such litigation 
have emphasized the realm of deterrence in which policies that can 
lead to the application of one state’s law (i.e., that of the defendant’s 
headquarters) are likely to be found.329
I suspect that the phenomenon of “drive-by class certification”330
was on the cutting edge of obsolescence in the state courts in 2005.  I 
also suspect that the phenomenon of ever-changing magnet courts 
(“judicial hellholes”) might well have run its course if left, not to its 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 117-133, 145-149. 
327 See supra text accompanying notes 153-155, 257-264. 
328 See supra text accompanying note 261 (discussing the constitutionality of “boot-
strapping”).
329 Recent scholarship has correctly noted the weakness of an agency-costs critique 
when applied to negative-value class actions in which the main goal can plausibly be 
deemed deterrence rather than compensation.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. 
Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial 
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006); William Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney 
General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).  In my view, however, 
those authors have not succeeded in articulating a principled method for determining 
when deterrence is plausibly deemed the main goal of litigation (which surely requires 
attention to the substantive-law scheme), or in suggesting means to prevent inefficient 
overenforcement. 
330 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 22 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22. 
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own devices, but to the political process.331  Even if so, however, what 
politics takes away, politics can restore.  Moreover, not all of the cases 
or types of cases that caused CAFA’s supporters heartburn can be as-
signed to politics, lack of resources and experience, or the other di-
mensions that feed invidious comparisons of the state and federal 
courts.  Some state courts were certifying multistate classes because 
they shared the commitments of the federal rulemakers in 1966, be-
cause they believed that either one state’s law or a manageable group 
of state laws could and should be applied, and because they otherwise 
thought certification appropriate under their governing rules. 
Just because the Constitution does not foreclose such decisions 
does not mean that there is no federal interest in regulating the proc-
ess by which or the forums in which they are made.332  Yet, we have 
seen that, even as revised by Friendly and Frank,333 the traditional view 
of Article III’s diversity grant (the only view that the Supreme Court 
has ever espoused) seems rather far removed from the vision pro-
jected in CAFA.  There we are told that the “framers . . . provid[ed] 
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national impor-
tance under diversity jurisdiction.”334  For that reason alone, Douglas 
Floyd’s work on the constitutional infirmities of CAFA must be taken 
seriously.335  Unless the Supreme Court were to disavow the traditional 
331 See Class Action “Judicial Hellholes”:  Empirical Evidence Is Lacking (Pub. Citizen, 
Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2005, http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf, at 6-8 
(2005) (summarizing recent legislative changes in state class action systems). 
332 Sherman identifies such an interest: 
But more important than the [federal courts’] resource and expertise issue 
was the argument that national corporations should not be subjected to multi-
state class actions in state courts and particularly in target venues that would 
define their legal liability nationwide.  This was a powerful argument, and the 
defection of a number of Democratic senators from their leadership’s opposi-
tion to CAFA seems to have been influenced by this concern. 
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 1593, 1608 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 77-95. 
334 CAFA § 2(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005); see also supra text ac-
companying note 11. 
335 See generally C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification 
for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006) [hereinafter Floyd, In-
adequacy]; C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (2004) 
[hereinafter Floyd, Limits] (examining the origins and validity of pivotal assumptions 
underlying federal jurisdiction expansion enactments).  More recently, Professor 
Pfander has provided other reasons, having to do with the proper role of ancillary ju-
risdiction, to limit the reach of minimal diversity.  See Pfander, supra note 203, at 1449-
59; infra note 339. 
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view of the purposes of the Constitution’s diversity grant, for which it 
is largely responsible, the Justices might have difficulty explaining how 
the exercise of jurisdiction in some of the cases covered by CAFA’s 
very broad reach can be justified.336
As Floyd points out, that task should be even harder for a Court 
that has promoted the constitutional values of federalism.337  It should 
not be sufficient simply to cite the Tashire case,338 the Court’s perfunc-
tory blessing (decades after the event) of minimal diversity in one of 
the very few contexts in which Congress has previously provided for 
it.339  Moreover, congressional attempts to buoy the constitutional case 
for CAFA by invoking interstate commerce are, as Floyd demonstrates 
in another article, also vulnerable to close analysis.340  Indeed, the 
kitchen-sink quality of CAFA’s statements of findings and purposes 
might be thought evidence of either congressional hypocrisy341 or, 
more charitably, a legislative phenomenon akin to alternative judicial 
336 See Floyd, Limits, supra note 335, at 652-71 (identifying the lack of fit between 
most of CAFA’s stated purposes and the purposes of the grant of judicial power in Ar-
ticle III). 
337 See id. at 645-50 (discussing Supreme Court cases with the theme of preserva-
tion of federalism and dual sovereignty). 
338 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); see also Floyd, Limits,
supra note 335, at 632-33 (discussing Tashire).
339 Federal jurisdiction for statutory interpleader is a far easier sell than is the exis-
tence of federal judicial power in a putative class action on behalf of 101 members, 100 
of whom, including the named class representative, are from the state where it was 
brought against a local defendant who then removed it.  That such a case would be 
within one of CAFA’s mandatory exceptions, requiring the court to decline jurisdic-
tion, does not alter the fact that the statute purports to confer it.  Consider the views of 
Professor Pfander: 
[T]he Court’s decision [in Tashire] to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction over 
claims in the nature of interpleader represents only a modest extension of the 
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction rather than a wholesale endorsement of 
minimal diversity.  Earlier decisions had required diversity between the stake-
holder and one set of claimants to the fund, and had permitted the exercise 
of ancillary jurisdiction over other, nondiverse claimants to the same fund.  
Tashire might be viewed as having simply clarified that this ancillary concep-
tion of interpleader was available in an original proceeding. 
Pfander, supra note 203, at 1453-54 (footnote omitted). 
340 See Floyd, Inadequacy, supra note 335, at 507-20; id. at 532 (“[T]he repeated in-
vocation of the language of the Commerce Clause in the statement of findings and 
purposes and the legislative history . . . is a red herring.”). 
341 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1942 (“Less charitably, they meet 
the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of ‘bullshit,’ because they are made with 
apparent indifference to their truth content.”). 
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determinations, confidence in any one of which is undermined by the 
concern that none of them fully engaged the court’s attention.342
There would nonetheless be serious irony in a decision by the Su-
preme Court holding CAFA unconstitutional (in some applications), 
however persuasive it might be in light of the traditional account of 
the diversity grant in Article III.  For, although there is essentially no 
support for CAFA’s articulated vision of diversity litigation in the Su-
preme Court’s decisions explaining the purposes of the grant—and 
only partial and equivocal support in the legal literature343—as Purcell 
demonstrates, the Court was hardly consistent in practicing what it 
preached while umpiring the system of corporate diversity litigation.  
Indeed, CAFA’s vision of diversity jurisdiction as opening the federal 
courts to “interstate cases of national importance” is pretty close to—a 
twenty-first century update of—that which drove the Court during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when corporate diver-
sity litigation was a staple of the federal courts’ docket.344  It is also 
pretty close to that which animated Congress when it first defined 
corporate citizenship for jurisdictional purposes in 1958.345
A reasonable member of Congress—even one who was aware that 
in the period from 1875 to 2004, “the overall importance of diversity 
cases to the construction of judicial policy ha[d] waned”346—could
thus have concluded that there was a need to change the balance of 
power in forum selection for class litigation between plaintiffs and de-
fendants.  The Supreme Court had been no more consistent in adjust-
ing federal diversity jurisdiction to the pressures and demands of the 
modern class action than it had been during the system of corporate 
diversity litigation.  It had failed in efforts to use the Constitution to 
control the excesses of state court personal jurisdiction and choice of 
law that added to the allure of state court class actions when the fed-
eral courts were not available and when they ceased to be hospita-
ble.347  Some state courts were clearly rubber-stamping multistate 
classes proffered by class counsel, and although there were reasons to 
believe that the situation was improving, at least one of those rea-
342 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (explaining the 
rationale for the rule that a judgment based on alternative determinations is not pre-
clusive except to the extent affirmed on appeal).
343 See supra text accompanying notes 77-95. 
344 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
345 See supra text accompanying notes 174-176. 
346 Curry, supra note 4, at 463. 
347 See supra text accompanying notes 246-264. 
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sons—personnel changes on courts whose members are elected—
provided no protection against recrudescence.348  Finally, although 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether a state court’s application 
of one law to the claims of all members of a multistate class was itself 
an abuse, there was little question that (1) certification in such cases 
would usually prompt settlement; (2) the choice of law, even if consti-
tutional, might subordinate important interests of other states; (3) in 
negative-value class actions, there was a risk of inefficient overen-
forcement; and (4) consumers would ultimately absorb many of the 
costs of any judgment or settlement, retrospective or prospective. 
The same conclusion, however, by no means follows for class ac-
tions that are not in any meaningful sense “multistate.”  CAFA’s sup-
porters sought to meet both workload and federalism objections in a 
variety of ways.  First, they relied on a small-class carve-out and on the 
aggregate amount-in-controversy requirement to keep smaller class 
actions, defined from either perspective, in state courts and out of 
federal courts.349  From the first predecessor bill on which the federal 
judiciary commented to the statute that was enacted, although the size 
of the carve-out remained at 100, the amount in controversy rose from 
in excess of $1 million to in excess of $5 million, exclusive of interest 
and costs.350  Second, rightly or wrongly, CAFA’s supporters concluded 
that Congress had already worked out a satisfactory adjustment of fed-
eral and state interests for securities and shareholder class actions, 
and that such adjustment could simply be incorporated in CAFA.351
Third, and most controversially, they relied on a number of “excep-
tions” to jurisdiction that were designed to permit or require a federal 
district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction where the interests of 
the states in keeping class actions in their courts were thought to out-
weigh the federal interests sought to be advanced in CAFA.352
348 See supra text accompanying notes 267-271.  For the confounding effect of “out-
lier” courts on attempts to discipline public policy with the fruits of methodologically 
sound empirical research, see infra note 367. 
349 The latter has been a tried and true technique of deflecting attempts to abolish 
or narrow diversity jurisdiction generally. 
350 See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House 
of Representatives, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1999) (on file with author) (describing the excep-
tions to the grant of jurisdiction in H.R. 1875). 
351 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56; supra note 76. 
352 See supra Part II.A.4.  The “local controversy exception” was added late in the 
long legislative process of refinement, a critical part of the compromise that permitted 
the statute to pass.  See 151 CONG. REC. S1006 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch). 
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Reliance on the amount-in-controversy requirement to meet fed-
eralism objections recalls Purcell’s insight that “one of the great, if 
largely unspoken, social and legal compromises of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries . . . [was that] [i]f plaintiffs agreed to 
keep their claims reasonably small, they could guarantee themselves a 
state forum.”353  We should also recall, however, that when the system 
of corporate diversity litigation evolved, doctrine that treated a corpo-
ration as a citizen of only one state was counterbalanced by jurisdic-
tional (including removal) provisions that, as interpreted, enabled 
many plaintiffs to keep their cases in state court, notably but not ex-
clusively by joining a nondiverse defendant.  Moreover, in slightly ex-
panding corporate citizenship in 1958 but not changing the removal 
regime, Congress in fact further empowered plaintiffs desiring to liti-
gate in state court.354
Let us by all means acknowledge the force of Purcell’s argument 
that the Court’s actual implementation of the system of corporate di-
versity litigation reveals a conception of the jurisdictional grant quite 
different from the traditional account and that Congress acted consis-
tently with that reconceived vision in 1958.  Let us also acknowledge 
that a similar vision animates CAFA itself.  It was, however, disingenu-
ous for Congress to try to have it both ways, and thus also to rely on 
the fictions of corporate citizenship, when fashioning exceptions to 
jurisdiction that were advertised as honoring the legitimate interests 
of the states.  To be sure, Congress’s purpose to deal with multistate 
class actions meant that the default regime’s requirement of complete 
diversity and its removal-related instruments of countervailing power 
for plaintiffs could not be left in place.  It would have been a simple 
matter, however, to acknowledge the fictions, and in the process, ac-
tually to serve state interests when crafting exceptions. 
CAFA’s exceptions, or some of them, are numbingly complicated 
and, as already observed, well calculated to keep lawyers and courts 
busy for years in work that advances the cause of substantive justice 
not one wit.355  For present purposes, however, the details need not 
detain us.  It suffices to note that none of the exceptions permits a state 
court to retain (if the defendant chooses to remove) a class action brought on 
behalf solely of the citizens of that state, alleging injuries sustained in the state 
353 PURCELL, supra note 107, at 251; see also supra text accompanying note 133. 
354 See supra text accompanying notes 170-178.  Recall that Congress also raised the 
amount in controversy to in excess of $10,000 in 1958. 
355 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1565-67 (stating that CAFA creates 
social waste). 
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as a result of the in-state activities of an out-of-state corporation doing substan-
tial business in the state.  Such a case is, therefore, defined as of “na-
tional importance.” 
This is the sort of case that class counsel in the default regime 
usually could keep in state court through the joinder of a nondiverse 
defendant.  It is also the sort of case in which there could be no con-
cern about an exorbitant exercise of personal jurisdiction, no doubt 
about the existence of the forum state’s regulatory interest, no consti-
tutional question about a choice of forum law, and, likely, no reason 
to fear ad hoc manipulation of state law.  Moreover, any such manipu-
lation designed to permit aggregation (as for instance through a pre-
sumption of reliance in a class action alleging fraud under state law)356
would represent a policy choice that was within the prerogatives of 
state institutions, the internal allocation of power among which pre-
sents no question of federal interest. 
With eyes not blinded by fictions,357 the reason for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction in such a case might seem to be a desire to give the 
corporate defendant a choice to seek, not a neutral forum, but a more 
favorable forum.358  On that view, by yielding to the overreaching of 
CAFA’s supporters, Congress gave new life to the view that the federal 
courts are “business men’s courts.”359  Less tendentiously, the mere 
fact that a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce makes state 
356 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 
(1987) (book review) (noting the use of “dubious substantive strategies that enable 
packaging”).
357 See Shapiro, supra note 63, at 123-24 (“Now, it could be said that the problem 
here lies not with CAFA, but with the definition of corporate citizenship used for all 
diversity purposes. . . . [I]t would have made more sense to choose some other basis 
than citizenship, such as residence or corporate presence, to determine a party’s con-
nection to the forum state.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 136 (“By using citizen-
ship (domicile) of both the plaintiffs and defendants as the measure of how localized a 
controversy is, Congress has insured that many controversies that are very closely con-
nected to only one state will not be able to fit the exceptions no matter how the courts 
interpret the statute.”). 
358 See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 548 (“It is indisputable that the primary politi-
cal goal of CAFA was to remove state class actions to the federal system, where, it was 
assumed, they would be dealt with severely (either through active denial of class certi-
fication, or simply by being warehoused indefinitely by an overwhelmed judiciary).”); 
Purcell, supra note 5, at 1887 (“CAFA did not so much save defendants from biased 
state courts as reward them with access to an alternate forum that they regarded as 
more favorable to their interests.”). 
359 See Friendly, supra note 81, at 498 (“There was a vague feeling that the new 
courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s courts.”); see also supra
note 91 and accompanying text. 
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law class action litigation against it (in all states but two) a matter of 
such strong “national interest” as to trump the interests of the several 
states.
What precisely are those interests?  After all, CAFA does not pur-
port to change Erie jurisprudence,360 and thus federal courts exercising 
the jurisdiction it confers are seemingly bound to apply state “substan-
tive” law (including the specific state law(s) selected by the choice of 
law rules of the state in which the federal court sits).361  Yet, federal 
courts sitting in diversity are famously not authoritative sources of 
state law, and the exercise of diversity jurisdiction has, even in the re-
cent past, been at cross purposes with the evolution of state law.362
These potential costs of ordinary diversity litigation are much more 
salient when state courts can, and predictably will, be stripped of the 
capacity to use a potent remedial form to implement substantive policy 
in a jurisdictional world that is no longer meaningfully concurrent.363
360 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46 
(“[T]he Act does not change the application of the Erie Doctrine.”); id. at 61, 66 
(same); Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1943 & n.129 (noting evidence that 
Congress did not intend to change the allocation of lawmaking authority under Erie);
supra note 178. 
361 I have previously sketched an argument that would justify a federal court under 
CAFA in refusing to apply a state choice of law rule that “bootstrapped” to enable ag-
gregation, on the ground that such a rule would be inconsistent with CAFA’s jurisdic-
tional policy.  See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1949-52. 
362 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States:  Positivism and 
Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1463-65 (1997) (discussing prob-
lems when “federal courts may be precluded from exercising similar judicial creativity 
[to that exercised by state courts] by principles of judicial federalism”); Heather Scrib-
ner, Protecting Federalism Interests After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:  A Response to 
Professor Vairo, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1440-42 (2005) (arguing that federal courts 
should abstain from deciding diversity cases when the applicable state law is unclear); 
Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federal-
ism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1677-82 (1992) (criticizing diversity jurisdiction for interfering 
with the development of state law); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 87, reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 80 (Minority Views of Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Feingold, and 
Durbin) (“[T]he class action legislation will slow—and in some cases thwart—the con-
tinual interpretation of state law.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
363 See Marcus, supra note 28, at 1311-12 (arguing that CAFA ultimately weakens 
“the regulatory effect of state law”); Scribner, supra note 362, at 1441-42 (same).  As 
Alan Morrison states, 
[I]t is my experience that class actions often raise claims that seek to push the 
boundaries of legal liability to new levels, and when the claim is based on state 
law, but is in federal court, federal judges, not state judges, will have the last 
word on the meaning of state law. 
Morrison, supra note 9, at 1527; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., No. 
05-0666, 2006 WL 999955, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2006) (“Under CAFA, plaintiffs 
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We know that some of CAFA’s supporters were not seeking differ-
ent class action law so much as they were seeking different attitudes 
towards class certification.  They hoped that many of the putative class 
actions removed under CAFA would be denied certification and go 
away.  We also know that the authors of the Senate Report rejected a 
major premise of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, deeming institu-
tionally illegitimate the goal of promoting law enforcement through 
negative-value class actions enabled by court rule.364  Congress could, 
of course, alter that policy judgment respecting negative-value class 
actions on a transsubstantive basis, as it has done occasionally in spe-
cific substantive contexts.365  But if it were to do so, one would hope, 
attorneys must now bring most indirect purchaser class actions under state antitrust 
law in federal court. . . . [T]his means that, as a practical matter, state courts will rarely 
get to interpret their own state antitrust laws.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  Indeed, Cabraser argues that federal courts should take a “fresh approach” 
to enabling “multi-state classes to proceed under a class action framework” because “we 
no longer enjoy the safety valve of dual state-federal court systems where such class ac-
tions are involved.”  Cabraser, supra note 262, at 567.  She continues, “CAFA has elimi-
nated the state court ‘safe harbor’ in which single-state class actions can be litigated.”  
Id.  Professor Nagareda’s interesting discussion of the uncomfortable role that choice 
of law plays in class certification perhaps implicitly recognizes the latter point.  For he 
observes that, “[i]n institutional terms, [choice of law] principles crafted to mediate 
the authority of competing state sovereigns turn out to sort the parallel roles of class 
action litigation and the administrative state—of private and public—potentially leav-
ing only the latter.”  Nagareda, supra note 238, at 10.  Presumably that is not a concern 
to the extent that statewide class actions can pick up the slack. 
364 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  In this respect, the Senate Report 
calls to mind a 1980 dissenting opinion of Justice Powell.  In response to the Court’s 
observation that reliance on private attorneys general had been “facilitated by Rule 
23,” Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980), and that the empow-
erment of those with negative-value claims was “a central concept of Rule 23,” id. at 338 
n.9, Justice Powell argued that “predicating a judgment on these concerns amounts to 
judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement 
available for particular substantive claims.”  Id. at 354-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).  He 
added that “[s]uch a judgment ordinarily is best left to Congress” and that, “[a]t the 
very least, the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the 
claim.” Id. at 355; see also supra note 198 (quoting more of Justice Powell’s opinion). 
365 See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the Truth in Lending 
Act, which did not have an amount-in-controversy requirement); Burbank, Aggregation,
supra note 178, at 1928-30 (describing the possibility that a legislature could view nega-
tive-value class actions as a “‘vehicle’ or ‘format’ for the vindication of substantive 
rights”).  An alternative strategy to capping class recoveries would be to bar class ac-
tions in certain types of cases where the risk of inefficient overdeterrence seems par-
ticularly great.  In that regard, a provision of New York law, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) 
(McKinney 2005), prohibits class actions seeking to recover a statutory penalty or a 
minimum measure of recovery (i.e., statutory damages) unless the statute specifically 
authorizes their use.  In Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (N.Y. 2007), 
the New York Court of Appeals held that treble damages authorized by a state antitrust 
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first, that it would act transparently, and second, that in doing so, it 
would attend to at least one difference, to wit, the source of the gov-
erning substantive law.  In any event, if the federal courts were to fol-
low the lead of the Senate Report, the costs of their altered stance to-
ward negative-value class actions would be incurred by the states, 
which would be largely denied the ability to pursue a different vision 
of justice in their courts through the class action.366
It remains to be seen, of course, whether, like some kinds of fed-
eral preemption, CAFA will create the federal uniformity of a regula-
tory void.367  In any event, at a time when the Supreme Court has re-
statute constitute a penalty for this purpose.  Still another strategy is to bar class actions 
in cases seeking recovery of very small individual amounts.  Thus, South Carolina re-
quires that each member of a damages class have a claim putting in controversy more 
than $100.  See S.C. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(5) (“[I]n cases in which the relief primarily sought 
is not injunctive or declaratory with respect to the class as a whole, the amount in con-
troversy exceeds one hundred dollars for each member of the class.”); Gardner v. 
Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (S.C. 1991) (applying Rule 
23(a)(5)).
366 As one court has observed, 
[W]hen faced with almost identical medical monitoring class certification mo-
tions, state courts are generally more amenable to granting certification than 
are federal courts. 
 Further, this dichotomy carries serious implications in light of CAFA.  As 
noted above . . . the likelihood that federal jurisdiction will attach to even a 
single-state class action is much higher after passage of CAFA.  To the extent 
that some areas of state substantive law are only adjudicated in the form of 
class actions, CAFA will thus work to preclude state courts from any opportu-
nity to address certain areas of law.  More to the point at issue here, CAFA will 
also remove from state courts the chance even to apply their own civil proce-
dural rules to determine the threshold question of whether certification of a 
medical monitoring class is appropriate.  The upshot of CAFA, then, is to 
move questions of medical monitoring class certification out of state courts 
and into federal courts—a move, which, based on existing precedent, favors 
defendants.
In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 308 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (internal 
quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
367 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:  An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 497-98 (2008) (discussing how federal preemption in the 
products-liability context can lead to remedial and enforcement voids that can leave 
consumers without recourse); cf. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 
(1980) (“The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an 
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action 
of government.”). 
 Professor Walker’s prediction that CAFA’s consumer-protection provisions will 
prove the “most significant” part of the statute, Walker, supra note 26, at 849-50, re-
flects another prediction, to wit, that CAFA’s “jurisdictional provision . . . will have little 
independent effect.”  Id. at 849; see also id. at 851; id. at 867 (predicting that removals 
1532 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 1439
discovered the constitutional safeguards of federalism, and whether or 
not Professor Floyd’s views about CAFA’s constitutional infirmities 
persuade, it hardly seems too much to expect clarity about the reasons 
thought to warrant access to federal court.  Moreover, however trou-
blesome some of the policy choices animating the 1966 amendments 
to Rule 23 may now appear from the perspective of political legiti-
macy, it hardly seems too much to expect such clarity when federal ju-
risdictional legislation enables litigants to deprive states of the ability 
to implement similar policy choices as a matter of state law.368
There is, however, one element in the legislative mix not yet con-
sidered, namely, the policy of using federal jurisdiction to mitigate the 
costs of overlapping class actions.  Even if consideration of the way in 
which CAFA implements that policy does not alter the conclusion that 
“will not result in different outcomes, only more class action litigation in federal 
court”).  The latter prediction is based entirely on a pre-CAFA Federal Judicial Center 
study of a sample of 438 removed cases.  See generally Willging & Wheatman, supra note 
84.  Comparing results in retained and remanded cases within a subset of 292 closed 
removal cases from the sample, the researchers found that “[f]ederal and state judges 
were about equally likely to certify a class, whether for trial and litigation or settle-
ment.”  Id. at 640; see also id. at 635 tbl.11 (finding class certification in twenty-four re-
manded cases (twenty percent), as compared to thirty-seven retained cases (twenty-two 
percent)).  They also found that the median class monetary recovery or settlement in 
remanded (state court) cases was greater than in retained (federal court) cases, but 
that this was a function of class size, and that the median recovery per class member 
was greater in retained cases than in those remanded.  See id. at 639 tbl.15. 
 Without in any way diminishing the value of such empirical work, particularly in a 
policy landscape dominated by anecdotes, this is a very small sample.  Moreover, I 
doubt that removed and remanded cases are representative of pre-CAFA cases filed in 
state court in which there was no attempt to remove (which would include cases ter-
minating in collusive settlements and probably many statewide—as opposed to multi-
state—class actions).  See supra text accompanying notes 353-354 (describing such 
cases).  Finally, although the FJC authors make a sound empirical observation when 
noting that data from avowedly “outlier” courts are unrepresentative, see Willging & 
Wheatman, supra note 84, at 597 n.21 (commenting on Beisner & Miller, supra note 
239, which focused on three outlier courts), CAFA’s supporters relying on those data 
did not need to claim that all, or even most, state courts were “magnet courts” or “judi-
cial hellholes.”  See Beisner & Miller, supra note 239, at 155 (“[C]lass action lawyers are 
bringing a large number of cases in a small number of state courts that have become 
‘magnets’ for interstate class actions and that thus exercise a wildly disproportionate 
role in adjudicating national disputes.”); id. at 157 (“[T]his new wave of class actions 
was not evenly distributed among state courts nationwide.”). 
368 In noting that “the sponsors of the bill were not very precise when describing 
how the exceptions would work,” Professor Shapiro seems not to consider that their 
ambiguity and inconsistency may have been deliberate and strategic.  Shapiro, supra
note 63, at 125.  For the negative impact on democratic values of using “procedure” to 
transform legal rights, see generally JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”:  Complex Litigation 
Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2004). 
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the statute was an abdication of Congress’s duty to safeguard legiti-
mate state interests, attention to it may provide cover to those among 
CAFA’s supporters, in and out of Congress, who do not wish to be as-
sociated with the notion that the business of the federal courts is busi-
ness.369
The Judicial Conference opposed the early (i.e., late-1990s) class 
action jurisdiction bills on workload and federalism grounds.  The 
bills in question had a much lower amount-in-controversy require-
ment and fewer exceptions and carve-outs to permit class actions to 
remain in state court.370  But the Conference supported using minimal 
diversity to deal with the problems of dispersed litigation arising out 
of a common accident or disaster.371
Between the time that the Conference opposed a pre-CAFA bill in 
1999 and its reconsideration of that position in 2002–2003, a number 
of important developments occurred, including, first, the Chief Jus-
tice’s silence in response to the recommendations of the Mass Torts 
Working Group and, second, the work of the rulemakers in trying to 
369 In his valuable article, Morrison suggests that the primary rationale originally 
invoked for CAFA was “the concern that overlapping and/or duplicative class actions 
cannot be consolidated in a single court, which can cause inefficiencies and possibly 
conflicting orders,” and that it was subordinated in the debate to the “national class 
action rationale . . . largely because there are a number of poignant examples.”  Morri-
son, supra note 9, at 1531; see also id. at 1539 (“As the bills proceeded in Congress, the 
overlapping class action concept began to take a back seat to another rationale . . . .”).  
This is not the way I read the history, at least in the Senate (I have not reread the 
House history for this purpose).  It is true that Senator Kohl mentioned the goal of 
“avoid[ing] a collusive ‘race to settlement’ by consolidating overlapping cases” in con-
nection with S. 2083, which he co-sponsored with Senator Grassley.  See 144 CONG.
REC. 24,603 (1998) (statement of Sen. Kohl).  That was not, however, the primary ra-
tionale he invoked.  See id. (noting that S. 2083 “encourages closer scrutiny of class ac-
tions through several provisions”); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 
1555 n.4 (“Class action abuses were the original target of the bill . . . .”).  Moreover, by 
the next Congress—five years before CAFA was enacted—addressing the problems 
created by overlapping and/or duplicative class actions was clearly secondary to the 
goal of bringing “interstate class actions” into federal court.  See S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 
9 (2000) (describing the key components of the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of 
2000).  As the discussion in the text reveals, I also do not share Morrison’s sanguine 
view about the “overlapping and/or duplicative class actions” rationale, although I 
note his acknowledgment that “there is remarkably little empirical evidence to support 
even a removal bill designed to solve problems from multiple unremovable class ac-
tions.”  Morrison, supra note 9, at 1538 n.40.  Finally, I certainly agree with his view that 
statewide class actions—that is, actions restricted to the residents or citizens of one 
state, even when based on the same claim—should not be removable.  See id. at 1546 
n.59.
370 See supra text accompanying notes 350-351. 
371 See supra text accompanying notes 293-297. 
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devise solutions to the problems created by overlapping class actions 
dispersed between the federal and state courts.  The rulemakers’ ef-
forts culminated in the conclusion that the problems were beyond the 
power of the rules process to fix.  As a result, the Civil Rules Commit-
tee and the Standing Committee had become convinced that any solu-
tion to the problems created by overlapping class actions would have 
to come from Congress.372
The Judicial Conference’s struggle to fashion a position on CAFA 
in 2003 suggests that key actors within the federal judiciary were di-
vided as to both whether to support the legislation and where the line 
should be drawn between cases that such legislation should allow to 
be brought into federal court and cases that it should leave in state 
court.373  The prospects for successful opposition on general grounds 
may have been slim as a matter of political reality.  Moreover, the ju-
diciary had already supported the use of minimal diversity for targeted 
jurisdictional purposes in connection with the 2002 legislation374 (as 
well as in the Federal Courts Study Committee Report).375  By inconsis-
tently espousing and/or partially obscuring the specific federalism 
concerns of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee, and by refusing 
to respond with specifics to a request for legislative language, the fed-
eral judiciary may have ensured that politics would indeed triumph. 
One who has cautioned the institutional judiciary about its com-
munications with Congress376 should probably applaud the Confer-
ence for refusing to be drawn into the intensely political battles over 
the line-drawing exercise that CAFA required.  From that perspective, 
it should make no difference that the refusal occurred in response to 
a specific request from a member of Congress.  It is one thing for the 
federal judiciary merely to remind Congress that proposed legislation 
portending a substantial diversion of cases from state courts to the 
federal courts should be evaluated in terms of its workload and feder-
alism implications.  It is quite another thing to specify just what 
proper regard for federalism requires.  Yet, it is also important to re-
call that the institutional federal judiciary has not always been consis-
tent in its invocation of principle, and thus that some of its communi-
372 See supra text accompanying notes 288-292. 
373 See supra text accompanying notes 298-306. 
374 See supra text accompanying notes 293-297. 
375 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 44-45. 
376 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1729-34 (discussing the potential costs of such 
communications). 
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cations with Congress invoking principle have been designed to ad-
vance particular policy views.377
The 1999 letter on behalf of the Conference went beyond a mere 
reminder to keep federalism values in mind.  That letter, after all, in-
cluded the assertion that “[t]ime-honored principles . . . counsel that 
access to the federal courts be expanded only where the expansion 
would serve a substantial federal interest and only where the parame-
ters of the expansion have been carefully crafted to address the per-
ceived problem without unnecessary adverse effects on state judicial 
processes.”378  The March 2003 letter was even more specific.379  In 
context, then, the subsequent refusal to provide specific legislative 
language in a letter that again submerged the particular federalism 
concerns raised by the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee380 virtually 
ensured that the political process would vindicate the maximalist view 
of the Standing Committee. 
CAFA’s statement of findings and purposes gives no notice of a 
perceived problem arising out of overlapping class actions dispersed 
between the federal and state courts and also no notice of congres-
sional purpose to address those problems.381  Even without consulting 
the legislative history,382 however, the existence of that aim can be in-
377 See id. at 1733 (describing the costs of the judiciary’s “taking sides in an inevita-
bly policy preference-laden debate”); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist 
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 308-09 (2003) (“[I]ndividual 
judges are discouraged from breaking ranks with the official conference policy, and 
the policies become an expression of norms of the judiciary by which entrants to the 
federal judiciary are socialized into its ranks.” (footnote omitted)).
378  Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Representative Henry J. Hyde, supra
note 350, at 5. 
379 See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Representative F. James Sensen-
brenner, supra note 305, at 2 (“Accordingly, parallel in-state class actions would not 
present, on a broad or national scale, the problems of state projection of law beyond 
its borders and would present few of the choice of law problems associated with na-
tionwide class action litigation.”); id. at 3 (“While the relationship of the defendant to 
the forum may have some bearing on state adjudicatory power, an insistence that all 
primary defendants maintain formal in-state citizenship is too limiting and may pre-
clude in-state class actions where a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum 
state, regardless of citizenship.”). 
380 See supra text accompanying note 306. 
381 See CAFA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005); supra text accompany-
ing note 11. 
382 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 23, 38, 40-41 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 
23, 36-37, 38-39 (expressing Congress’s intent to minimize duplicative class actions and 
forum shopping); see also Shapiro, supra note 63, at 130-31 (discussing the proper in-
terpretation of “principal injuries” in the “local controversy exception” in light of the 
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ferred from two of the statute’s exceptions,  the “discretionary excep-
tion” and the (mandatory) “local controversy” exception.  As to the 
former, one consideration that a federal court is to take into account 
when deciding whether, “in the interests of justice,” to decline to ex-
ercise jurisdiction is “whether, during the 3-year period preceding the 
filing of that class action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the 
same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have 
been filed.”383  As to the latter, even if all of the other, very restrictive, 
conditions are met, the exception evaporates unless “during the 3-year 
period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action 
has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against 
any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons . . . .”384
Passing differences in language and focusing only on the “local 
controversy” exception, the exclusion from the exception would pre-
vent a federal court from declining to exercise jurisdiction under 
CAFA if one statewide class action involving different class plaintiffs 
but similar claims against the same defendant had been filed within 
three years (even if that class action were itself not removable under 
CAFA!).  One of the supposed selling points of the compromise ena-
bling CAFA’s passage was that it “limit[ed] a court’s authority to base 
federal jurisdiction on the existence of similar class actions filed in 
other states by disallowing consideration of other cases that are more 
than three years old.”385  This was an exceedingly small point at which 
to stick.  The exclusion effectively privileges the supposed federal in-
terest in managing overlapping class actions over the interests of a 
state, even in cases where greater than two-thirds of class members 
and a defendant from whom significant relief is sought are citizens of 
that state and the principal injuries alleged were incurred there.386
legislative history, and concluding that exceptions “were to be used for truly local con-
troversies, not local subsets of nationwide controversies”). 
383 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(F). 
384 Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). 
385 149 CONG. REC. S16,103 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
386 As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted, 
The Committee wishes to stress that another purpose of this criterion is to en-
sure that overlapping or competing class actions or class actions making simi-
lar factual allegations against the same defendant that would benefit from co-
ordination are not excluded from federal court by the Local Controversy 
Exception and thus placed beyond the coordinating authority of the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 40-41 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39.  Many people 
have failed to grasp the effect of these provisions on statutory exceptions that were al-
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The affront to federalism values in this provision may not simply 
be that the provision disables states from adjudicating cases in which 
they have an intense interest.  Once the state court class actions are 
brought into federal court, they will likely be subject to the tender 
mercies of the multidistrict litigation process.  In that process, the in-
centives of key participants—some counsel, defendants, and the trans-
feree court—will be to create bigger “litigations” either by evading the 
restrictions on settlement classes that the Supreme Court prescribed 
in Amchem and Ortiz or through abandonment of the class form for 
nonclass aggregations.  The incentives, in other words, will be to elide 
factual and legal differences that, although impeding certification, are 
what states regard as critical conditions for, or determinants of, effec-
tive regulation.387
ready very narrow.  See, e.g., Stern, supra note 72, at 495 (“[Mississippi trial lawyer Rich-
ard] Scruggs predicts that attorneys seeking leverage in settlement negotiations with 
corporations will file class action suits in a big state such as California, along with com-
panion suits in smaller neighboring states where there might be overlapping claims—
assuming they can find injured individuals who are residents of those smaller states.”).  
Indeed, even some academics do not seem to grasp the narrowness of the exceptions.  
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 28, at 1313 (“Also, CAFA allows for single-state class actions 
in state court, so large cases in California and New York, for example, may compensate 
for regulation lost to the statute.”); id. at 1290 (inaccurately summarizing exceptions).  
But see, e.g., Morrison, supra note 9, at 1534 (“[T]he way [the exceptions] are drafted 
will result in virtually no cases ever being remanded.”); id. at 1538 (“There is only the 
most remote chance that a case will be sent back to state court under one of the nar-
row remand provisions . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 63, at 85-86 (“The exceptions were 
drafted in a way that will make it very difficult for plaintiffs to use them, even in many 
cases that more properly belong in state, rather than federal court.”).  The FJC’s ongo-
ing empirical work includes the question of whether CAFA’s exceptions “preserve state 
court jurisdiction over in-state class actions.”  Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1737.  If 
their work in that respect is to be of any value, it will be essential to define “in-state 
class actions” precisely and to follow that definition consistently. 
387 See Marcus, supra note 26, at 1769 (“[O]ne possible result of CAFA’s juridic-
tional policy could be to empower future federal courts to become more creative in 
favor of class action treatment than they have been in the past.”); id. at 1813-19 (dis-
cussing the development of choice of law rules for class actions in efforts to impede or 
allow class certification); Mark Moller, Class Action Lawmaking:  An Administrative Law 
Model, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 39, 107 (2006) (“[T]here is reason to fear that class action 
courts face special institutional pressures that predispose them to favor certification.”). 
 Interpretation of a number of Supreme Court opinions have [sic] reduced the 
effectiveness of the class action as a means of settling a mass conflict.  This de-
velopment has led a number of judges and attorneys, particularly in pharma-
ceutical cases, to attempt mass settlements on a consolidated and cooperative 
basis without the formalities of a class action.  The substitute quasi-class action 
aggregate technique has advantages and is being closely studied.
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  Those who were surprised by Judge Weinstein’s call for the expansion of 
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On that view, CAFA may result in the replication on a grander 
scale, under cover of settlement, of some of the supposed abuses in 
state court class actions that Congress said it wanted to stamp out.  
The difference would be that the balance of bargaining power in set-
tlement would have shifted to defendants.388  Indeed, in an inversion 
of the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy, CAFA may dry up the mar-
ket for statewide class actions,389 leading counsel who understand the 
dynamics of the MDL process to seek to be first in line with a multi-
state class action that nods and winks past a Supreme Court that has 
lost interest.390  Whatever the potential benefits and costs of gathering 
CAFA’s jurisdictional reach in this opinion, see id. at 542 (“It may be useful for Con-
gress to consider expanding the Class Action Fairness Act from class actions to at least 
some national MDL, non-Rule 23, aggregate actions.”), need look no further for an 
explanation.  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom:  Independence, Imagi-
nation and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1993-98 (1997) 
(discussing the “possibility that Judge Weinstein’s utility function drives him to seek (or 
create) the extraordinary in preference to the ordinary—‘litigations’ rather than cases”). 
388 Professor Stephen Shapiro’s assertion that “the settlement leverage will still tilt 
towards the plaintiffs,” Shapiro, supra note 63, at 131, seems to neglect the added lev-
erage defendants will have in most MDL proceedings involving multiple statewide class 
actions by reason of their ability to prevent certification for litigation.  Cf. Purcell, supra
note 5, at 1874 (discussing the added leverage that defendants have to extract collusive 
settlements after CAFA by remaining in state court but threatening removal and the 
risk of a federal court refusing certification). 
389 See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 544 n.6 (“The remaining alternatives [to a state 
court nationwide consumer class action] would seem to be fifty separate class ac-
tions . . . or more likely, after the enactment of [CAFA], . . . a multistate class action in 
federal court.”). 
 In Figueroa—which was not an MDL proceeding because the competing class ac-
tions were in state court—the court that ultimately declined to approve the settlement 
had preliminarily certified a multistate class for claims that included breach of con-
tract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment, 
money had and received, and unfair business practices and false advertising under 
statutes of all fifty states.  Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 
1300-01, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  Apparently, the court accepted plaintiffs’ contentions 
that there were no consequential differences among state laws.  See id. at 1300-01; cf.
supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of class counsel to wish 
away differences in state law so as to secure certification of multistate classes in state 
court).  But cf. Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing 
certification of a multistate class alleging breach of express and implied warranties be-
cause of failure of plaintiffs to demonstrate predominance). 
390 As Stern reported, 
Milberg Weiss co-founder Mel Weiss sees an opportunity in the new class ac-
tion bill statute [sic].  He expects smaller law firms that specialize in state 
courts to seek out his firm of 120 lawyers now that more class actions will wind 
up in federal court.  “In some ways, it will help me,” Weiss says. 
Stern, supra note 72, at 495. 
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mass disaster litigation in the federal courts, it is difficult to under-
stand why difficulties encountered in the management of overlapping 
class actions under the default regime warranted a remedy so grossly 
overinclusive.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand why an adequate 
solution to those difficulties was not possible through a minor 
amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act.391
This aspect of CAFA raises most clearly the question whether the 
additional burdens that the statute imposes on the federal courts will 
adversely affect the quality of justice, not just in the cases that it allows 
to be brought to federal court, but also in the rest of the federal 
docket.  This concern is particularly acute at a time when civil trials 
are vanishing,392 when the resources the federal courts receive from 
Congress may be inadequate to handle their (pre)existing work,393 and 
when some of those courts appear to be embracing procedural short-
cuts that are themselves troublesome from the perspective of the op-
timal enforcement of the substantive law.394  This concern is also more 
insistent to the extent that some key members of the federal judiciary 
sought (or at least welcomed) the burdens CAFA will impose.  Ani-
mated by an expansive (if not imperialistic) view of the gathering 
powers of federal courts, some federal judges have become inured to a 
view of modern litigation that, by privileging the goals of reducing ex-
pense and delay, ignores the costs of complexity.395
391 Distinguish the cases in question here—in connection with the “local contro-
versy” exception—from the kinds of cases that were the object of the aborted rules 
proposals and Judge Easterbrook’s Bridgestone/Firestone opinion, which were, by and 
large, multistate class actions.  See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
392 See supra note 277 and accompanying text (noting that more cases are termi-
nated by summary judgment than by trial). 
393 See Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 401 (“Since CAFA provides for no new 
judgeships, no additional staffing, and no new resources for the federal judiciary, 
CAFA will further increase the federal courts’ already heavy burdens.”); Lee & Will-
ging, supra note 26, at 1726 (“From a purely administrative perspective, the resulting 
increase in complex cases seemed dangerous, threatening to consume scarce judicial 
resources and to place additional pressures on an already overburdened federal judiciary.”). 
394 See Burbank, supra note 277, at 624-25 (discussing legal and factual “carving” 
for purposes of granting summary judgment, both of which can subvert the substantive 
law); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (redefining plead-
ing requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8); Editorial, The Devil in the 
Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52 (2007) (criticizing Twombly for constricting access to federal 
court).  The author is chair of the Editorial Committee of the American Judicature So-
ciety, which publishes Judicature.
395 See Burbank, supra note 356, at 1476-83; Burbank, supra note 307 (discussing 
complex American litigation); see also supra note 72 (questioning the Federal Judicial 
Center’s decision—for all consolidated cases, including those subject to the MDL 
process—to include only lead cases in their analysis of CAFA cases in federal court). 
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Finally, there is evidence that the federal courts are resisting some 
of the most egregious overreaching of CAFA’s supporters.396  Whether 
or not that is true, the experience of the federal judiciary in comment-
ing on legislative proposals and implementing the final product may 
advance understanding of the institution as an interest group. 
Failure to speak with one voice in the legislative process leading 
up to CAFA prevented the federal judiciary from checking the ex-
cesses of interest-group and partisan politics.  The voice that, as a solo, 
might have made a difference—cautioning against overloading al-
ready burdened federal courts—was recognizable as both inflected 
with institutional self-interest and pitched to the interests of all liti-
gants in federal courts.397  The other voice in the federal judiciary’s 
duet—championing the gathering powers of federal courts—not only 
took a narrower view of institutional interest, but it could also be 
enlisted in the chorus of those who, while waving the Stars and 
Stripes, were singing L’Internationale.398  In such circumstances, it 
396 See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1579-91 (presenting data 
seeming “to show that both the district courts and the courts of appeals have resisted 
an expansive reading of CAFA”). 
397 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1733 n.254 (“On matters as to which one would 
expect the judiciary to try to maximize the institution’s collective preferences, . . . every-
one recognizes that judges are self-interested and can discount what they say without 
closing off an obvious and important source of relevant information.”).  But see id.
(“[T]here are reasons to doubt the judiciary’s ability to forecast the work that new 
statutory rights would create.”).  Speaking in July 2003, when CAFA’s prospects re-
mained unclear, Judge Hodges, the chair of the JPML, said, 
 We certainly don’t want to open the floodgates to an onslaught of litigation 
in the federal courts that would overwhelm us and require the creation of 
otherwise unneeded additional federal judges or encroach upon traditional 
jurisdiction of the states.  It is a very sensitive area.  It is a question of how you 
strike a balance in the long run in defining what constitutes a mass tort, how 
many claims there should be, how many plaintiffs, what the amount of [sic] 
controversy should be, and to what extent you are going to relax the diversity 
requirements.  Even then, there are always going to be some cases that would 
remain in state court.  The so-called minimal diversity bill is pending in Con-
gress now, and the chance of passage is anybody’s guess.  I really don’t know. 
Hansel, supra note 275, at 20. 
398 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (dis-
paraging an approach to class certification that reflects “the model of the central plan-
ner”); Burbank, supra note 7, at 1733 (noting that the perception that the institutional 
judiciary’s position on proposed legislation, even though supposedly based on neutral 
principle, is in fact based on ideological considerations causes the judiciary to “incur 
the same costs as if it were actually participating on the merits of such debate”); id. at 
1734 n.254 (arguing that the judiciary should provide data to Congress without ad-
vancing an argument about the “‘proper’ role of the federal courts”); Lee & Willging, 
supra note 26, at 1732 (“The judiciary’s concerns about caseload were balanced by its 
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would hardly be surprising that, once the occasion for attempted insti-
tutional unity had passed, both a more capacious view of institutional 
interest and divergent views about the requirements of federalism 
found powerful voices.399
CONCLUSION
The view one takes of a statute that was enacted three years ago is 
necessarily preliminary, at least in some dimensions.  Mindful of the 
ease with which a federal statute’s “antecedent period of travail”400 can 
be forgotten, it seemed to me useful to record here some of the his-
tory that may illuminate an appreciation, if not the interpretation, of 
what is, after all, a major piece of federal legislation. 
Unfortunately, although the statute’s studied ambiguity on critical 
questions has already generated a great deal of litigation, the extent of 
its impact on the “happy relation of States to Nation”401 remains un-
clear and likely will be for a long time to come.  So too does its impact 
on the general quality of justice in the federal courts, although the 
Federal Judicial Center’s empirical studies should provide a basis for 
judgment on some dimensions of that question.402
The hypocrisy and ambiguity underlying and infecting CAFA are 
especially vexing for one who, although informed by the political sci-
ence literature on judicial behavior, has an abiding faith in the federal 
judiciary to prefer law to ideology when the law is clear.  Nonetheless, 
I doubt that the federal judiciary will bring about a regulatory void—
own interest in finding solutions to the problems associated with multiple and over-
lapping class action litigation in the state and federal courts.”).  As I have previously 
observed, 
[A]lthough the breakdown of the congressional committee system and the 
other forces that have led to the dominance of party influence and party dis-
cipline in legislative politics help to explain why members of Congress might 
in fact regard the judiciary as just another interest group, we all suffer when it 
is so regarded. 
Burbank, supra note 7, at 1741. 
399 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1589-90 (“[T]he insignificance of 
the factor representing docket pressure indicates that judges are not resisting CAFA 
merely because of a heavy workload.”); see also supra text accompanying note 393 (not-
ing the possible inadequacy of judicial resources). 
400 George H. Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. REV. 504, 504 (1935). 
401 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2.  For the importance of looking to 
the impact of CAFA on state courts, see supra text accompanying note 14. 
402 For a description of the FJC’s ongoing work, see Lee & Willging, supra note 26, 
at 1743 (describing Phases II and III of the FJC study). 
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the fondest hope of some of CAFA’s supporters—in those cases where 
the argument in favor of federal jurisdiction is strongest.  Indeed, 
mindful of the impact that politics (through judicial selection) has 
had on forum preference for class actions, viewed from the perspec-
tive of either the federal or the state courts, it seems possible that 
CAFA’s supporters, too, may come to regret the extent of their success 
in opening access to federal court.403  That does not allay, however, the 
concerns that arise from considering the likely fate of cases for which 
the argument in favor of federal jurisdiction reduces to the fictions of 
corporate citizenship and the gathering powers of federal courts. 
At the end of the day, CAFA’s exceedingly narrow exceptions are 
revealed as another depressing example of legislative overreaching by 
those who invoke the virtues of federalism when it is convenient to do 
so.404  There is no need, and no good reason, to await experience un-
der the statute, much of which, for years, will consist of jurisdictional 
litigation that lacks any social utility.  CAFA’s exceptions should be 
amended now to restore the balance of power between plaintiffs and 
defendants in class actions where a state’s interest in regulation 
through litigation is intense and where the argument for federal ju-
risdiction relies on the fictions of corporate citizenship and the gath-
ering powers of federal courts.  One way to do that would be to add 
exceptions that allow putative class actions composed predominantly 
of in-state citizens and putative class actions alleging in-state injury to 
person or property to remain in state court if they would remain there 
under the default regime.405  Yet, it would seem a shame to compound 
403 See Marcus, supra note 26, at 1769 (“There is no particular reason to assume the 
enduring attractiveness for business interests of federal courts’, compared to state 
courts’, views on class certification and related matters . . . .”); id. at 1789 (suggesting 
that CAFA may in the long run benefit plaintiffs, rather than defendants). 
404 See Purcell, supra note 5, at 1871 (“CAFA inspired an astonishing reversal in the 
attitude of conservatives and Republicans toward the state courts.”).  To the extent, 
however, that indignation on this score has a partisan element, it should be tempered 
by Professor Pfander’s account of legislation proposed by Senator Tydings in 1969 
“that broadly authorized the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over consumer class 
actions based on state law.”  Pfander, supra note 203, at 1445.  As Pfander observes, the 
“apparent purpose of the legislation was . . . to shift consumer class actions into federal 
court to secure the application of what were then perceived as the more liberal joinder 
provisions of Rule 23.”  Id. at 1446.  Moreover, the proposed legislation died in part 
because of the “concerted opposition of the very business groups that were later to 
support the adoption of CAFA.”  Id. at 1446-47. 
405 This appears to have been the approach of the Federal-State Jurisdiction 
Committee of the Judicial Conference: 
In that context, this Committee endorsed an approach that it believes will pre-
serve a greater role for the state courts than the role contemplated in the pre-
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the waste of litigation fostered by jurisdictional provisions that are 
keyed to the number of citizens in a putative class.  Moreover, citizen-
ship ratios themselves do not reliably signal state interest.  For those 
reasons, in a regime of minimal diversity that acknowledged the power 
of fictions to thwart legitimate state interests, it might make more 
sense to confine the additional exception to any putative class action 
seeking recovery only on behalf of those alleging in-state injury to per-
son or property as a result of the activities of the defendant—without 
regard to the citizenship of either plaintiffs or defendants.  Such a 
provision would have the additional value of dispensing with some of 
the more troublesome maneuvers by which plaintiffs can defeat re-
moval in the default regime, notably through joinder of a nondiverse 
defendant.406  The contemplated amendments to CAFA should also 
eliminate provisions in existing exceptions that are designed to enable 
federal court management of overlapping class actions, but which 
might result in recrudescence in federal court of some of the state 
court abuses that CAFA sought to eliminate.  Finally, Congress should 
consider whether, in light of scholarship discussing targeted jurisdic-
tional policy,407 amendments to the Anti-Injunction Act are necessary 
to give the federal courts what they really need. 
vious legislative proposals.  That approach would create new exceptions to any 
class action legislative proposal relying on minimal diversity jurisdiction.  
Those exceptions would preclude the use of minimal diversity where (1) sub-
stantially all members of the class are citizens of a single state, or (2) the 
claims arise from death, personal injury, or physical property damage within 
the state. 
AGENDA E-9 ADDENDUM, supra note 299, at 5.  The Committee observed that its pro-
posed approach “would leave the determination of the citizenship of the defendants, 
and the satisfaction of the complete diversity requirement, to be made in accordance 
with current jurisdictional rules.”  Id. at 5 n.9.  See supra text accompanying note 299 
(discussing the history of this proposal). 
406 See supra text accompanying note 356.  The provision would also eliminate 
whatever room remained (under the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee’s proposal), 
if any, for forum shopping facilitated by general doing-business jurisdiction. 
407 See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1949-52 (arguing that CAFA is ani-
mated by a different, more targeted, policy of federal jurisdiction from the policy of 
diversity jurisdiction implemented in Erie’s progeny); Wolff, supra note 27, at 2069-72 
(noting that CAFA provides federal jurisdiction in cases that may lead to “broad com-
mercial harms” or a decrease in confidence in the judicial system and, for these rea-
sons, may fall within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act in certain cases); supra
note 287 (advocating careful consideration of “jurisdictional” policy in interpreting the 
“in aid of jurisdiction” exception under the Anti-Injunction Act).
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APPENDIX
Table 1:  State Adoptions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
This table contains information on state adoptions of the 1966 amendments to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The first four sections contain states not 
adopting the rule or for which a date could not be found.  The remaining sec-
tions are organized in chronological order. 
State and Year Description 
States Without Class Action (2)
Mississippi408   
Virginia409
States Retaining a Rule Not Derived from the Federal Rule (3) 
California “California’s operative general class action stat-
ute . . . was enacted in 1872 as part of California’s 
Field Code and has remained essentially un-
changed.”410  However, “California class action juris-
prudence embraces and synthesizes Rule 23 and its 
jurisprudence.” 411
Nebraska Still retains the “procedural statutes based on the 
Field Code of 1849.” 412
408 See Don Barrett & Alfred H. Davidson IV, Mississippi, in STATE LAWS SUBCOMM.
OF THE CLASS ACTIONS AND DERIVATIVE SUITS COMM., ABA, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS 
ACTION LAW 2007–2008, at 379, 379 (Dennis K. Egan et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
ABA, SURVEY] (“The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure contain no section permitting 
class actions.”).  For partial alternatives to class actions in states that do not follow Fed-
eral Rule 23, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes:  
Differences from—and Lessons for?—Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008) (manuscript at 102-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090554. 
409 See Dale W. Pittman, Virginia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 711, 711. 
410 Elizabeth J. Cabraser et al., California, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 55, 56. 
411 Id. at 76. 
412 Edward D. Hotz & Shawna D. Peterson, Nebraska, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 
408, at 417, 417. 
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State and Year Description 
Wisconsin Rule includes only the concepts of numerosity and 
commonality and states them in the disjunctive.413
Interpretations of the Federal Rule are nevertheless 
persuasive.414
States Retaining the 1938 Version of the Federal Rule (1) 
North Carolina415
States Adopting the 1966 Federal Rule for Which a Date Could Not Be Found (2) 
Connecticut
Maine
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1966–1971 (11)416
Arizona (1966)417
Minnesota (1967) Rule adopted 1951, amended 1967, and revised 
1988.418  The Minnesota Supreme Court indicated in 
1972 that “the first two requisites” of the rule had 
been met in a case.419  Since the 1938 Federal Rule 
divided class actions into types instead of providing 
a list of prerequisites, it can be assumed that the 
1967 amendment was the conforming amendment. 
413 See Charles H. Barr & Dennis K. Egan, Wisconsin, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 
408, at 743, 743 (“[U]nlike the federal rule, the Wisconsin rule does not explicitly ad-
dress typicality, adequate representation, predominance or superiority.”). 
414 Id. at 743-44. 
415 See Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 354 S.E.2d 459, 463 (N.C. 1987) (discuss-
ing the North Carolina legislature’s explicit adoption in 1967 of a rule similar to the 
1938 version of the Federal Rule, despite the 1966 federal amendments). 
416 There are three states (Colorado, Delaware, and Indiana) for which the date of 
adoption could be narrowed only to some time between 1966 and 1971.  Homburger 
indicates that these states had adopted the revisions sometime before publication of 
his article.  See Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 631 n.133 (1971) (listing states modeling their class action procedures after 
the 1966 Federal Rule). 
417 See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 23 state bar committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (referring 
readers to the “official comment of the federal advisory committee . . . on the change 
in Federal Rule 23”). 
418 MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.01 credits (West 2006). 
419 Klicker v. State, 197 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1972). 
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State and Year Description 
Montana (1967)420
Washington (1967)421
Kansas (1969)422
Kentucky (eff. 1969) Amendment history indicates that Kentucky’s civil 
procedure rule was adopted in 1953 and later 
amended effective 1969 and 1978.423  Homburger 
indicates it had been amended to match the Federal 
Rule by 1971; thus, we can assume that the 1969 
amendment was the conforming amendment.424
New Jersey (eff. 1969) Rule was effective in 1969 and amended in1974 and 
subsequently.425  A New Jersey appellate court dis-
cussed the rule in 1972 and gave the 1966 federal 
amendments as the rule’s source.426
South Dakota (1969)427
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1970–1974 (12)428
North Dakota Adopted the 1966 Rule some time between 1971 and 
1973, but an exact date could not be obtained.429
North Dakota has since changed its (cont.)
420 See Paul C. Collins et al., Montana, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 399, 402 
(“Rule 23 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure was completely rewritten in 1967 to 
adopt the language of the federal rule.”). 
421 See Stephen M. Rummage & Fred B. Burnside, Washington, in ABA, SURVEY, su-
pra note 408, at 715, 715-16 (noting that Washington adopted its class action rule, 
which is identical to the Federal Rule, in 1967). 
422 Order Amending and Supplementing Certain Provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 203 Kan. LXII, LXXIV-LXXV (1969). 
423 KY. R. CIV. P. 23.01 credits (West 2007). 
424 See Homburger, supra note 416, at 631 n.133. 
425 N.J. CT. R. 4:32-2 note (West 2008). 
426 See Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 287 A.2d 736, 737 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972). 
427 See Order No. 2, In re Amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 83 S.D. xi, 
xvii-xx (1969). 
428 The categories (1966–1971 and 1970–1974) overlap the years 1970 and 1971 
because three states cannot be confidently dated between 1966 and 1971.  See supra
note 416. 
429 Homburger indicates that North Dakota retained the 1938 Rule in 1971.  Hom-
burger, supra note 416, at 626 n.94.  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in 
1973, labeled Federal Rule 23 as identical to North Dakota Rule 23.  Horst v. Guy, 211 
N.W.2d 723, 726 (N.D. 1973). 
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State and Year Description 
North Dakota (cont.) rule to adopt the Uniform Class Actions Act,430 as 
has Iowa (though Iowa did not adopt the 1966 revi-
sions in the interim).431  It appears that the Uniform 
Act was largely inspired by the 1966 Rule,432 and 
these two states are thus included as adopters. 
Ohio (eff. 1970)433   
Nevada (1971)434
Tennessee (eff. 1971)435   
Utah (1971)436   
Vermont (1971) Original undated reporter’s note calls this rule 
“identical to Federal Rule 23.”437  Later code compi-
lation states that Vermont’s rules of civil procedure 
were first promulgated in 1971.438
Wyoming (1971)439
430 See Ronald H. McLean & Jane L. Dynes, North Dakota, in ABA, SURVEY, supra
note 408, at 491, 491. 
431 See C. Carleton Frederici, Iowa, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 237, 238. 
432 See id. (“The author believes that the drafters of the Uniform Act took the 1966 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the case law interpreting and deciding various issues . . . and 
tried to codify what they thought were the best decisions . . . .”). 
433 See Barbara Quinn Smith, Ohio, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 515, 517, 538 
(noting that sections (a), (b), and (c) of the Federal Rule and the Ohio Rule are iden-
tical, and that the Ohio Rule went into effect in 1970). 
434 See NEV. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2007) (stating that the Nevada 
rule was revised in 1971 to match the 1966 federal change). 
435 See Martha S.L. Black, Class Actions Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, 46 TENN. L. REV. 556, 558 (1979) (explaining that Tennessee changed its class ac-
tion rule, in 1971, to be “substantially identical” to Federal Rule 23 “in most respects”). 
436 UTAH R. CIV. P. 23 note (Lexis 2007) (stating that Utah’s class action rule was 
amended in 1971). 
437 VT. R. CIV. P. 23 reporter’s notes (2000). 
438 See James S. Holden, Foreword to Vermont Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure and 
District Court Civil Rules, in VT. STAT. ANN., at ix, ix (2000). 
439 See Patrick R. Day, Wyoming, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 751, 755 (“Wyo-
ming’s current class action rule . . . has not been amended since 1971 when it was 
adopted as a counterpart to the original federal rule [sic].”). 
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State and Year Description 
Hawaii (1972) Original rule adopted in 1954, amended in 1972, 
and further amended in 1999.440  Since the Hawaii 
Supreme Court used language consistent with the 
1966 Federal Rule in 1978, 1972 must be the con-
forming amendment.441
Missouri (1972)442   
Alabama (1973)443   
Massachusetts (1973)444   
Oregon (1973)445   
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1975–1979 (9) 
Idaho (1975)446   
Louisiana (1975) Originally adopted a pared-down version of the 
1938 Rule, permitting only “true” class actions.447
The Louisiana Supreme Court chafed under this 
restriction, judicially expanding the scope of class 
actions over several decades.448  The first explicit use 
of federal precedent was in 1975.449  The Louisiana 
legislature revised the rule in 1997 to match the 
Federal Rule.450
440 HAW. R. CIV. P. 23 history (LexisNexis 2007). 
441 See Life of the Land v. Burns, 580 P.2d 405, 410 n.6 (Haw. 1978). 
442 See MO. R. CIV. P. 52.08 committee’s note 1974 (2007) (“This is the same as 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); id. credits (West 2007) (identifying 
1972 as the year of adoption). 
443 See ALA. R. CIV. P. 23 committee’s comments on 1973 adoption (2007) (paral-
leling the advisory committee’s note to the Federal Rule). 
444 See MASS. R. CIV. P. 23 reporter’s notes—1973 (2007). 
445 See Bernard v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., 550 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Or. 1976) (stating 
that Oregon enacted a modified version of Federal Rule 23 in 1973). 
446 See IDAHO R. CIV. P. 23 credits (2007). 
447 Donald C. Massey et al., Curtailing the Tidal Surge:  Current Reforms in Louisiana 
Class Action Law, 44 LOY. L. REV. 7, 37 (1998) (explaining that only “true” class actions 
were allowed prior to a 1975 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court). 
448 See id. at 43 (“Within a ten-year period, the Louisiana Supreme Court effectively 
repealed Louisiana’s restrictive class action statute, judicially enacted the broader fed-
eral rule, and extended its application to the mass tort arena . . . .”). 
449 See id. at 37-38 (discussing Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees, 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 
1975)).
450 Act of July 1, 1997, No. 839, 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1389 (West). 
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State and Year Description 
New York (1975)451   
Alaska (1976)452    
Illinois (1977)453   
Pennsylvania (1977)454   
Texas (1977)455   
New Mexico (1978) Although the rule adopted in 1978 was similar to 
the 1966 Federal Rule, virtually no class actions were 
filed in New Mexico prior to July 1, 1995, when the 
rule was again revised to match the Federal Rule.456
Oklahoma (1978)457   
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1980–1984 (5) 
Florida (1980)458   
Iowa (1980)459 Has adopted the Uniform Class Actions Act.460
Michigan (1983)461   
451 Act of June 17, 1975, ch. 207, 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws 313 (McKinney). 
452 Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 258 (Oct. 15, 1976) (on file with author). 
453 See Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Inc., 574 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (noting that the Illinois class action rule was adopted in 1977 and patterned af-
ter the Federal Rule). 
454 See PA. R. CIV. P. 1701 credits (West 2007). 
455 See Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (“The 1977 
amendment to [Texas Rule of Civil Procedure] 42 was patterned after [Federal Rule] 
23 with little change.”). 
456 See Marte D. Lightstone, New Mexico, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 455, 
455-57. 
457 Act of Apr. 29, 1978, ch. 245, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws. 644.
458 See The Florida Bar, In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 168-70 
(1980) (creating a new class action rule based on Federal Rule 23). 
459 Frederici, supra note 431, at 238 (stating that Iowa enacted the Uniform Class 
Actions Act in 1980). 
460 See supra note 432 and accompanying text (suggesting that the drafters of the 
Uniform Class Actions Act looked to Federal Rule 23 for guidelines). 
461 See Dennis K. Egan, Michigan, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 345, 345 (ex-
plaining that Michigan’s class action rule was overhauled in 1983 to substantially match 
the Federal Rule). 
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State and Year Description 
New Hampshire (1983)462
Maryland (1984)463   
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1985–1989 (1) 
South Carolina (1985)464
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1990–1994 (2)
Arkansas (1990) Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a new class action 
rule in 1979 that replaced an earlier statute that was 
based on the idea of virtual representation.465  Much 
of the 1979 rule was a “verbatim reiteration” of the 
previous statute,466 and the court initially put sub-
stantial weight on the fact that the legislature had 
not adopted the Federal Rule for class actions de-
spite adopting a number of other federal rules.467
The rule was narrowly construed until about 1988, 
when the court found “the spirit of the federal rule” 
present in the state rule.468  Since the court seems to 
have adopted the Federal Rule wholesale in 1990, 
that is used as the effective date.469
Rhode Island (1991)470   
462 N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 27-A history (LexisNexis 2007). 
463 See John Parker Sweeney & Matthew T. Wagman, Maryland, in ABA, SURVEY,
supra note 408, at 311, 311 (“In 1984 Maryland adopted a version of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as its own class action rule . . . .”). 
464 B. Randall Dong, South Carolina, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 623, 623-24. 
465 Kenneth S. Gould, New Wine in an Old Bottle—Arkansas’s Liberalized Class Action 
Procedure—A Boon to the Consumer Class Action?, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 2 (1994). 
466 Id. at 8. 
467 Id. (discussing Drew v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 610 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1981)). 
468 Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 747 S.W.2d 81, 
86 (Ark. 1988). 
469 In re Changes to the Ark. Rules of Civil Procedure, 304 Ark. 733, 738-41 (1990). 
470 Paul V. Curcio, Rhode Island, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 611, 611 (label-
ing the Rhode Island rule, as a result of its 1991 amendments, “nearly identical” to the 
Federal Rule). 
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State and Year Description 
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1995–1999 (1)
West Virginia (1998) Used a variation of the 1938 rule until 1998.471  Nev-
ertheless, courts occasionally used elements of the 
revised Federal Rule before 1998 in determining 
whether to certify a class.472
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 2000–2004 (1)
Georgia (2003) The state has only recently adopted the 1966 revi-
sions, 473 though the ABA Survey indicates that they 
had effectively adopted the rule previously.474  How-
ever, there is not a lot of case law and much of it is 
from after 2000.
471 See Joseph Beeson, West Virginia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 735, 735 
(“Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted on April 6, 1998, is 
essentially identical to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). 
472 Id. at 739 (identifying the West Virginia factor test, which is similar to the fed-
eral factor test, in class certification decisions). 
473 Act of June 4, 2003, § 3, 2003 Ga. Laws 820. 
474 See Kevin A. Maxim, Georgia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 165, 165 (“[I]n 
practice Georgia parties litigated class action issues as if the standardized text had been 
implemented years [prior to 2003].”). 
